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I may be arrested 
I may be hit 
I may not even 
Have something to eat 
But I won't change my opinion 
I won't ever move from this hill. 
If there is no water 
I'll dig myself a well 
If there is no meat 
I'll buy a bone 
And put it in the soup -
I'll get on, I'll get on. 
They can say what they like 
Here, I don't have to pay rent 
If I die tomorrow morning 
I'm very near the sky! 
From 0 piniao 
a favela song from Brazil 
by Ze Keti and sung by 
Nara Leao 
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Foreword 
If today was a typical day in Seoul, the population probably 
jumped another one thousand persons. That doesn't sound too 
much until one starts calculating yearly increases. And similar 
rates are being experienced in many of the world's major cities. 
Much of this increase is from the apparently never-ending influx 
of migrants from the countryside. Unfortunately, despite the 
enormity of the increase and the problems it brings, we know all 
too little of its dimensions and the nature of the migrant, his wants 
and what he has to offer. 
The problem of the migrant, already much discussed, was one 
of many issues highlighted in 1967 when the Centennial Study and 
Training Programme on Metropolitan Problems was organized to 
enable the world's major metropolitan areas to exchange experi-
ences in a search for solutions to their problems. 
One of the more important conclusions of the Centennial Pro-
gramme was that we are going about solving our problems in a 
way that is often irrelevant and not leading to action. It was in 
response to this need that INTERMET emerged. 
INTERMET is a world-wide network linking more than 40 study 
groups in major metropolitan areas. In turn, each study group 
brings together elected and appointed officials from all of govern-
ment, professionals, academics, businessmen, civic leaders, and 
other concerned citizens, all sharing a belief in the multi-interest 
approach to urban problems. INTERMET is policy oriented, focus-
sing upon research-action projects. Throughout any one project, 
the emphasis is upon the sharing in a continuing process, that takes 
the group, as a group, through the research phases, to policy 
development and implementation and back to further adjustment 
following evaluation. This sharing is carried out both within the 
group and between groups. 
The project on Rural-Urban Migrants is the flrst to be developed 
by INTERMET and has served as a model for the development of 
other projects that have followed. It owes much to the leadership, 
sensitivity and experience of Dr. Aprodicio A. laquian, INTERMET's 
Director of Research. In keeping with the INTERMET approach, the 
research design was developed through correspondence with the 
group leadership and finalized at a meeting of the group leaders 
in Manila in June 1970. For this meeting, a set of monographs 
was prepared, by the groups, on the current migrant situation in 
their respective cities. The monographs were later revised and 
extended and are now presented here with further analytical 
materials by Dr. Laquian, as the first written contribution of this 
project for a further understanding of the migrant. 
Other documents will follow as the project proceeds. However, 
while in no way down playing these publications, it must be said 
that a far greater contribution is being made to the resolution of 
the problem at hand. This involves the build-up of a wealth of 
understanding on the part of the policy-makers, a sharing of this 
policy making process with others, and a greater commitment to 
action, with continuing involvement throughout the project, on the 
part of both the public and private sectors. 
It is on behalf of all involved in this project that I express our 
hope that this approach will help alleviate the plight of the migrant 
and contribute to a greater understanding as to how all may help 





A study such as this which covers eight metropolitan areas all 
over the world and spans a couple of years can only be the result 
of the combined efforts of many people. To all those who are, or 
have been involved in this INTERMET Study of "Rural Urban 
Migrants and Metropolitan Development," go our heartfelt thanks. 
The Study Groups in the metropolitan areas included in this 
study are the main sources of ideas, support and information. 
Without them, it would be impossible to do this study. Special 
mention, however, must be made of the heads of the Study Groups, 
who are: Purnaman Natakusumah, Director, Perwakilan Jawa 
Barat, Lembaga Administrasi Negara, Bandung; Pedro Sosa Franco, 
Jefe, Division Planes Sectoriales y Zonales, Oficina Municipal de 
Planeamiento Urbano, and Professor, Faculty of Architecture and 
Town Planning, Universidad Central de Venezuela, Caracas; 
Adebayo Adedeji, Director, Institute of Administration, Uni-
versity of lfe, Ibadan; Kemal Ahmet Aru, Dean, Faculty of Archi-
tecture and Chairman, Department and Institute of Town Planning, 
Technical University of Istanbul, Istanbul; Agoes Salim, Director, 
Department of National Unity, Government of Malaysia, Kuala 
Lumpur; Julio Cotler, Professor, lnstituto de Estudios Peruanos, Lima; 
Leandro A. Viloria, Director, Institute of Planning, University of the 
Philippines, Manila; and Chung-Hyun Ro, Director, Institute of 
Urban Studies and Development, Yonsei University, Seoul. 
Most of the papers included here were presented at the Manila 
Seminar-Meeting held in June 1970. The Manila Study Group is 
to be thanked for hosting the meeting and making arrangements 
for the seminar. Aside from Dr. Viloria, others who helped make 
the seminar-meeting possible are: Dean Carlos P. Ramos, Vice 
President, University of the Philippines; Dr. Rauf P. de Guzman, 
Director, Local Government Center, University of the Philippines; 
and the following staff members of the University: Lita Velmonte, 
Esmeraldo Canonizado, Dolores Endriga, Fred Silao, Tito Firmalino, 
Gerry Calabia, Jose Valdecanas and others. 
Senator Helena Z. Benitez, Chairman of the Committee on 
Housing, Urban Development and Resettlement of the Senate of 
the Philippines opened the Manila Seminar with a thought-pro-
voking keynote speech on the role of technocrats in national urban 
policy making. For this, and other support she gave the Seminar, 
we are extremely grateful. 
During the Manila meeting, the participants had an opportunity 
to visit the community of Slip-Zero, in Tondo. We are sure that the 
participants as well as INTERMET and the Council for Regional 
Development Studies of the University of the Philippines, share our 
gratitude to the people of Slip-Zero for their hospitality in accept-
ing us into their community. Thanks are also due to Richard Poethig, 
for arranging the visit. 
A seminar-meeting involving people from foreign and Philip-
pine cities entailed a great deal of expense. We acknowledge 
with thanks, therefore, the assistance of The Asia Foundation, in 
funding some of the seminar expenses. Special thanks are due to 
Mr. Louis Lazaroff, Programmes Officer, in the San Francisco office; 
Mr. William Evans, representative in Manila; Mr. John Bannigan, 
representative in Seoul; and Mr. John Sutter, representative, Kuala 
Lumpur. 
In the difficult task of editing, rewriting and rechecking of facts 
contained in the metropolitan area papers, several colleagues 
have been most helpful. Professor John F. C. Turner of Massa-
chusetts Institute of Technology proposed major revisions in some 
sections of the manuscript and provided recent survey data on 
Lima. Professor William A. Withington of the University of Ken-
tucky read the chapter on Bandung and kindly suggested specific 
changes. Mr. Solomon 0. Tokun, Chief Town Planning Officer of 
the Ministry of Lands and Housing in Nigeria, read the draft on 
the Ibadan chapter and made some suggestions on how it can be 
improved. Mr. Gregory Pai of the Institute of Urban Studies and 
Development at Yonsei University made data available and read 
the draft chapter on Seoul. To the persons mentioned above and 
others who have helped in putting the manuscripts in order, the 
Editor is eternally grateful. 
Additional digging for data, organization of the bibliography, 
proof-reading, and translating are only some of the tasks taken on 
by Miss Penny Dutton in the course of preparing this work. Without 
her dedicated assistance, cheery disposition and hard work, the 
job of publishing this monograph would have been much more 
difficult. Miss Linda S. Pabellano, who did the backbreaking job 
of typing, stencilling, mimeographing and near endless retyping 
of the manuscript is to be commended for an excellent job. Thanks 
are also due to Mrs. Geraldine Sharpe, who pulled strings and 
performed near magical feats in making sure that this work got 
done. 
The persons mentioned above, as well as many others, have 
contributed to the final shape of this monograph. Responsibility 
for errors of fact and interpretation, however, are mainly those 
of individual authors and the Editor. 
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THIS monograph is the initial result of an ongoing research 
project on rural-urban migrants and metropolitan development 
launched by the International Association for Metropolitan Research 
and Development (INTERMET) in November 1969. As conceived, 
the project is a comparative action-research venture designed to 
understand the problems associated with rural-urban migration 
and to seek ways and means of coping with these problems. 
The papers included in this work were written for the First 
Seminar-Meeting on Rural-Urban Migrants and Metropolitan 
Development held in Manila, Philippines on 22 to 26 June 1970. 
They portray the situation in eight metropolitan areas participating 
in this study in so far as internal migration and resulting slum and 
squatter conditions are concerned. These metropolitan areas are: 
Bandung, Indonesia; Caracas, Venezuela; Ibadan, Nigeria; Istan-
bul, Turkey; Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia; Lima, Peru; Manila, Philip-
pines; and Seoul, Korea. 
The Manila Seminar-Meeting was convened by INTERMET 
and COREDES (the Council on Regional Development Studies, Uni-
versity of the Philippines) with the following purpose in mind: "To 
exchange information, ideas and experiences on the nature and 
extent of rural-urban migration and how the problems posed by 
rural-urban migrants are met in the participating countries." The 
papers presented in this Seminar-Meeting were written as "base-
line studies" designed to give an initial description of the migrant 
situation in the cooperating cities. Since they were prepared before 
the making of primary surveys (which is going on at this time of 
writing), the papers had to rely on secondary data from sources 
such as the census, previous surveys, academic studies, govern-
ment reports, official metropolitan plans, etc. The goal in writing 
the papers was to present a comprehensive picture of the past 
and present situations in the participating cities, including such 
things as the historical background of the city, the process of 
internal migration, factors that have influenced migration, the 
geographical and political distribution of migrants in the urban 
landscape, the problems posed by migrants, governmental and 
non-governmental solutions to problems, etc. 
To allow for some comparability in the papers presented, a 
common outline was used by the authors. As much as possible, the 
authors were also asked to stick to common concepts, approaches 
and terminologies which were included in a research design for 
the larger project sent to them in advance. Because of the variety 
and richness of the experiences in the cooperating metropolitan 
areas, however, it is only natural that some aspects of the common 
outline were emphasized in some cities and not in others. In some 
cases, also, lack of data made it difficult to pursue certain subjects 
which would have added more substance to the present work. 
The INTERMET Study 
Previous studies of urbanization indicate that a large part of 
the rapid growth of metropolitan areas in developing countries 
seems to be due to internal migration. Migrants provide much of 
the energy and many of the problems that confront large cities in 
the developing countries. It is known, for example, that one of 
the most serious results of rural-urban migration is the growth of 
squatter and slum communities. It is on this basis that INTERMET 
has decided to initiate a study focused on such communities. Of 
course, not all squatters and slum dwellers are migrants and not 
all migrants become squatters and slum dwellers. This study, 
therefore, is concerned with a narrower sample of people who are 
migrants and at the same time squatters and slum dwellers. 
The key question to which the INTERMET study addresses 
itself is the developmental role of slum and squatter communities 
occupied mainly by migrants to the metropolis. Development, in 
this sense, is thought of in terms of economic and social com-
ponents. As far as economic development is concerned, the study 
takes the conventional meaning of increase in goods and services 
produced and their just allocation among the members of a com-
munity. Social development, on the other hand, may be defined 
in terms of (a) social stability or the absence of disruptive events 
such as revolutions, riots and other disturbances in the metro-
politan area; (b) social and political participation in community, 
city and national affairs; (c) integration of new members of the 
society to the social body; and (d) openness of the society to new 
ideas and influences and its capacity to adapt to new things. 
By developmental role of migrants, especially those who live 
as squatters and slum dwellers, is meant the extent to which they 
contribute to the achievement of the economic and social condi-
tions mentioned above. In effect, therefore, a measure of whether 
migrants are developmental or not is the difference between their 
contributions to development and the weight of their non-develop-
mental activities. Migrants may contribute something to develop-
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ment but they may also block it. They represent resources but 
they also bring about many problems that the urban community 
has to solve if it is to develop and grow. 
The literature on migrants, squatters and slum dwellers is 
full of generalizations related to the extent to which such people 
contribute or do not contribute to the development of the metro-
politan area and the country as a whole. The INTERMET study 
tries to re-examine most of these generalizations in the light of 
conditions in eight metropolitan areas. Specific questions with 
which the project is concerned include: 
a. Reasons behind rural-urban migration. It is commonly 
assumed that migrants are usually "pushed" from the countryside 
because of difficulties of life there, or "pulled" by the city because 
of promises of employment, education, amenities, or a better life. 
How true is this assumption in the light of the complex of motiva-
tions, kinship ties, economic opportunities, social pressures, wars 
and catastrophes, etc., which may enter into the making of a 
decision to migrate? 
b. Nature of the slum or squatter community. Much of the 
literature on slums and squatters is coloured by the Western bias 
which sees them as disorganized, conflict ridden, anti-social and 
characterized by alienation and anomie. On the other hand, some 
studies in developing countries are finding exactly opposite traits. 
It is important to know the nature of these communities because 
the effectiveness of measures to improve them depends on this 
knowledge. 
c. Functions served by the slum or squatter community. Closely 
related to the nature of the slum or squatter community is the 
question of what functions it performs. Is it a socialization agent 
that breeds criminals, juvenile delinquents, deviates and anti-social 
individuals or does it perform social and psychological control 
functions as well as act as an intermediary in a person's process 
of becoming urban? What economic functions does squatting and 
slum dwelling perform? How about social and political functions? 
d. Problems associated with slums or squatter communities. 
What problems are attributed to slums and squatters? How are 
these problems perceived by the government sector, private citi-
zens, and the squatters and slum dwellers themselves? What is 
the complex of factors that account for these problems? 
e. Solutions to problems. What have the government, the 
private sector, citizens and squatters and slum dwellers themselves 
done to solve problems arising from squatting and slum dwelling? 
What solutions are planned? What accounts for the success or 
failure of solutions? What can be done to optimize the chances of 
success in coping with such problems? 
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In general, the questions raised above point to one of the 
main hypotheses of the study, which is that measures designed to 
improve conditions in the slums and squatter areas will be effective 
only if they are derived from the true characteristics of such areas. 
This highlights the role of research in the project. Research must 
reveal the true nature of internal migration, squatting and slum 
dwelling. It must guide policy, in this way, in the same instance 
that the policy making and implementing processes contribute to 
it by making information available to researchers. 
As an action-research project, the INTERMET venture consists 
of several stages. The first of these is information gathering, where 
research plays a very large role. The INTERMET study groups in 
the participating cities are expected to collate and analyze data 
regarding the migrants, slum and squatter situation in their com-
munities. This involves the writing of baseline studies, making of 
intensive surveys and the writing up of such researches so as to 
make them available to policy makers. 
The second stage of the project is the translation of the study 
findings to specific policy proposals. In this regard, the composi-
tion of the INTERMET Study Groups in the cities is especially mean-
ingful. Each Study Group is made up of government officials, 
private citizens, professionals, academics, civic leaders and other 
persons concerned with metropolitan problems. Many of these 
Study Group members are personally involved in the formulation 
and implementation of policies and measures for improving the 
conditions of rural-urban migrants. This personal and even institu-
tional involvement fits beautifully into the "action-research" scheme. 
It assures the Study Group's access to information which feeds into 
research. It also makes it possible for research findings to be taken 
into consideration in the policy formulation and implementation 
processes. Finally, the Study Group may serve as an informal 
point of policy coordination where information on programmes 
is exchanged, the roles of governmental and non-governmental 
entities are clarified, and where the formal lines of authority 
involved in the coordination process are supplemented and some 
of the red tape inherent in prescribed procedures and methods is 
avoided. 
The division of the project activities into research and action 
components, however, is only meant for theoretical neatness. In 
reality, action and research are hopelessly intertwined and it 
would be extremely difficult to determine where one component 
begins and where another ends. This is, of course, due to the fact 
that we are dealing here with an ongoing process, which, hope-
fully, will lead to the improvement of conditions in communities 
occupied primarily by rural-urban migrants. 
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Participating Metropolitan Areas 
In accordance with the methodology used by INTERMET in 
all its study programmes, the inclusion of any one city in a pro-
gramme depends on what the Study Group in that city chooses to 
participate in. This decision is based on what the Study Group 
thinks is the most important problem in its metropolitan area. 
Most of the time, the decision is also strongly influenced by the 
subject matter interest of a number of Study Group members. Such 
interest may be along research or action lines or both. The Study 
Group may be eager to learn more about a particular metropolitan 
problem in order to do something about it. (For more on INTERMET 
and its programmes, see page 214). 
The metropolitan areas included in this study were chosen 
because of the expressed interest of Study Groups located in them 
in the problems arising from rural-urban migration, especially 
problems related to slums and squatters. First of all, the problem 
of migrants was of special concern to these Study Groups because 
their metropolitan areas were all confronted with it. In all of the 
metropolitan areas cooperating in this study, squatters and slum 
dwellers make up no less than a quarter of the metropolitan 
population. Though these people were the most obvious mani-
festations of the migrants' problem, there were also other problems 
that the Study Groups were interested in. 
As previously mentioned., the metropolitan areas cooperating 
in this study are Bandung, Caracas, Ibadan, Istanbul, Kuala 
Lumpur, Lima, Manila and Seoul. Though more is discussed about 
these cities in the chapters that follow, it may be useful at this 
point to describe them briefly. 
BANDUNG. The city of Bandung, with a population of 1.2 
million and an area of 8,098 hectares, is the third largest urban 
centre in Indonesia. It was founded in 1811 and incorporated as 
a municipality in 1906. It is primarily an administrative and 
political centre, being the capital of the Province of West Java, 
although it is also widely known as an educational centre and a 
tourist resort. This latter trait is due to Bandung's relatively mild 
climate, a result of its high elevation. As a regional centre, Ban-
dung attracts many migrants most of whom settle in rural-like 
kampongs or move on to the national capital of Djakarta, 185 
kilometers away. The latest estimate sets the slum and squatter 
population of Bandung at 27 per cent of the urban population. 
CARACAS. Venezuela's national capital was founded in 1567. 
The Caracas metropolitan area of 11,572 hectares is divided into 
the Distrito Federal and Distrito Sucre. It has a population of 2.1 
million which makes up 22.6 per cent of the total population of 
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Venezuela. As the country's largest metropolitan area, as well as 
its primary economic, social and political centre, Caracas has 
become the goal of many migrants. Many of these former campe-
sinos (farmers) have found themselves in the communities of 
ranchos (makeshift dwellings) that cluster on the valleys and hill-
sides of Caracas. Some 19.7 per cent of the total urbanized area 
in Caracas is occupied by ranchos and about a third of the popula-
tion is made up of squatters and slum dwellers. 
IBADAN. The Municipality of Metropolitan Ibadan is the 
second largest city in Nigeria, with an area of 2,298.5 square miles 
and a population of 1.2 million. In contrast with Lagos, the national 
capital, it is more of a traditional African city. It was formally 
founded in 1800 and incorporated in 1961. As in other African 
cities, the population of Ibadan has also been swelled by rural-
urban migrants who live in slum and squatter communities. 
Metropolitan Ibadan is dividj:!d into the city of Ibadan itself and 
six districts. The city itself, with a population of 627, 178 covers 
an area of only 40 square miles. 
ISTANBUL. The oldest city in this study, Istanbul, was founded 
in 685 B.C., almost simultaneously with the city of Troy. At present, 
it has a population of 2.3 million and an area of 1, 131 square 
kilometers. It is divided into the central city and 25 districts. The 
population of the city proper makes up about 80 per cent of the 
total metropolitan population. Slums and squatters, called gece-
kondus, are one of Istanbul's most serious problems, comprising 
33.9 per cent of the metropolitan population. 
KUALA LUMPUR. Kuala Lumpur is the capital of Malaysia. It 
has traditionally been a Chinese -dominated city. It was founded 
in 1859 and incorporated in 1896. Within its 355 square miles live 
some 782,824 people, about 8 per cent of the country's total popu-
lation. The racial and ethnic mix of Kuala Lumpur's population 
(Malay, 26.6 per cent; Chinese, 58.1; Indians, 11.5; and others, 
3.8), is an indicator of the problems and prospects of Malaysia's 
development. In many ways, what happens in the federal capital 
of Kuala Lumpur may determine what will happen in the nation 
as a whole. 
LIMA. Metropolitan Lima typifies the primacy so common 
among Latin American cities, with 20 per cent of Peruvians residing 
within it. It was founded in 1535 and has rapidly grown from 
the migration of people from the interior, many of whom populate 
the barriadas (shantytowns). As the country's capital and main 
seaport, Lima's attractive power is considerable, with the result 
that although it already has 2.5 million people, it still continues 
to grow. One problem arising from this massive growth is the 
political fragmentation of the Lima-Callao metropolitan area, which 
makes the provision of urban services quite difficult. 
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MANILA. Manila is a curious example of an Asian city with 
Latin American characteristics. It shares common traits of primacy, 
fragmentation and overpopulation with Latin American cities. 
Metropolitan Manila's 3.2 million people make up about nine per 
cent of the Philippine population. The city was founded in 1571 
and got its present city charter in 1901. Being an old city and the 
most important political and economic centre in the country 
(Quezon City, the national capital is within the Manila metropoli-
tan area), Manila has attracted many migrants, with the result 
that about a third of its population is now made up of squatters 
and slum dwellers. 
SEOUL. The Seoul Metropolitan Area, with its population of 
4.2 million is the largest city in this study. It ranks 22nd in a list 
of the largest metropolises in the world, although the central city 
of Seoul itself ranks 11th among large cities. The population of the 
Seoul metropolis constitutes close to 14 per cent of the national 
population. As an urban centre, Seoul City is old, having been 
founded in 304 A.D. It was the Korean War, however, which really 
caused the rapid expansion of the metropolitan area, a growth 
which has resulted in many problems, the most serious of which 
are squatting and slum dwelling. 
Comparing the eight metropolitan areas in this study, one 
need not go too far beyond the easily measurable aspects of 
population, land area, formal boundaries, etc., to consider some 
of the functions and roles that they play in their national settings. 
It is easily seen that all the metropolitan areas involved in this 
study are important national and/or regional centres. Five of the 
eight are national capitals while three are regionally important. 
It is interesting, therefore, to explore the particular roles of these 
urban centres in the economic, social and political development 
of the countries they are in. 
The phenomenon of primacy, so characteristic of cities in 
developing countries, is exemplified by the roles played by the 
metropolitan areas in this study. Within the Caracas metropolitan 
area resides 22.6 per cent of Venezuela's population. The pro-
portion is 20.0 per cent for Lima, 13.8 per cent for Seoul, 9.0 for 
Manila, 7.7 for Istanbul, and 7.6 per cent for Kuala Lumpur. All 
but two of the cities are the largest urban areas in their countries: 
Ibadan, which has 1.8 per cent of Nigeria's population, is second 
only to the capital, Lagos, and Bandung, with 1.09 per cent of 
Indonesia's population is the third largest city in the country. 
The primacy of most of the cities included in this study is 
shown further by comparing them to the second largest urban 
areas. The Lima-Callao metropolis is 2.5 million, while the next 
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largest city, Arequipa is only 180,366. Caracas has 1.8 million 
people while Maracaibo, the second largest city, has only 589, 103. 
Seoul, Manila, Istanbul and Kuala Lumpur are also dominant 
urban areas. The second largest cities to these centres are Pusan, 
with 1,425,703 as against Seoul's 4.1 million; Cebu, with 310,000 
as against Manila's 3.2 million; Ankara with 905,660 as against 
Istanbul's 1.7 million, and Penang (Georgetown) with 234,930 as 
against Kuala Lumpur's 782,824. 
Administratively and politically, all the metropolitan areas 
included in this study are "regionally unorganized." No one single 
governmental body has jurisdiction over the whole urbanized 
area, although certain area-wide authorities for specific services 
do exist. In fact, in some of the areas (Lima and Manila are 
notable examples), there is a tendency toward fragmentation of 
authority over urban government. In Lima, no less than 17 local 
government units exist in the metropolitan area while in Manila, 
21 such local units provide all sorts of competing urban services. 
Typically, most of the metropolitan areas in this study have 
densely populated urban cores where urban growth first began. 
In some instances, as in Seoul, the formal boundaries of the core 
city have been expanded as the population grew and moved to 
the peripheral areas. To date, 94.6 per cent of the population of 
metropolitan Seoul is living within the jurisdiction of the City of 
Seoul. Similarly, the boundaries of Bandung have been expanded, 
including more areas within the city's jurisdiction so that now, 
some 93.8 per cent of the metropolitan population resides within 
the city limits. 
In contrast, however, is the situation in Lima, Kuala Lumpur 
and Manila, where the city proper doesn't have as large a share 
of the metropolitan population and where the tendency for people 
to move to the periphery may actually be resulting in a slower 
growth rate for the city proper. The city of Lima only accounts for 
13.1 per cent of the metropolitan population. Kuala Lumpur and 
Manila's shares are 40.4 and 43.7 per cent respectively. In Manila, 
the city proper is now growing at only 1.8 per cent per year while 
the metropolitan area is growing at more than 4 per cent. 
The factors mentioned above: primacy, lack of regional 
organization, and slackening of growth in the city proper, are all 
somehow related to the problem of internal migration which is 
the main concern of this work. The effect of the dominance over 
national economic, social, political and administrative life played 
by the urban centres studied here is obvious: the cities serve as 
powerful magnets that draw people from the villages and lesser 
cities. 
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Anybody who has an ambition and a dream has to go to the 
great city to find his fortune. It matters little that the city, with its 
slums and squatters, offers misfortune as well. People just come, 
anyway. 
The rapidity of population growth is seen in the failure to 
adjust administrative and political structures to the realities of 
metropolitan life. Local government units suited for smaller 
populations still persist in areas where problems have multiplied 
and now call for joint and area-wide action. With jurisdictional 
conflicts and confusions, local units find it extremely difficult to 
provide necessary urban services. Service deterioration, on the 
other hand, attracts less desirable members of the population. 
Slums attract more slum dwellers, and the poorer the conditions 
in the slums, the poorer the people attracted there. 
A corollary of jurisdictional fragmentation is usually the 
deterioration of the city core. People who can afford to live in 
the suburbs usually move out of the city centre, especially if a 
good transportation system is available. Offices and entertainment 
places may continue to locate in the central city. However, resi-
dences in the central city become primarily occupied by the poor. 
The lowering of the tax base in the central city may result in 
poorer services, driving better people to the suburbs further. The 
deterioration of conditions in the city core, of course, attracts 
poorer people and the cycle gets tighter. With the city center 
denied the resources that go to the suburbs due to jurisdictional 
fragmentation, the result is only further deterioration. 
Metropolitan Development: a Problem and a Solution 
The continued influx of people to already large urban centres 
results in metropolitanization. The deterioration of the central 
city drives people, commerce and industry out to the periphery. 
At the same time, the high cost of lands in the city centre as well 
as the difficulties of transportation to and from the downtown area 
may contribute to this centripetal tendency. Finally, new migrants 
who became squatters and slum dwellers may temporarily or 
permanently occupy lands in the periphery. All these factors lead 
to the phenomenon of "urban sprawl," or the uncontrolled expan-
sion of the urban conurbation. 
The problems arising from this urban sprawl are obvious. The 
cost of extending services to all parts of the urban area goes up 
because of the wider territory covered. Transportation and com-
munication costs also rise. Finally, as peoples' activities involve 
the criss-crossing of political and administrative boundary lines, 
the responsibility for regulation and control of these activities gets 
diluted and becomes unclear, resulting in overlapping of govern-
mental activities, confusion and general maladministration. 
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As urban problems reach a metropolitan level, traditional 
ways and means of coping with them become increasingly inade-
quate. For example, the employment of land use controls, regula-
tions and by-laws becomes difficult with the blurring of territorial 
boundaries. In some rapidly growing metropolitan areas, attempts 
have been made to put peripheral squatter areas under control 
by expanding formal city boundary lines. The squatters, of course, 
merely uproot their shacks and locate once more in an area just 
outside the new boundary lines. Since the revision of formal 
boundaries is always a thorny political problem in most countries, 
the cities cannot resort to this too often. Besides, extension of 
formal boundaries to far flung areas increases the costs of services 
and strains the capacities of urban government. 
Even as metropolitanization poses many problems, however, 
it is also viewed as a possible way out of the dilemma that most 
urban areas are confronted with. In urban centres where people 
increasingly work in one place, live in another and pursue their 
leisure in still another, the formal political boundaries that used to 
divide the urban area into local government jurisdictions are 
becoming less and less meaningful. The expansion of urban life 
now means that activities carried out in one sector of the urban 
area will have repercussions in another, no matter how definitely 
drawn the boundary lines are. The need for area-wide solutions, 
therefore, of a metropolitan or even a region-wide character, 
is becoming more and more apparent. Such programmes as 
transportation (especially traffic control, rapid transit, multi -media 
transportation mixes, etc.), housing (including regulation and 
control of squatters and slum dwellers), education and welfare, 
and other services are proving more and more efficient and effec-
tive if handled on a region-wide scale. In this sense, therefore, 
metropolitan action is seen as a solution to urban problems. 
The INTERMET study, focusing as it does on rural-urban migra-
tion and its effects on metropolitan development, explores the 
advantages and disadvantages of metropolitan action in the pro-
grammes that hope to improve the situation in slum and squatter 
communities occupied primarily by migrants. It looks at the 
resources and problems that the migrants bring with them to the 
metropolitan area and tries to find out how they fit into the over-
all urban picture. From the other end, the study also looks at the 
resources and problems emanating from metropolitan action and 
tries to find out how they are integrated into the whole urban 
process. From these combinations, it is hoped that a truer picture 
of the relationships between internal migration, metropolitan 
action and the solving of urban problems would emerge. 
This study is planned to be completed in another two years. 
Within that period, intensive surveys in selected slums and squatter 
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communities in the participating cities will be conducted, a typology 
of slum and squatter communities world-wide will be worked out, 
specific case studies of how government and non-government 
entities cope with the migrants' problem will be written, and an 
international comparative study embodying all findings in the 
study will be prepared. This monograph, therefore, is only the 
first in a series of works which are expected to come out of the 
study. As an initial attempt, however, it is very important in that 
it provides the seeds for the larger things to come. 
Toronto, Canada 
20 January 1971 
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INTOLERABLE congestion, widespread famine and imminent 
environmental catastrophe are the frightening elements of the 
models frequently projected by planners, political leaders and 
scholars for the near and the more distant future of both the develop-
ing and the affluent nations. Governments and international bodies, 
therefore, are acting to "stop" the trend of what is often called 
the "population explosion". This is true, particularly in the develop-
ing countries where people are aspiring to achieve the better life 
now possible while low national productivity is hardly able to 
sustain the lives that better health and sanitation are saving.1 The 
city offers the fulfillment of aspirations. Consequently, waves of 
redundant rural populations migrate to the cities and metro-
politan areas in both worlds; and this universal migration affects 
decisively the settlement patterns of production and people and 
releases a chain of drastic social changes. 
Spontaneous Urbanization 
In the l 950's, 50 million people were being added to the 
world's total every year. At present, this rate of accumulation is 
70 million a year. It was in the l 930's, about 30 million a year 
but is expected to reach an annual rate of 125 million by the year 
2000. At that time, our planet may be inhabited by more than 
6 billion people. Two out of every three persons will most probably 
be urban dwellers. Thus a socially tolerable and economically 
This introduction is bosed in part on previous works of the author, especially "The 
Urban Crisis in the World," Urban Affairs Q·uarterly, Vol. 1, No. 1, (New York: Sage 
Publications, 1965); "The Urban Crisis: its Meaning for Development," United Nations 
Monthly Chronicle, New York: 1965; "Planning and Development of the Metropolitan 
Environment," in Simon Miles, ed., Metropolitan Problems: International Perspectives, 
(Toronto: Methuen Publications, 1970); and "Spontaneous Urbanization, the City-
Region and National Development,'' International Social Development Review, No. 2 
United Nations Publication, Sales No. E.70.IV.10. 
1 Notes start on page 185. 
viable urban environment will have to be erected in the next three 
decades for 13 times as many people as in the previous 150 years; 
and the rate of construction would have to average at least 40 
times that of the recent past - a task difficult to accomplish even 
for the highly industrialized countries but inconceivable with the 
resources and technology of the developing countries. As a result, 
conditions are rapidly declining in town and village in the develop-
ing countries as the gap between population growth and economic 
growth widens. 
The gross national product of some Latin American nations, for 
example, averages an increase of less than 2 per cent annually, 
and is greatly exceeded by the rate of urbanization and still more 
by the rate of growth of shanty towns. Similar conditions exist 
in the other developing continents. The resulting urbanization is 
always characterized by chronic underemployment, inadequate 
shelter and communal facilities, absence of safe water and sanita-
tion, increasing blight, and a growing rate of disease and mor-
tality. The rural migrant has in fact exchanged a marginal 
subsistence and the relative security of an extended rural family 
for urban living, defying the humblest concept of "decency". 
Seldom does his chosen community welcome him; nor do its 
institutions serve him willingly or well. 
The plight of the newcomer emerges clearly from this tersely 
worded news item from Mexico: "Seven thousand 'paratroopers' 
[squatters in the vernacular] occupied half-a-dozen tracts of land 
south of the harbour. The owners sought the help of federal troops 
to evict the invaders, but the authorities seem unable to act. 
Violence is feared - the 'paratroopers' are armed ... the news 
has reached neighbouring shops and communities that home sites 
can be acquired for 125 pesos. An 'office' was set up, funds 
collected from interested families and plots of 100 to 150 square 
meters staked out ... An avalanche of buyers appeared and 
overnight innumerable shacks and shanties sprang up where the 
earth was barren for many years."2 
A growing number of cities in the developing world now have 
squatter towns and shanties which already contain one quarter 
to one half of the population. Their existence is generally deplored 
but it is accepted as an inevitable corollary of development. 
Nevertheless, it demonstrates the determination of the migrant 
to claim for his family the "right to shelter" and shows his ability 
to build with little help. But this dynamic force has only infre-
quently been applied in partnership with government to promote 
orderly growth. Instead the "marginal man" has no choice but 
to squat and live without basic amenities because he cannot afford 
the "minimum standards" established by law and his adopted 
community cannot provide even the most elementary services to 
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settlements he is obliged to build illegally. He who needs it most 
is excluded by the law from aid by government. 
This, then, is the physical and social environment of the rural 
migrant's new settlement. Often, he is propelled out of a stone-age 
technology or feudal land tenure into an urban environment 
shaken by explosive transformation. He is truly the unsung hero of 
urbanization. But let us not accept his condition as the penalty 
to be paid for changing from underdevelopment to sustained 
national economic growth. Our society's economic, technological 
and human resources have reached such levels that no human 
being on earth should have to be ignorant and hungry, or live in 
blight and squalor. However, the millions of poor - black, old 
or white - found even in the most affluent countries underline the 
truth that human progress is not an automatic consequence of 
economic growth. To obtain it, a nation must allocate to human 
development an appropriate share of the wealth it produces, and 
plan for equitable distribution of the social benefits it can offer. 
But narrow economic considerations continue to withhold re5ources 
from being used for human development. Abstractions, such as 
"Gross National Product," "Per Capita Income", or "Per Capita 
Consumption", useful as they may be for certain international (or 
regional) comparisons, are meaningless in terms of the problems 
of given places and problems of given individuals, families and 
communities. 
The legitimate desire of the developing countries to improve 
conditions of life cannot be arrested. Consequently rural/urban 
migration cannot be turned off, or even less reversed. The question, 
then, is: How can national planning acknowledge this rapid trans-
formation from agricultural rural to urban industrial societies, so 
that it should aid development, rather than impede it? The 1968 
issue of the International Social Development Review3 surveyed 
the world urbanization process, the socio-economic conditions it 
creates, and the policies and plans devised by governments to 
cope with its consequences and causes. The survey shows that at 
the close of the first United Nations Development Decade (1970) the 
gravity and urgency of the urban crisis continues to receive 
secondary attention, and that preoccupation with the means of 
economic growth most probably will continue also during the 
second Development Decade. Nevertheless, recently, development 
economics has begun to change: improving the human condition 
is more widely believed to be necessary for an adequately bal-
anced and rapid economic growth. But the crucial importance of 
the city as the essential environment in which economic capacities 
are created or impeded and human qualities of life are enlarged or 
frustrated is not yet fully realized. The attitude of administrators 
and planners tends to remain complacent in spite of the fact 
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that most developing countries already appear to be "over-
urbanized", since their industries and related activities fail to 
employ productively the men and women who migrate to cities 
or the young people who reach the working age; and in some 
areas, conditions have reached levels which are bound to distort 
the course of projected development, delay economic growth and 
sometimes even reverse hard-earned economic and social gains. 
At the same time, less than tolerable urban conditions tend to 
aggravate racial and other social tensions causing violence, riots 
and "insurrection" in the slums of certain affluent countries. 
The fallacy of "laissez-faire" in urban affairs 
Most nations use 15 to 25 per cent of their resources invested 
in fixed capital formation for residential construction (not counting 
most of the building in squatter towns). Another 15 to 20 per cent 
goes into essential urban services. Thus, while a third to a half of 
these resources go into environmental development, no measur-
able impact is made on the urban crisis.4 Most development 
planners tend to neglect this huge investment area owing to the 
fact that, historically, it was only exceptionally that cities were 
planned. Their development just seemed to "happen" as the 
economy grew. The "laissez-faire" attitude in this vital area 
now persists in many countries only because a chronic shortage 
of housing has in turn diverted an unduly large share of family 
incomes into rents or the purchase of dwellings built wastefully 
and sited on "expensive" land "developed" through highly specu-
lative land operations. 
Urbanization, whether spontaneous or planned, is a phe-
nomenon of national development. In either case its effect on 
human and economic progress is profound. Economic and social 
factors have motivated rural/urban shifts in the past and they 
motivate them now. There are, however, fundamental differences 
between the two situations. The nineteenth century industrial 
revolution in Europe and North America, for example, proceeded 
at a relatively moderate pace. In the main, the market mechanism 
regulated economic growth. As cities expanded a new social 
structure emerged gradually, to be sure not without hardship and 
shock for the migrating peasant become industrial worker. People 
and factories were settling in the developed areas of the most 
advanced nations and world trade favoured their industries. Now, 
the rush to the capitals and metropolises of Africa, Asia and Latin 
America is most intensive, massive and rapid in countries whose 
natural resources remain underdeveloped and their man-made 
counterparts - the economic and technological resources and skills 
- are insufficient. Now, the terms of trade are highly adverse to 
the developing nations: an ever increasing quantity of their 
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primary products buy now a diminishing volume of capital, equip-
ment and other essential imports.5 These differences are increasing. 
In the highly developed countries, industrialization and general 
economic development in the main continue to match the rate of 
urbanization. Indeed, many industrial countries now "import" 
foreign labour to satisfy growing manpower needs.6 But in the 
countries developing now, imbalances and problems multiply under 
the impact of rapid urbanization resulting in massive concentra-
tions of uprooted and "foot loose" unemployable labourers in 
shanty towns and slums in growing physical squalor and social 
tension. 
Available evidence indicates that, generally, metropolitan 
regions will continue to grow and the difficulties so far connected 
with them will become progressively more acute in the immediate 
and near future. Urbanization will inevitably continue at varying 
rates, until the urban/rural ratios reach about four to one. Then 
the process will most probably assume slower rates, until land, 
employment and mechanization reach ratios capable of creating 
high productivity in agriculture, providing to rural families incomes 
similar to those already attained in the city.7 In this context the 
long-term total impact of urbanization is highly positive. The city 
leads in industry, incomes and culture. If planned for compre-
hensively on the regional scale it could also become an effective 
means of eliminating existing disparities between town and 
country. Instead of spending scarce resources on attempts of only 
a temporary value to contain rural people in their marginal sub-
sistence condition practical measures should be devised to facilitate 
urbanization in selected locations designated within the framework 
of national development goals. The rising tide of migration should 
persuade planners and governments of the futility of trying to 
"prepare" the potential migrant for "living in the city" which rejects 
him by definition, and of the need rather to focus attention on the 
city's ability to accept the new citizen (often the country's most pro-
gressive rural man) to accept urbanization as a positive mani-
festation of development and a factor potentially useful for 
development. Society must fear less the much maligned "popula-
tion explosion" and start devising instead an explosion of develop-
ment and productivity which in turn could enable the people to 
assume their appropriate role of productive resource and not be con-
sidered a calamity. Family planning is of course a desirable choice. 
But the current emphasis on birth control as the cure-all for the ills of 
underdevelopment seems overstated. Also, it tends to shift world 
attention from cause to consequence - from the dangerously low 
rates of economic growth the developing nations are able to 
attain (without massive external aid) to their current high rates 
of population growth, a result of effective external aid in food, 
health and sanitation. 
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The United Nations set a realistic goal for the first Develop-
ment Decade (l 961-1970), namely a rate of economic growth of at 
least 5 per cent per annum. The developing nations failed to 
attain it - on their own. Higher rates have been achieved and 
sustained by a number of countries both with socialist and with 
"free enterprise" economies; and the corresponding rapid rise in 
levels of living together with intensive general education have 
sharply reduced their national birth rates (and consequently their 
population growth) by individual choice in dignity and freedom. 
More adequate rates of economic growth must somehow be 
achieved in the future. It seems unlikely that the same "marginal 
people" in the developing countries, illiterate and allegedly 
apathetic in matters of development, could now conveniently be 
assumed to understand a highly sophisticated and complex rela-
tionship between their national economies and the size of their 
own families. Or is it implied that family planning and birth 
control might be enforced as an alternative to stepped up economic 
growth and education? The answer to this dilemma depends on 
the society's ability to organize a workable world economy in the 
interest of peace and survival. 
Elements of a viable urbanization policy and strategy 
in developing countries 
The current urban crisis is complex and is deeply rooted in the 
growing inter-dependence of national economies which, in turn, 
are increasingly becoming integral parts of the world economy and 
world trade. It has already unleashed a complex of interacting 
socio-economic and environmental problems insoluble in terms of 
national economies and national planning alone. Every nation 
must use its own resources as effectively as possible, or face 
degradation. But the size and urgency of the job at hand demands 
that the efforts of the developing nations be supplemented by 
intensive international technical and capital aid. While there is a 
free flow of data and strictly technical advice from developed to 
the developing countries, adaptations of their experience to the 
sobering conditions of underdevelopment are yet to be made. 
Worst of all, one of the most important ingredients of develop-
ment, namely, investment capital, remains extremely scarce in the 
developing countries. 
The reciprocal relationship of population, urbanization, the 
human condition and economic growth is obvious. However, the 
location of vital economic activities will probably continue to follow 
the path of least resistance. As nations continue advancing and 
adopt advanced technologies and management methods, and as 
new sources of energy (including atomic power) and new means 
of livelihood and modes of transportation appear, the process of 
urbanization could reach a highly explosive stage. In these circum-
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stances, comprehensive regional planning combined with adequate 
investment in the physical and social infrastructure and in produc-
tivity could be expected to guide the development of urban and 
industrial agglomerations (both existing and nascent). Such pat-
terns may suitably distribute settlements and people so that they 
are linked together in territorial entities that are cities in the socio-
economic sense and regions in the geographic and political-
administrative sense (city-regions). Unless the present trend of 
excessive concentration can be changed, the already overcrowded 
metropolitan agglomerations will become less and less efficient 
in their role of agent of development and less and less suitable as 
places to live in. 
Two separate but exceedingly loosely connected development 
processes occur in most countries simultaneously. The first consists 
of a set of large "productive" projects involving few persons and 
benefiting in the short run only a small part of the nation. They 
are meant to build the country's infrastructure and industry and 
make available more equally in the long run the benefits of the 
wealth so created. 
The second process is in fact a struggle for survival until large 
scale development matures and becomes operative and adequately 
productive. It consists of a variety of programmes mostly social in 
nature. For instance, "community development" has been com-
bined in some cases with agricultural demonstration services to 
increase food production for the growing urban consumption. Some 
rural people have thus been started on the way of participation in 
the national development effort as producers and as consumers. 
In other cases, handicrafts and cottage and small-scale industries 
have been regrouped in villages and towns, and organized as 
partly mechanized undertakings. They are able to produce for 
the growing urban market the badly needed consumer goods for 
which no modern large scale industry existed. Rural and small 
communities become considerably more attractive and hitherto 
dormant resources begin to contribute substantially to general 
development. 
Programmes such as these are obviously useful, but their 
effectiveness is limited in the long run. Consequently rural masses 
migrate to the cities where development goes on with more 
certainty for the future. Urbanization is indeed the principal means 
by which the benefits of development reach increasingly larger 
sections of a country's population. Under conditions of under-
development, urbanization often takes the form of "invasion" and 
squatting on vacant land and of illegal construction of shanty-
towns. This "spontaneous" form of urbanization is now accepted 
in many areas as being unavoidable. A whole new doctrine of 
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"moral justification" and "legality" of squatting and of "borrowing" 
utilities is beginning to emerge. New zoning practices and dwelling 
standards are being formulated and enacted, bringing housing 
costs closer into line with the economic capacity of "marginal 
citizens". In itself, therefore, the phenomenon of squatting is a 
very progressive step. The provisional community (barriada) 
surely is not a slum in any strict sense of the term. A high degree 
of co-operation and planning goes into the preparation of an 
"invasion" and building a squatter town. Political action and a 
great deal of collective bargaining and negotiation go into 
securing and "legalizing" land tenure and obtaining communal 
services and employment. "Marginal man" really cares for his 
community and participates in its affairs most actively. Yesterday's 
"ignorant" peasants are learning quickly how to manage their 
community democratically with their own and their families' 
shelter and livelihood as incentives. The possibilities of a nascent 
squatter town becoming a stable community are all there. Decline 
and decay, however, are equally possible: owing to a lack of 
positive and constructive support by public authorities, local 
and central, the barriadas begin to change from "incipient" 
communities to slums. 
Wherever the marginal migrant settles, whether as transient 
or as permanent settler, he has undergone a radical change. 
Modern science and technology applied in health, agriculture 
and industry have profoundly altered conditions in country and 
town and the "push" away from a declining rural life combines 
with the "pull" of the city to change his outlook and aspirations. 
As "urban man" he has moved (often with the help of relatives, 
friends or tribal connections in the city slums) from the traditional 
landlord-peasant relationship to a new, as yet uncharted, social 
environment of the squatter town. He now joins with others to 
promote his and his family's interest collectively. This new social 
structure, co-operative in nature, with its strong reliance on self-
help, self-management and direct action is a new condition in 
urban affairs. It should now be used also by urban and public 
authorities as a new development tool, particularly for tackling 
the many problems of "marginality" by means of community and 
collective action. Instead, futile aspirations are being promoted, 
for example: individual home "ownership" via "savings and loan" 
institutions at the cost of one quarter or more of the family budget, 
a device conceivably viable when family incomes are more or 
less adequate to meet other essential needs after paying these 
high housing costs, but economically or socially inapplicable and 
therefore meaningless in most developing countries. Much could 
be learned, in this connection, concerning workable approaches, 
methods and techniques, through pilot projects sufficiently large 
in scale to realize economies and to test the feasibility of adapting 
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practical experience from one particular situation to another or 
to demonstrate the viability of new approaches. 
The reports from eight metropolitan areas reproduced in this 
volume project a clear picture of the complexity, the magnitude 
and the world-wide impact of the accelerating pace of urban-
ization. They also show that to date development theory and 
practice has failed to recognize the city's role as the long-
neglected link among the many interacting processes and 
activities of an expanding industrialization. The metropolitan 
region (the city-region) emerges from these studies as the level 
at which action designed to facilitate the change from the tra-
ditional rural-agricultural to an urban-industrial society can be 
meaningfully planned and organized. This realization is true 
for both the rich and for the developing countries, but it is 
particularly important for the latter where capital resources are 
scarce but where the rural-urban migration is a dynamic force 
which could be used in partnership with government to transform 
"spon~aneous urbanization'' from "cancerous growth" into a 




Purnaman N atakusumah 
Director, West Java Regional Office 
National Institute of Administration 
Indonesia 
2 
BANDUNG is the third largest metropolitan area in Indonesia, 
after Djakarta, the national capital, and Surabaja, the main 
urban centre in East Java. It is the capital of West Java, a 
populous governmental unit that surrounds Djakarta Raya or 
the capital region. Aside from being an administrative and 
political centre, Bandung is widely known as a tourist resort 
mainly because of its mild and pleasant climate. It is also an 
educational centre, with six universities, a technological institute, 
a teacher training centre, and various research institutes located 
in the metropolitan area. 
The city of Bandung lies 12 kilometers from north to south 
and nine kilometers from east to west. It is situated on a plateau 
and is surrounded by small towns: Padalarang and Tjimahi on 
the west, Lembang and Tjisarua on the north, Udjungberung on 
the east and Dajeuhkolot and Buahbatu on the south. The 
plateau inclines in a north-south direction, with the highest point, 
1,050 meters above sea level located in the north and the lowest 
point, about 675 meters above sea level in the south. Because 
of its elevation, the city is pleasantly cool all year round, with an 
average temperature of 24 °C throughout the year. 
As a provincial capital, Bandung plays an important role in 
national affairs. This role is considerably enhanced by its proximity 
to Djakarta, only 185 kilometers away. Through the years, 
Djakarta has grown and expanded pushing its boundaries into 
the province of West Java. As a natural consequence of this 
growth, the province, as well as its capital, Bandung, has also 
progressed. The fact that Bandung is an educational and military 
centre also enhances its growth. Aside from the six universities 
located in the city, there are 34 other colleges and institutes as 
well as military schools. Bandung has an estimated student 
population of 34,814. The Army General Staff College is located 
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in the city, while the Air Force General Stoff College and the 
Police General Stoff College ore situated in Lembong, a small 
town 12 kilometers north of Bandung. 
Historical Background 
In 1811, Bandung, which at that time hod a population of 
1,800 inhabitants, was the capita I of the kabupaten (regency) of 
Bandung. The regency become a gewest (residency) in 1864, 
when the capitol hod a population of 11,052. The Dutch, who 
liked the climate of Bandung which contrasted so much with the 
humidity of Djakarta (known then as Batavia), also found that 
the place was excellent for growing crops such as tea, coffee, 
quinine and rubber. The plantations in and around Bandung 
attracted many people to locate there, so that by 1906, the 
authorities decided to grant the settlement autonomous status. 
Under the 1903 Decentralization Low, Bandung became a 
gemeenten or municipality and was given a limited degree of 
outonomy.1 
In 1906, when Bandung was given municipal status, it hod a 
population of 38,403 and a total land area of 900 hectares. About 
a quarter of the land area hod already been built up at the time. 
The increase of the population to 48,980 in 1911 necessitated 
boundary adjustments and the city area was expanded to 2, 150 
hectares. For five years, the city's boundary remained the same 
in spite of the fact that by 1916, the population hod increased to 
70,000 or just a little bit less than double the population in 1911. 
In 1921, Bandung's boundaries were expanded by 703 hectares 
but by that time, the population hod risen to 114,311. The city's 
land area remained the some for a decade, though the popu-
lation hod reached 161,569 in 1931. 
Table 1 
Population, Area and Density of Bandung for Selected Years2 
1906 -1961 
% Built-up 
Density Built-up Area to Total 
Year Population Area (Has.) (per Ha.) Area (Has.} Area 
1906 38,403 900 42.6 240 26.6 
1911 47,980 2, 150 22.3 300 13.9 
1916 70,000 2, 150 32.5 380 17.6 
1921 114,311 2,853 40.0 850 29.7 
1926 140,181 2,853 49.1 1,050 36.8 
1931 161,569 2,853 56.6 1,300 45.5 
1954 802, 104 8,098 99.0 2,500 30.8 
1961 972,566 8,098 120.0 4,667 57.6 
12 
Colonial status for Indonesia effectively ended in 1942 with 
the Japanese occupation of the country, despite the fact that the 
Dutch tried to impose their sovereignty over the country even after 
the Second World War. Colonial life, however, was most marked 
in the urban centres of Indonesia and persists up to the present. 
For example, much of the current difficulty in providing services 
and amenities to urban centres in Indonesia may be traced to the 
governmental structures that were formed during the colonial 
period. 
Like other urban centres in Indonesia, Bandung developed 
primarily because of European influence. In fact, the grant of 
municipal status to Bandung was dictated more by the presence 
of Europeans in the place than by the size of its population. Gov-
ernmental structures during the Dutch regime were divided into 
those that served the Europeans and those that ruled the native 
Indonesians. Autonomous municipal status was given to areas 
which could be governed by the Dutch. The central government 
had jurisdiction over all native Indonesians, even those that lived 
in areas which were within the boundaries of municipalities. 
Hence, two sets of government officials grew up under these 
circumstances: local government officials who were mostly Euro-
peans and central government officials who were also Europeans 
but who had to deal with the influential Indonesian traditional 
leaders. 
Because the municipalities, such as Bandung, could raise 
their own resources to meet the needs of their primarily Euro-
pean populations, they were able to provide urban services. The 
kampongs and desas (communities and villages) which were 
composed mainly of Indonesians, however, could not get enough 
from the central government to afford these services. In 1918, 
therefore, municipalities were given the authority to annex Indo-
nesian communities within their framework, in view of health 
and other problems which came from them and affected the 
Europeans as well. In the mid- l 920's, a policy of "lndonesian-
ization" of the civil service was launched by the Dutch. Many 
Indonesians took over civil service positions formerly held by 
their colonizers. To some extent, this move assured Indonesian 
cultural content (which tended to emphasize the value of the 
local community) in colonial administration. 
To sum up, urbanization and colonization were strongly 
linked together in the history of Indonesia. The nature of this 
linkage was described by Milone in the following manner: 
Urbanization in colonial times was, then, related both 
to the formation of capitals or seats for administrative 
divisions and to European commercial development. It was 
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also related to the processing of plantation crops: to the sus-
taining of Christian centres; to the exploitation of resources 
such as coal, oil, tin, and timber; to the creation of military 
cantonment centers; to port functions and the siting of rail-
road termini and highway junctions; to the provision of 
public services and secondary and university level education 
(principally for the Europeans but also for a relatively small 
number of Indonesians and Chinese); to the location of higher 
courts and hospitals; and to the desire of Europeans to spend 
their free time away from the plantations in shopping and 
in being together in exclusive urban social clubs, and to 
enjoying holidays and retirement in a pleasant upland 
climate.3 
Administrative and Political Structures 
Indonesia's present local government system reflects the 
combination of native institutions as well as governmental forms 
introduced by the Dutch. Generally, a distinction is made be-
tween central government structures that operate at the local level 
and which are answerable to the Ministry of the Interior, and 
local autonomous regions granted decentralized powers. These 
two types of institutions interact at about three different levels: 
the province or autonomous region, the municipality, and levels 
lower than the municipality such as the ketjamatan, kelurahan, etc. 
Formerly, the heads of autonomous units were elected but after 
the take-over of the military, they also became appointed, as 
are the central government unit heads. There is hope that with 
increased stability in Indonesia, the structure and functions of the 
local government will return to their former state. 
The city of Bandung is a local autonomous entity. As pre-
viously mentioned, this status was attained in 1906 when it 
became a gemeenten or municipality with its own Gemeente-Raad 
or City Council. The Council was headed by the head of the 
administrative region as chairman. It had eleven members: eight 
Europeans, two Indonesians and one representative of the 
Chinese and Arabian community. 
On 1 July 1917, the first City Mayor (Burgemeester) of Ban-
dung was appointed by the central government. In 1926, under 
Government Act No. 369, the Gemeente Raad became the Stads 
Gemeente Raad, a council with greater powers and autonomy. 
The council's membership was increased to 27 in view of these 
changes: 15 Europeans, 9 Indonesians, and 3 Chinese and/or 
Arabians. 
During the Japanese occupation of Indonesia (1941-1945), 
the council was abolished and city administration became a one-
man rule affair. Dutch officials were interned and Indonesians 
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took over the civil service jobs. The Dutch language was out-
lawed and Bahasa Indonesia became widely used. The Mayor of 
Djakarta was placed directly under the jurisdiction of the Resident, 
who was in turn answerable to the Japanese Sixteenth Army. 
One important change introduced during this period was the 
formation of the lowest level of municipal territorial unit, the 
neighbourhood association, which became the forerunner of the 
present rukun tetangga and rukun kampong. 
Immediately after the war, the Indonesians revolted against 
the Dutch. Bandung became a part of the area ruled by the 
Dutch, and was liberated from the former colonizers only in 1949. 
The 1945 constitution which guided Indonesian rule until inde-
pendence stipulated that pre-World War II structures were to be 
used until new forms could be created. After August 1950, when 
the unitary state of Indonesia was formed, the status of Bandung 
as an autonomous municipality was assured. The structure of 
Bandung's city government has changed little since independence 
in 1950: the executive is the Mayor, who is appointed by the 
Minister of Home Affairs (now Interior) upon nomination of the 
city council. The Council is composed of 35 members, and it 
serves as the local legislative body. Serving as an advisory group 
to the Mayor and assisting him in the administration of city 
affairs is the Badan Pemerintah Harian (The Body for Daily 
Government). 
From 1950 to 1956, Bandung enjoyed the autonomous status 
of kota besar. As such, it was regarded as a middle level autono-
mous region with right of government with the central authorities. 
Since 1956, however, Bandung has been made a kotapradja, the 
second highest level of local government in Indonesia. 
Population Migration and Metropolitan Growth 
Changes in the organizational structure of Bandung through 
the years have primarily been caused by the rapid growth of the 
city and its growing importance in regional and national affairs. 
Compared to the other large urban centres in Java, Bandung has 
the highest rate of population growth. 
The average annual rate of growth of Bandung's population 
has been estimated at 3.63 per cent. If the average rate of 
natural increase in the city is 2.07 per cent {Census figure), then 
the average rate of growth due to migration may be set at 1.5 
per cent. This means that 43 per cent of the increase of the popu-
lation of Bandung is due to migration. 
A closer study of the population growth in Bandung reveals 
an increasing rate of growth since 1950. In this decade, the rate 
of growth was set at 4.44 per cent per year. This means that the 
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Table 2 
Indonesia's Six Largest Cities 
[by Percentage of Increase] 
Number of Number of Percentage 
Inhabitants Inhabitants of 
City 1930 1961 Increase 
Bandung 160,000 972,566 583 
Djakarta 533,000 2,973, l 00 558 
Malang 86,000 341,400 394 
Surabaja 341,000 1,007,900 295 
Bog or 65,400 154, l 00 236 
Semarang 217,800 503, 100 231 
annual rate of growth due to migration was 2.37 per cent or 
that 53 per cent of the population increase in Bandung has been 
due to rural-urban migrants. 
Table 3 
Population Growth in Bandung 1950-60* 
Number of Increase in Percentage 
Year Inhabitants Population of Increase 
1950 644,475 
1951 668, l 49 23,67 4 3.67 
1952 689,779 21,630 3.24 
1953 757,825 68,046 9.86 
1954 802, l 04 44,279 2.30 
1955 839, l 55 37,051 4.61 
1956 870,346 31,191 3.72 
1957 913,528 43, 182 4.90 
1958 951,828 38,300 4.19 
1959 986,880 35,052 3.68 
1960 1,028,245 41,365 4.19 
As seen in Table 3 and the graph on page 17, population 
growth in Bandung has been most rapid in the decade 1950 to 
1960. Two specific reasons may be given for this. In 1950, the 
*These figures are from the Five Year Development Plan for the City of Bandung, 
1969-1973. They seem to be estimates that tend lo be on the high side. Other sources 
set the population of Bandung in 1961 at 972,566. 
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city was made the capital of West Java, thus increasing rapidly 
the number of civil servants living within its boundaries. The 
jump of the percentage of increase from 3.24 to 9.86 may be 
directly linked to the transfer of many civil servants to Bandung, 
as well as the other jobs, services and other occupations that they 
generated. The increase in 1957-1958, on the other hand, was 
due to disturbance in the countryside created by the Darul Islam 
(Islamic World) rebellion in West Java. The unstable conditions in 
the villages forced many of the people to move to Bandung and 
other urban areas. Even after the rebellion many of the migrants 
to Bandung did not return to their places of origin, thus swelling 
the city's population further. 
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As for personal and other motives for migration to urban 
centres like Bandung, one can only deduce these from studies 
made in other cities as no such survey has been made in Bandung. 
In a study made by the School of Economics of the University of 
Indonesia, for example, it was found that in Djakarta, 34.3 per 
cent of rural-urban migration was due to financial and economic 
reasons. Other reasons included: to raise one's level of income, 
17.3 per cent; unsatisfactory position in place of origin, 12.0 per 
cent; unsafe conditions in the rural areas, 2.1 per cent; to join 
relatives in the city, 9.2 per cent; to continue studies in the city, 
6.6 per cent; and job transfers, l 0.1 per cent. When the analysts 
made a distinction between migrants into Djakarta from urban 
centres and those directly moving from rural areas, they found 
the economic and financial motive stronger for the already 
urbanized migrants.4 
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It is difficult to pinpoint the places of origin of migrants to 
Bandung in the light of insufficient data. However, based on 
observations and general knowledge of the community, the largest 
group of migrants in Bandung seemed to come from other parts 
of West Java, Central and East Java or the regions closest to the 
city. The second largest group comes from Sumatra. Of this 
latter group, the migrants from West Sumatra and Tapanuli are 
most visible because they traditionally run restaurants or engage 
in small retail trade. Other groups do not have such marked 
characteristics. 
Patterns of Settlement 
Like most old cities that grew rapidly in population, Ban-
dung has an old section which is the city centre, a largely resi-
dential zone around it, and a peripheral area which is heavily 
populated by low-income people. It can be seen from the map on 
page 19 that the city centre corresponds closely with the city's 
core which dates from the developed area in 1906. Subsequent 
developments are reflected in the built up area in 1931, which 
shows a close correspondence with the zone of first class homes 
shown in the map on page 21. These homes were the residences 
of the Dutch colonial officials, which were later transformed into 
governmental residences and homes of the Indonesian elite. In 
contrast with the physical layout, housing, size of lots and other 
characteristics of the old city centre, the residences of the Euro-
peans tended to be better planned, featuring larger houses and 
lots, better services and other amenities, etc. Up to the present, 
this difference is still visible. The most expensive and beautiful 
residential sections in Bandung are still in the northern parts of 
town. 
According to a survey made by the Planning Office of the 
City of Bandung, slum settlements characterized by deteriorated 
housing are found in the city centre, especially in areas which 
are on district boundaries (See map on page 22). Most squatting, 
however, occurs in the peripheral areas, where the high densities 
and dilapidated housing which occurs in the city centres are not 
found. The squatter communities in the periphery have all the 
characteristics of rural kampongs, with houses usually having 
their own vegetable plots, fruit orchards, and even rice paddies. 
In the sectors within the ketjamatan (sub-districts) of Leng-
kong, Andir, Sukadjadi and Tjibeunjing, squatter settlements have 
grown rapidly. The population of these areas has grown fast due 
to migration of squatters. Sukadjadi's population increased from 
56,556 in 1954 to 93,715 in 1961, an increase of 65.70 per cent 
in six years. The increase in population is shown in the rapid 
rise of densities in the area. While in 1954, there were 70.82 
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persons per hectare in the place, this rose to 117.3 persons per 
hectare in 1961. The same pressure of people on the land is seen 
in the ketjamatan of Andir, which had a density of 155.1 persons 
per hectare in 1961. Already, the settlements mentioned above 
have inadequate facilities as far as water, electricity, health and 
other services are concerned. They are still growing, however, 
especially in the light of industrialization in the area. Govern-
ment authorities in Bandung have planned these areas as indus-
trial zones thus enhancing the migration of people who seek jobs 
and who offer services to those employed in industries. 
In other parts of Bandung there are lands which are occupied 
by relatively well to do squatters, and this shows in the types of 
housing erected by these people. They are squatters in the legal 
sense only, but their living style and other characteristics do not 
brand them as slum dwellers. Many such squatters are living on 
government property. Some of them are government officials or 
people in high places. Many students also live in such squatter 
areas, because rents are not too expensive there. 
In terms of squatting and slum dwelling which causes social 
problems, this often occurs close to the city centre, especially in 
areas close to the markets and other places where cheap employ-
ment can be obtained. In these areas, there are slum dwellers 
which are not technically squatters because they own the resi-
dences they occupy or are renting rooms and bed spaces in pri-
vate homes. Here, however, the high density, lack of sanitation, 
lack of services and other evils of urban living in such deteriorated 
conditions are readily apparent. 
Characteristics of Squatters and Slum Dwellers 
In view of the lack of social surveys among Bandung's 
squatters and slum dwellers, the characteristics of these seg-
ments of the population have to be deduced from other sources. 
The most obvious index to the economic situation in the slum and 
squatter areas is the type of housing occupied by the people. As 
in other countries, the shanties of squatters and slum dwellers 
tend to be small, dilapidated, made of light materials, and often 
badly congested. The jobs of squatters and slum dwellers are 
mostly those not requiring special skills or training. Incomes are 
low, though needs are simple. It is usual for several members of 
the family to be partially employed, so as to add something to 
the total family income. 
A typical example of a squatter or slum dweller is a person 
whose main source of income is the earnings from his betjak, a 
foot-pedaled tricycle which is the most common means of short-
range transportation in Bandung and in other cities of Indonesia. 
Some betjak drivers own their vehicles but many just rent them 
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from owners, who exact a fixed fee. A betjak driver starts 
earning only after he has earned the fee due the owner. Earnings 
are usually very low in relation to the physical exertion involved. 
Community life in the slum and squatter areas is heavily 
reminiscent of rural life. The houses of squatters and slum 
dwellers are usually built in clusters and are huddled very close 
together. This is due to the natural factor of space limitation and 
possibly to a psychological need to cling together for security. 
Indonesian life, according to sociologists, displays three main 
characteristics: gotong rojong (mutual help), tolerance, and 
musjawarah (peaceful consultation). Basically, the Indonesian is 
not individualistic though his relationship with other people is 
usually on a highly personalized plane. He has a very strong 
sense of communal solidarity, featuring a pattern of mutual 
assistance in such activities as building a house, planting and 
harvesting of crops, etc. The value of helping the weak and the 
needy without expecting any reward is ingrained in the social-
ization process. 
The trait of tolerance is shown in the refusal of people to 
engage in direct conflicts. Social relationships are usually con-
ducted on a highly symbolic plane. Because of the personalized 
approach to things, the errors of others are easily forgiven. The 
value of friendship and of maintaining a good social relationship 
are often held higher than values measured in terms of work 
results. 
As a consequence of gotong rojong and tolerance, the Indo-
nesian dislikes open disagreements. Hence, problems are usually 
solved through peaceful consultation and face to face talks, often 
involving intricate ceremonies and rituals. The imposition of the 
will of one person over another is not liked by Indonesians, 
especially in the light of their colonial experience. People will 
go to extreme efforts to keep discussions going because they 
feel that this is the way in which rational and acceptable solu-
tions are arrived at. 
Taking these social characteristics of Indonesians into con-
sideration, the Government of Indonesia has created government 
organizations at the community level to help in solving common 
problems. Such community organizations are the Rekun Tetangga 
(RT), Rukun Kampong (RK) and the Rukun Warga (RW). The 
RT's and RK's are at the neighbourhood level. RW's, on the other 
hand, are usually composed of several neighbourhoods and an 
RW may be thought of as a "Larger Neighbourhood Association." 
In many countries, especially in Latin America, the potential 
for violent political action in slum and squatter areas has been re-
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peatedly voiced in the literature. In Bandung, residents of squatter 
and slum areas seem to have participated actively in actions against 
the government. While the evidence points to the youth and the 
intelligentsia as the instigators of revolutionary action, these active 
elements have also been able to gain the support of the squatters 
and slum dwellers. In the abortive coup attempt in 1965, for ex-
ample, many of the residents of slums and squatter areas partici-
pated actively, succeeding in holding the reins of government in 
Bandung for a few hours. However, the political participation of 
squatters and slum dwellers does not seem to be sustained over a 
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All in all, people who live in the slums and squatter areas of 
Bandung seem to possess the characteristics of individuals trans-
planted from the rural kampongs. This is especially true of those 
who live on the city's periphery, where many still rely on the products 
of the soil (farming, horticulture, handicrafts), supplemented by 
periodic employment in non-farm pursuits. This transplanting of 
rural traits to an urban milieu is often the cause of many problems. 
As seen in the country's "self-help" efforts, however, it may also be 
the basis for cooperative solutions. 
Problems Arising from Rapid Migration 
The most serious problem that arises from the influx of migrants 
to Bandung is housing. As shown in Table 3 on page 16, the annual 
rate of population growth in Bandung has ranged from 2.30 per 
cent to 9.86 per cent from 1950 to 1960. Within that time, however, 
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the supply of housing has hardly kept up with this rapid rate of 
population growth. As shown in the chart on page 24, the gap 
between total housing need and housing supply in Bandung has 
been widening since after the Second World War and there seems 
to be no ready solution in sight. Since 1951, squatting and slum 
dwelling, as seen in the gap between total housing supply and the 
number of registered houses, has been meeting part of the housing 
need. However, since most squatter and slum homes are sub-
standard, this sector of housing supply is only a short-term solution, 
if it is one at all. Some authorities think squatting and slum dwelling 
is a symptom of the housing crisis instead of a solution. 
Table 4 
Number of Registered Houses in Bandung 
Year Number Increase % Increase 
1949 46,928 
1950 51,458 4,530 9.65 
1951 55, 184 3,726 7.24 
1952 57,878 2,694 4.87 
1953 61,688 3,810 6.58 
1954 65, 168 3,480 5.64 
1955 67,030 1,862 2.85 
1956 70,680 3,650 5.44 
1957 72,997 2,317 3.27 
1958 75,311 2,314 3.17 
1959 77,995 2,684 3.56 
1960 81,053 3,058 3.92 
1961 83,001 1,948 3.40 
1962 84,464 1,463 1.76 
1963 85,596 l, 132 l.34 
1964 86,544 948 l.10 
1965 87,450 996 l.15 
1966 87,849 399 .45 
In the absence of official flgures on the housing shortage in 
Bandung, one can only estimate it from the flgures currently avail-
able. In 1966, the city of Bandung had a population of l, 116,387. 
In that same year, the number of registered houses was 87,849 
(see Table 4). According to the studies made by housing authori-
ties in the city, each house in Bandung had l 0 people living in it 
on the average, which is an index of doubling up in most houses. 
If we assume that this average holds true for all types of housing 
in the city, the inhabitants of registered houses will be 878,490 
(l 0 x 87,849). Subtracting this flgure from the total city population, 
we get the flgure of 237,897, which represents the number of 
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people occupying houses that are not registered. Assuming the 
same average of l 0 persons per house, this sets the housing lack 
at 23,789. 
Since the registration of houses in Bandung is an imperfect 
administrative process, we can only assume that a large part of 
the 23,789 houses not registered in the city are squatter shanties. 
Some people included in the figure as occupying unregistered 
houses may also be doubling up with relatives or friends, paying 
rents, or not permanently occupying any kind of dwelling at all. 
No matter how imperfect the statistics, the difficult situation in 
Bandung as far as housing is concerned is readily discernible. 
This is so, especially in the light of the figures in Table 4 above, 
which show a steady decline in the percentage of registered houses 
since 1962. 
Aside from the housing shortage, of course, the rapid 
migration of people to Bandung has created other problems. For 
example, the present capacity of the water supply system in Ban-
dung is 976 liters per second. The supply needed by the con-
suming public is set at a minimum level of 2,265 liters per second. 
All hospitals in Bandung have a bed capacity of 2,671 while the 
minimum required for Bandung's total population is 4,500 beds. 
The public markets in Bandung have a total area of only 25.38 
hectares while the demand is for 40 hectares. 
In short, water shortage, sanitation problems, crime and 
juvenile delinquency may be directly traced mainly to the increase 
in the population of Bandung due to migration. As Bandung has 
become important in regional and national affairs, it has served 
to attract many people. The pressure of these people on the city's 
already limited services has brought about a near critical situation. 
As in other parts of Indonesia, however, official efforts to solve 
Bandung's problems are slow in coming for the country seems to 
be preoccupied with other larger problems. 
Past, Present and Proposed Solutions 
In Bandung, as in other cities of Indonesia, there has been 
relatively little concrete effort in the past to improve the facilities 
for city living. During the fight for independence, in the period 
between 1945-1950, most efforts were directed towards the fight 
for freedom, international recognition and the achievement of 
political unity. During the 1950-1960 decade, governmental action 
was mostly aimed towards quelling regional conflicts, pacifying 
opposing political groups and achieving national peace and 
security. In the years 1961-1966 political and economic turbulence 
reached its peak. It was in this period that the Communist Party 
of Indonesia tried to seize power from the government and that 
inflation reached dangerous heights. 
26 
Preoccupation with national problems has had a strong 
impact on the regions, provinces, and cities of Indonesia. Practical 
and urgent measures necessary to improve local conditions were 
put aside in the period of nation-building. Local development was 
de-emphasized in favour of problems of national concern. The 
result was that the bulk of government expenditures in the central 
and regional level was channeled to political and security purposes. 
With the central government so dominant, there was a marked 
decline in local government administration in Indonesia after inde-
pendence. Administrative practices were impaired by political pre-
occupation and power struggles which had deeply penetrated the 
governmental apparatus. The standards of performance efficiency 
in the public service degenerated due to instability of the economic 
and political situation. 
Under these circumstances that beset Indonesia, the role and 
function of the central government became extremely important. 
New leadership was asserted when the central government 
attempted to take a new direction and translate its policy into 
more concrete and realistic terms. Some changes in the general 
situation have been evident since 1967. This was seen in the 
manifestation of administrative action towards the improvement 
of governmental affairs. Indonesia's earnest desire to rehabilitate 
and stabilize the economy and the political situation became 
apparent in 1968-1969. Hyper-inflation which had previously 
been raging all over the country started to disappear and economic 
stability began to emerge. The impact was strongly felt also at 
the regional level. The local governments, like the city, have 
discovered a favourable climate for administrative adjustment and 
reform. 
The City of Bandung, within its resource limitations, has not 
been indifferent to the problems generated by rural-urban mi-
gration. One specific action was initiated in 1968 when the city 
government required the registration of squatter and slum dwelling 
units. The government also exacted charges from the illegal occu-
pants of government lots and out of the proceeds, it planned to 
purchase sites for the relocation of squatters and slum settlers. 
One repercussion of this action, however, has been the belief of 
the people that the imposition and collection of fees legalized 
their occupancy of the lots and implicitly established their titles of 
ownership. Thus, they have started selling the lots or their "rights" 
of occupancy. The city government had to come out with an 
ordinance prohibiting such sale. At the time of writing the 
registration of houses continues while the ordinance on house 
construction is being enforced more vigorously. 
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There have also been attempts of the city government, with 
the aid of a city special police force, to eject the squatters from 
certain localities. In fact some houses were actually demolished 
but no sooner had the "demolition squads" left than squatter 
houses started to sprout again. Because of these counteractions 
to thwart the city government measures, the problem of rural-
urban migration becomes even more formidable. The city govern-
ment has taken other steps. It has required the erection of houses 
reasonably far from public roads. Buildings on certain areas 
which should not be there have been torn down. Negotiations for 
a resettlement site located in the southern part of the city are 
being made by the Regional Housing Center with the assistance 
of the Institute of Technology of Bandung. 
Focus on Local Development 
General observations indicate that natural attachment to each 
other prevails among the rural folks generally and a spontaneous 
bond keeps them in their towns and communities. However, as 
the conditions in the cities improve and those in the rural areas 
deteriorate, the economic and social gap between the urban and 
rural areas widens. In the former it is believed that there are 
more job opportunities and greater economic security; higher and 
better education can be obtained; more convenient public utilities 
are provided; places of entertainment and recreation centres 
abound and are more varied, etc. All these upset the balance of 
habitation in the region, especially between the urban and rural 
communities. City life becomes more attractive, the forces which 
bind people in the rural areas loosen, the exodus to the city starts 
and consequently, the problems of rural migration and urban-
ization emerge and become a menace. 
In answer to the complaint of the local units about the loss of 
their best people to the capital, it must be pointed out that the only 
way for them to keep their good people from migrating is to pro-
vide incentives and favourable conditions that may approximate 
urban living, measures that give recognition to what capable 
citizens can do for their localities. 
A long-term positive approach to the migrants situation 
would be the uplifting of the socio-economic conditions of the 
entire region of West Java, with emphasis on the development of 
the rural communities: increased agricultural production in the 
West Java Region; establishment of cottage industries outside the 
city, (such as the creation of spinning mills in Tjipadung and 
Bandjaran) and providing out-of-town opportunities and other 
projects to absorb manpower, thus minimizing the flow of labor 
force into the city. 
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This local development approach is consistent with the policy 
of the national government on the deconcentration and decentral-
ization of governmental functions, thus promoting the cause of 
local autonomy. The crucial thing is how to carry out this policy 
to full realization, such that it becomes the central force to stimu-
late and achieve improved living conditions in the local area, 
around Bandung. Toward this end, steps are being carried out 
gradually. The regions, provinces, and towns have undertaken 
local development projects, with the support of the central gov-
ernment. More schemes seem to be needed to provide more 
opportunities for local development. 
The Regional Approach 
There is some evidence that Bandung has failed to tap and 
make full use of its potential resources. This may be one reason 
for its inability to undertake long-range development programmes. 
Of course, one must not fail to mention political and administra-
tive difficulties which have also gotten in the way of development. 
One effective approach to the migrants situation in Bandung 
would be planning and action on a regional basis in which both 
the city and provincial governments work hand in hand. The new 
Governor of West Java who realizes the strategic importance of 
Bandung, politically and socially, has expressed his desire to affirm 
the right place of Bandung as the center of the Region of West 
Java. He has made available the facilities of the Provincial Gov-
ernment to help the city in some of its projects, such as the repair 
of the main roads in the city and the conduct of the areal survey, 
which is now in full swing. The regional military authority in 
West Java has improved the peace and order situation in West 
Java and with this improvement there has been a decrease in 
the rate of migration from 2.3% to 1.5%. 
Bandung's development can further be accelerated by assist-
ance from the Province. Solutions to the problems of the city must, 
therefore, be considered within the framework of the regional 
development strategy described above and not independently or 
isolatedly, as has been done in the past. On the other hand, plans 
should be formulated in consideration of the segmental plans of 
kabupatens (towns), kotamadyas (cities), and desas (villages). 
Social Involvement 
Since it is almost impossible to eject the slum dwellers and 
squatters from the city outright without a favourable and attractive 
resettlement site, the City Government might just as well learn to 
live with them-for the meantime, at least. One effective means 
to do this, which does not require a huge outlay, is to exploit 
possibilities for involving them in city government affairs and 
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community development activities. Their spirit of cooperation and 
sense of participation can be stimulated to the full through urban 
community development programmes. 
On certain occasions the city government has been successful 
on this score. It is encouraging to note the cooperation that the 
people have demonstrated where it has been sought and enjoined 
in some projects of the City. The spirit of community organization 
and community development consciousness based on the Indo-
nesian tradition of gotong-rojong (or mutual cooperation) is ever 
alive in slum and squatter areas. All that is needed is to ignite it 
to productive flame. What is remarkable is that where the need 
for social improvement is deeply felt, the spirit of mutual coopera-
tion is strongest. The government often sponsors contests among 
neighbourhood associations as a stimulus to the beautification and 
maintenance of cleanliness in cities and towns. Bandung was the 
winner in this contest for the year 1969. 
Relocation and Resettlement 
The urban migrants problem, which is steadily growing 
worse, should be one of the most urgent in the City Government's 
order of priorities. The resettlement of squatters and slum 
dwellers and the expansion of the city government's housing 
programme should be given top consideration in the city govern-
ment capital budget. It has been established that there is a logical 
connection between deficient housing and the rise of slums and 
squatters; and it has been shown that the government has to ex-
pand its housing programme. Perhaps the most effective and 
feasible course of action that the city government should take 
under the circumstances, would be to choose a suitable area for 
these slum and squatter inhabitants and to construct tenement 
houses which they can rent at minimal cost. It is then proposed 
that the city government should not relent in pursuing the imple-
mentation of its plan to relocate the squatters and slum dwellers. 
The successful and effective approach of the city government 
in coping with the problems caused by rural-urban migrants 
would be a positive step in community development and in the 
establishment of the social infrastructure of wholesome living in 
the city. It is the responsibility of the government to create this 
social climate which allows the dynamic elements of society to 
expand, grow, and evolve in a positive way. 
Conclusion 
Indonesia has experienced political and economic upheavals 
since it gained full independence in 1950. Ironically, while the 
resources of the country were devoted to solving the problems 
30 
arising from these, the instabilities they created have accelerated 
the migration of people to the country's main urban areas. Since 
inadequate resources were committed to solving urban problems, 
Indonesia now finds itself faced with one of the most serious 
situations in Southeast Asia as far as urban affairs are concerned. 
One of the critical indices to the seriousness of Indonesia's 
urban problems is the lack of information regarding the most 
basic aspects of urban life. Population figures, data on economic 
activities, demographic data and other bits of information taken 
for granted in other countries are either not available or only 
partially available in Indonesia. One result of this lack of infor-
mation is planning on the basis of lacking or even inaccurate data. 
The plan for Bandung is one example of such an effort. Obviously, 
the rationality of a plan is only as good as the data it is based on. 
Where figures are lacking or inaccurate, one cannot expect the 
plan to be fully workable. 
The picture in Bandung since 1967, however, seems to have 
considerably brightened. In the first place, political and economic 
stability in the whole country now makes it possible to devote 
official energies to coping with urban problems. The example of 
the authorities in Djakarta is not lost on the officials in Bandung. 
Many of the approaches and techniques being tried in the capital 
are also being introduced in the capital of West Java. 
One important factor in Bandung's efforts to cope with its 
internal problems is the relative flexibility of governmental struc-
tures in the Indonesian system. In their efforts to take advantage 
of the merits of Dutch, Indonesian and other institutions, the 
authorities in Indonesia have not been shy in creating new struc-
tures. The regional "two-tiered" governmental units now used in 
Djakarta and Jogjakarta are examples of such innovations. One 
hopes that in the case of Bandung, an appropriate structure will 
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VENEZUELA is located in the northern part of South America 
and is bounded by the Caribbean Sea in the north, the Atlantic 
in the east, Brazil and a disputed zone, in the south, and Colombia 
and Brazil in the west. It occupies a territory of 912,050 square 
kilometers. Caracas, the capital of the republic, is linked to the 
Caribbean by its main port, La Guaira, 17 miles away. The dis-
tance of Caracas from other major capitals of the world is not too 
much: Lisbon is 6,500 kilometers away, New York, 3,500 and Rio 
de Janeiro, 4,250. 
Caracas is situated in the north-central part of Venezuela, very 
close to the coast. It has facilities to communicate with the rest of 
the country by means of an infrastructure that has been greatly 
developed in the last ten years. The city spreads out in a narrow 
valley 25 kilometers long and four kilometers wide. The moun-
tain range which surrounds the city (the Cordillera de la Costa) 
has traditionally made communication with the neighbouring places 
difficult but the development of a transport and communication 
network in recent years has changed the situation immensely. 
Caracas is blessed by a benevolent climate, despite its dis-
tance from the coast and its altitude of 920 meters above sea level. 
Of late, however, the city's temperature seems to be changing. 
People complain that Caracas is now warmer, and blame the rapid 
progress of urbanization and the cutting of the surrounding forests 
for this. Many of the surrounding areas have been denuded of 
vegetation. Some of them have been occupied by squatters who 
live in the outskirts of the city. 
This chapter is based on a poper written originally in Spanish. 
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Demographic Aspects 
The city of Caracas was founded in 1567. During the first 233 
years after founding, it reached a population of 40,000 inhabitants. 
In the 140 years that followed (between 1800 and 1940) the 
population increased to 293,000 inhabitants. In the last twenty 
years (1940 to 1960), the official population of Caracas was as 
high as 982,000 people. It is estimated that Caracas, by 1970, 
has reached a population of two million. From these figures, it 
may be seen that Caracas doubles its population about every 20 
years. 
In 1966, the population of Caracas was estimated at 
1,797, 162, which made up about one-fifth (19 .3 per cent) of the 
entire population of Venezuela (about 8,985,000). Of Vene-
zuela's total population, two-thirds (67.9 per cent) lived in urban 
centres of over l 00,000 inhabitants. Most of these lived in the 
Greater Caracas area. 
The population of Caracas has grown steadily since 1936 
when it had 259,000 people. The average annual increase in the 
city's population has risen from 19,000 persons in the 1936-1941 
period to 58,000 in the 1950-1961 period. The volume of 
population growth in Caracas is shown in Table l. 
Table l 
Population Growth in the Urban Area of Caracas 
lnter-censal Total Population Average Annual 
Periods Increase Increase 
1936-1941 95,000 19,000 
1941-1950 340,000 38,000 
1951-1961 642,000 58,000 
The growth of the Caracas population may be equally 
attributed to natural population increase and internal migration 
to Venezuela's primary urban centre. The migration from the 
country's interior, which mainly consists of people coming from 
rural areas or from urban places in the vicinity of the capital, is 
going on at an increasing rate. In many ways, this migration is 
responsible for some of the economic and social problems cur-
rently encountered in the city of Caracas. 
One of the serious problems faced by the Caracas metro-
politan area is the fact that basic public services in the city have 
not kept pace with the fast growth and expansion of its popu-
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lotion. For example, though Venezuelan law makes elementary 
schooling compulsory, only 71 per cent of the youth population 
of Caracas (ages 7 to 14) were registered in schools in 1966. This 
left about 100,000 children, which comprised 29 per cent of young 
people within that age group, out of school. Furthermore, of the 
students in school, about 40 per cent attended school in buildings 
that were not designed for educational purposes. 
The problem of Caracas, in the final analysis, cannot be 
separated from the problems of Venezuela. Basically, they are 
rooted in the maldistribution of the country's population, marked 
by concentration in the coastal areas, with Caracas as the primary 
centre. Factors internal to the Caracas urban area, however, also 
contribute to the problems. Important among these are political 
and administrative structures that do not lend themselves to 
effective coordination and cooperation. 
Political and Administrative Structures 
The urbanized area of Caracas belongs to the Department of 
Libertador, part of the Distrito Federal (Federal District) and Dis-
trito Sucre (District of Sucre) which is in the State of Miranda. 
Though one general plan exists for the whole urban area, the 
implementation of this plan often suffers from lack of coordination 
because of the political and administrative division mentioned 
above. 
Coordination of activities in Caracas is further confused by 
the fact that the national ministries also conduct operations in the 
urban area by virtue of its being the national capital. Thus, with 
three governmental levels (national, departmental or state, and 
municipal) and two areal divisions, operations in Caracas some-
times gain a bewildering aspect. At present, for example, there 
are two municipal entities governing municipal zoning in the 
urban area and a builder must go to both of them to get a con-
struction permit. Furthermore, the national ministries in charge of 
road construction, housing, sewerage, waterworks and gas con-
duct their operations in the urban area independently, with little 
or no coordination, not only among themselves but with the state, 
departmental or municipal entities as well. Thus, incidents such as 
the following are not uncommon: two months after the public 
works department finishes an important road, the waterworks 
department tears it up to put in new pipes. The damage is re-
paired, but after six months the telephone company tears up the 
road again to put in its cables. The result of all this, of course, 
is not only waste of effort and resources, it also inconveniences 
the travelling public which has to use the road. 
It is obvious that if the Greater Caracas area is to effectively 
cope with the urban problems confronting it, there is a need for 
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some political and administrative re-structuring. The preparation 
of one general plan for the metropolitan area,1 and the attempts 
to integrate the plan with the national development plan prepared 
by the central government are laudable. However, in view of the 
fact that problems arising from rapid migration of people to the 
Caracas area are expected to become worse in the future, much 
more is needed to increase the capacity of the whole urban area 
to face the critical years ahead. 
Population Migration and Urban Problems 
The maldistribution of Venezuela's population which is shown 
in the high concentration in the coastal areas and lack of people 
in the interior is rooted in economic conditions that have shaped 
the country's history. In the 1920's, old farmlands along the shores 
of Lake Maracaibo yielded oil. Since that time, the whole country 
has undergone a drastic transformation which influenced popu-
lation distribution. The oil industry changed an economy formerly 
based almost completely on agriculture. With the development of 
the oil industry came the exodus of the peasants from their farms 
and the appearance of the first true urban centres in Venezuela. 
The economic and social development of Venezuela since the 
1920's has been almost dominated by the oil industry. Industries 
of a different type, such as light manufacturing and agricultural 
processing were also started in the country but they did not 
flourish too much. Partly, the failure of these industries may be 
attributed to the competition from foreign industries which were 
attracted by the huge profits being obtained from "black gold." 
High wage rates, expensive production, and lack of technical skill 
also worked against the other industries. Since Venezuela did not 
have a protective economic policy at that time, harmful compe-
tition worked against its own industries. 
Of the few industries that were started and survived, some, 
such as food production and construction stand out. The same may 
also be said of the cigar and cigarette industry, the production of 
food from animals and the shoe industry. However, the domi-
nance of the oil industry in the country's economy prevented other 
industries from fully developing because of reasons previously 
mentioned. Since the oil industry was concentrated in specific 
parts of the country, population growth in these parts became 
very rapid also. 
At present, the Government of Venezuela is attempting a 
policy of economic development which will correct the imbalances 
that occurred in its early period of growth. Industrialization is 
still seen as the key to national development, however. Certain 
areas of the country have been designated as zones of future 
industrial power and their development is being planned. These 
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include the area of Moron for the petrochemical industry, the 
central area of Maracay-Valencia as a centre for manufacturing, 
and the zone of Guayana as a centre of enormous possibilities 
arising from its vast mining potential, especially iron.2 
Alongside this industrialization policy, however, the Govern-
ment is also pursuing an agricultural policy based on the Agri-
cultural Reform Law put into effect since 1960. This policy is 
concerned with the redistribution of land, the provision of credit 
to farmers and the improvement of technical skills of people 
through state organizations. The implementation of this agricul-
tural policy has shown some excellent results after a decade of 
hard effort. It is hoped that with agricultural successes, the 
migration of people from the rural areas may slow down in the 
future. 
Up to the present, however, the migration of the campesinos 
(peasants) to the urban areas of Venezuela continues unabated. 
Much of this migration ends in the Caracas metropolitan area. 
Caracas as the capital of the country, has been a major attraction 
for migrants since the beginning. This attraction has become 
stronger with time and is closely related to the rising mobility of 
the country's population and the improved communication and 
transport system throughout the country. 
According to the Census of 1920, 12.2 per cent of the popu-
lation residing in the Federal District of Caracas was born in 
other parts of the country. Another 5.5 per cent of the district's 
population was born in foreign lands. With the growing import-
ance of Caracas in the nation's life, more and more people have 
migrated to it ever since. Thus, the percentage of residents born 
outside the Federal district has gradually increased through the 
years, reaching 44.9 per cent in 1941. Since that time, however, 
the proportion of migrants to the total population seems to have 
stabilized. 
According to the censuses, from 1951 to 1961, the percentage 
of migrants to total population has slightly decreased from 48.6 
per cent to 44.7 per cent. This decrease may have been due to the 
fact that in this period, the Federal District lost some people to 
the rapidly developing District of Sucre. As a whole, therefore, 
migration to Caracas from other places may not have been de-
creasing - the variations may have been due to movements 
within the metropolis itself. 
If one adds the population coming from foreign countries to 
the growth of the Caracas population, the increase is even bigger. 
In 1920, the proportion of migrants and foreigners in the Caracas 
population amounted to 17.7 per cent. This went up to 55 per 
cent in 1951 and 54.2 per cent in 1962. Though in 1920, for-
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eigners coming to the capital represented only 5.5 per cent of the 
total population, in 1950 they represented 12.5 per cent and in 
1961, 17 .1 per cent. 
The factors that influence the migration of people to Caracas, 
of course, are not confined to the urban area alone. Ray has 
pointed out that the growth of the barrios in Caracas is somehow 
linked to political developments that have occurred at the national 
government level in Venezuela. In The Politics of the Barrios in 
Venezuela, Ray states that three fairly well-defined stages in the 
country's history have direct links to the rural-urban migration to 
Caracas. These are: (1) the coup of October 1945 that brought 
down the regime of General Isaias Medina Angarita; (2) the rapid 
economic growth from 1950 to 1957 which also roughly coincided 
with the dictatorship of President Marcos Perez Jimenez; and (3) 
the overthrow of the Perez Jimenez regime in January 1958.3 
According to Ray, the rural to urban migration from the 1920's 
to 1945 was at a relatively high rate but it was really the 1945 
coup that triggered off large scale migration because it established 
an administration which for the first time in Venezuela's history 
sought the support of the populace. The authoritarianism of the 
Perez Jimenez regime which started in 1950 was not strong enough 
to counter the pull exercised by Caracas and more people moved 
to the capital. During this regime, the GNP of Venezuela went up 
95 per cent, oil production doubled, and the construction industry 
as well as other industries boomed. These developments, of 
course, attracted a lot of campesinos to Caracas. Finally, the 
revolution of 1958 which turned over power to a popularly-
oriented military-civilian junta, also invited many rural people 
to come to Caracas. Ray contends that more barrios in Caracas 
trace their origin to the first 24 months following the revolution 
than to any other period.4 
Paths of Migration 
It is interesting to analyze the paths taken by the movement 
of native Venezuelans into the Federal District of Caracas but lack 
of data makes such a study difficult. Census data provide informa-
tion on the states where the migrants come from but they do not 
indicate the specific location of places of origin within the state's 
boundaries. Hence, the more detailed path of migration is im-
possible to obtain from the data currently available. One cannot 
find out, for example, whether the flow of migrants is from rural 
villages to large cities, from villages to small towns and then to 
cities, or it is primarily from city to city. 
From data currently available, it is known that from 1920 to 
1936, almost every state in Venezuela has contributed to the flow 
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of migrants to the Federal District of Caracas. Studies also reveal 
that two factors seem to be generally influential in this migration: 
the distance of the state of origin from the Federal District, and 
the population size of the state sending migrants to Caracas. 
Historically, it is known that initially, much of the migration 
to the Federal District of Caracas came from neighbouring states: 
especially the states of Miranda and Aragua which share a border 
with the Federal District, and the state of Carabobo, which is also 
close to Caracas. With time, however, people from states farther 
from Caracas joined the migration streams. In the 1920 to 1936 
intercensal period, people from the state of Apure, Barinas, 
Cojedes, Monagas and Portuguese were represented in the 
Caracas population. 
In terms of population size, it is observed that states with a 
larger population tend to send more people to Caracas. Thus, the 
migration between the state of Miranda and the Federal District 
has been the largest population shift in the country. These two 
places have the highest rate of population growth in Venezuela, 
although the Federal District grows faster than the state of Mir-
anda, indicating that on balance, the migration tends to be in 
favor of the capital. 
If one looks at a political map of Venezuela, it is seen that the 
states on the northern side of the country tend to be more highly 
populated than the southern states. The northern coastal states 
serve as attraction points for people who live inland. Thus, on the 
map on page 40, it is seen that the strip corresponding to the 
Andean states is the country's most densely populated area. The 
zones not so marked in the southern part of the country have low 
population densities, about .5 inhabitants per square kilometer. 
On the other hand, the mountainous area along the coast which 
covers approximately 177,000 square kilometers is inhabited by 
80 per cent of the country's total population. The central plains, 
with 300,000 square kilometers has barely half a million inhabi-
tants while the region of Guayana, with 413,000 square kilo-
meters (about 47 per cent of the total national territory) only has 
a population of 200,000. 
A closer look at the region around the national capital of 
Caracas reveals that migration is also hastened by the availability 
of the means of transportation around the place. On the map on 
page 40, for example, it is interesting how the major thorough-
fares all lead to the Caracas metropolitan area. In fact, the map 
also shows how the settlements tend to be clustered very closely 
together in this part of the country. The road network may also 
be responsible for the fact that population concentrations are 
already spilling into the state of Miranda and other nearby states 
sharing a border with Caracas. 
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Location of Ranchos in the Urban Area 
As previously mentioned, the Caracas metropolitan area is 
divided into two districts. Distrito Sucre, which occupies the western 
part of the city, is the older area and is more densely populated 
than Distrito Federal, which is mainly composed of new develop-
ments on the eastern side of the city. Generally, there are more 
ranchos in Distrito Federal than in the Distrito Sucre. In fact, the 
higher class residential places, new business zones and some new 
government offices are now found in the Distrito Sucre. 
The location of the ranchos in Caracas is shown on the map 
on page 42 which was prepared by the Oflcina Municipal de 
Planeamiento Urbano. As is readily apparent from the map, the 
ranchos are located on the western part of the city, especially close 
to, and even inside the area of downtown Caracas. The ranchos 
have also proliferated on the south-western portions of the city, 
following the road network and the ravines and hills that ring 
the city. 
The map showing the location of ranchos also shows the 
spatial distribution of people in Caracas according to income. As 
the map on page 42 shows, people of higher income (those receiv-
ing from $711 to $888 per month) are mostly found in the eastern 
portion of the city especially in the high-class residential sections 
in Distrito Sucre. Middle income people ($356 to $710 per month) 
are mostly found near the city centre and low-income people ($355 
per month or less) are found in the areas which are identified in 
the map as occupied by ranchos. 
The extent of the city's urbanized area occupied by ranchos 
has grown steadily through the years. A series of maps prepared 
by the OMPU for its Caracas 1990 Plan of Urban Development 
reveals the extent of land areas occupied by ranchos (See Table 2). 
Table 2 
Land Area Occupied by Ranchos 
(1930-1966) 
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In 1966, some 570,000 people lived in the 2,280 hectares 
occupied by ranchos in Caracas. These made up a little less than a 
third of the metropolitan area's population. The plan for Caracas 
estimates that by 1990, the city would have a population of 
5, l 00,000, if the rate of growth of six per cent per year remains 
unchanged. Of these more than five million people, about 
1,650,000 would be rancho dwellers. 
In a study of marginal areas carried out by the Comite de 
Remodelacion de Barrios started in 1962 with assistance from the 
Alliance for Progress, the ranchos were classified according to 
their location. The study found that a greater number of ranchos 
are increasingly located in the peripheral areas of the city as 
against the inner city. Furthermore, of the peripheral area rancho 
dwellers, there were those who lived on the hillside, in the ravines, 
and on level ground. 
Generally speaking, most ranchos are located very close to 
the access roads to the city because people tend to work in the 
centre. The ranchos in the peripheral city areas are following the 
road network and thus forming what people have sometimes 
called the "belt of misery" of Caracas. There are also ranchos 
located in dry river beds, in deep ravines where development is 
limited by the difficult terrain, which also inhibits the extension of 
services. Studies have found that of people who live on the hill-
sides, some 70 per cent have constructed their dwellings on slopes 
of 40 degrees or less. The remaining rancho dwellers, however, 
occupy hillsides with a 60 degrees or less incline (but exceeding 
40 degrees). The difficulties involved in living in houses located 
at such a steep incline are obvious. During the rainy season, many 
of the hillsides get eroded so badly that landslides sometimes take 
some of the houses along. Water and other amenities are also 
extremely difficult to get on the hillside. Still, a steadily growing 
number of people are preferring to stay in these high places 
(ranchos reach an altitude of 1,050 meters above sea level in 
Caracas) because of the pressures of the population on the land. 
In sum, we find that in Caracas, ranchos usually occupy 
specific types of land. These are: 
(a) Zones adjacent to the main access roads of the city; 
(b) Zones surrounding working centres or places of employ-
ment such as those found in the extreme eastern and 
western parts of the city; 
(c) In the neighbourhood of low income housing projects 
which have been developed or subsidized by the 
Banco Obrero (Workers' Bank); 
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(d) In zones adjacent to ranchos which are undergoing a 
process of expansion; 
(e) In zones adjacent to areas where high income people 
live, where those who provide them with many services 
usually locate; 
(f) In vacant and uncontrolled areas; and 
(g) In territories allocated or donated by the proper muni-
cipal authorities which are designed to relieve the 
pressure on the land caused by the rancho dwellers. 
It is generally known that the ranchos are a consequence of 
certain socio-economic processes at work in most of the countries 
of Latin America. The phenomenon of squatting and slum dwelling 
is also found in the cities of Bogota with its tugurios, Rio de 
Janeiro with its favelas, Lima with its barriadas, etc. The ranchos 
of Caracas, like the favelas of Rio, are especially difficult to de-
velop, however, because of the nature of the terrain that they 
occupy. As already mentioned, not only are the ranchos located 
on the periphery of the city, they are also perched on very steep 
slopes which add rnore expenses for development. 
Some people advocate that low cost housing be provided to 
rancho dwellers and that the cost of such housing should be passed 
on to them over a long period of time. A survey of 18 rancho 
communities conducted by the Comite de Remodelacion de Barrios 
in 1964 found that average annual income per family in these 
places was Bolivares 7,023.00 (about US $1,500). Considering the 
cost of other things basic to human life, most of these families 
would not be able to exist on this income if 20 per cent or so of 
their income will go to housing costs. So long as they live in the 
ranchos, they may be able to avoid paying for housing, which, in 
effect augments their income. In public housing, however, unless 
the government is willing to provide very heavy subsidies, the 
rancho dwellers may find it very difficult to make both ends meet. 
Public Utilities and Services 
As is to be expected, many public utilities and services which 
are taken for granted as available to citizens in other urban 
centres as big as Caracas, are not within the reach of the rancho 
dwellers surveyed by the Comite de Remodelacion de Barrios. 
Two factors contribute to this lack of service: the distance of the 
peripheral area ranchos from the centre of town and the difficult 
hilly terrain which they occupy. 
The surveys found that eighty per cent of the families living 
in the ranchos do not have a ready access to water and that a 
much higher percentage does not have toilet facilities. These facts, 
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of course, contribute to a serious sanitation problem in these 
communities. In most instances, drinking water is available only 
on the lower parts of the slopes and people have to descend down 
the steep hillsides to get it. The same difficulties are encountered 
in disposing of dirty water and sewerage. 
In certain places, the government provides free water to 
rancho dwellers. Usually, drinking water is available only in a 
central point. The people can get the water by asking for it from 
somebody in charge, who is holding the key to the water distri-
bution system. Even this type of service, however, is only avail-
able to people at certain times of the day and the rancho dwellers 
spend considerable time in getting their water supply as everyone 
congregates at the water distribution point when it is time for the 
water to be opened. 
Electricity is also provided free in most ranchos in Caracas, 
although in certain places, a minimum fee is charged. No electric 
meters are used in the ranchos. There is no telephone service in 
these areas either. 
For cooking, many people in the ranchos use bottled gas. 
However, in places where it is difficult to take the gas, kerosene 
is used. This combustible fluid has caused several accidents and 
fires in the ranchos. 
Garbage disposal in the ranchos is rarely available and 
people usually throw their garbage in vacant lots, ravines, open 
streams and nearby surroundings. The garbage trucks of the 
municipality get the garbage only on the lower and more access-
ible portions of the terrain. Since it is easier for the people to just 
dump their garbage elsewhere, the municipal services are often 
not used. 
To sum up, the general condition of public services in the 
ranchos is inadequate and appallingly ineffective. People in these 
densely populated areas have little recreational, educational and 
other facilities. In most instances, because the government con-
siders their tenure illegal, it is powerless to extend services to their 
areas. Some rancho communities organize and get together to 
make services available to them but with their low income and 
their attitude towards the government, such efforts are often also 
inadequate. 
Social and Economic Characteristics of Ranchos 
As previously stated in Table 2 above, the land area in 
Caracas occupied by ranchos has increased from 5.3 per cent of 
the total in 1930-1938 to 19.7 per cent at present. It is estimated 
that the number of people living in the ranchos has grown from 
30,000 (17 per cent of the total population) in 1930-1938, to 
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570,000 (31 per cent of the total population) in 1959-1966. 
Studies have been conducted on how this portion of the Caracas 
population lives. Such studies invariably reveal that while the 
economic conditions in the ranchos are deplorable, social relation-
ships seem to be healthy and not conducive to personal and 
social disorganization. 
In describing the social and economic conditions existing in 
ranchos, it is helpful to make a distinction between the dwelling 
itself and the people who live in it. One should also make a dis-
tinction between the early stages of a rancho and its more devel-
oped stage. The typical rancho dwelling in an area which is 
newly settled consists of a house with cardboard walls or other 
discarded materials, a zinc roof and earth flooring. Hanging 
sheets serve at times as partitions and divisions within the house. 
Sanitary conveniences rarely exist. There may be a small space 
outside the house where animals are bred and where garbage is 
collected. 
The occupant of an early rancho dwelling is usually a family 
of more than six people. The head of the family did not have 
formal education, though some of the children may have reached 
the primary grades. Total family income may be around Bolivares 
600.00 or less, with not much chance of increasing it in the near 
future. 
One noticeable fact about rancho dwellings and the people 
who live in them is the tendency of conditions to improve over a 
period of time. In time, the cardboard walls are replaced with 
stone walls, which may not be finished and polished but which 
nevertheless serve their purpose of protecting the tenants against 
the elements and providing them with privacy. The floor gets 
covered with concrete. Toilet facilities are added. More rooms 
are made as the house is expanded. The partitions inside the 
dwelling now become wood or concrete. 
In the case of ranchos in good condition, the roof is usually 
made of concrete, walls are of brick or of hollow blocks. The 
total environment is marked by bricks - especially when the house 
is composed of two or more storeys. Toilets are common. The 
rancho owner even constructs a terrace for the restful hours, which, 
combined with the excellent view provided by living on the hillside, 
becomes a bit of luxury. Many such ranchos in good condition 
are located in the areas that were settled earlier, usually those 
closer to the city and located in less steep inclines. 
In most cases, the rancho dweller in the improved settlements 
has steady employment, usually as a skilled laborer. There may 
also be several people working and contributing to the total family 
income - the wife, older children, even extended family members. 
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The younger children usually attend school and are likely to go 
beyond the educational attainment of their parents. The outlook 
of the family is optimistic, with, perhaps, a dream of owning their 
middle class home later in another part of town. 
The improvement in the rancho dwelling and the people is 
recognized by the National Census organization in Venezuela. 
Generally, the census definition for a rancho includes "all housing 
in a surrounding predominated by ranchos, marked by the char-
acteristic construction of the dwellings." However, the census also 
states that a rancho which is improved by substituting its original 
materials into a house is qualified as a house and its inhabitants 
are called houseowners. 
In a survey made in 1968 in a squatter area close to the centre 
of town the economic and social characteristics of rancho dwellers 
in a relatively old area were revealed. In this community of some 
500 families, there were about 577 men of employable age (15 
years and above) who were surveyed. The study showed that 72.5 
per cent of these were gainfully employed. Of those not included 
in this figure, 14.5 per cent did not specify their means of employ-
ment, 14.3 per cent were unemployed, and 2.7 per cent were 
students. All in all, a little less than half of the men had temporary 
employment while the rest had steady jobs. 
Of the men as a whole, 20.5 per cent were unskilled labourers, 
16.5 per cent were ski lied laborers, 15.3 per cent were drivers {cars, 
taxis and trucks), 6.4 per cent were office workers, 4.5 per cent 
were civil servants, 2.4 per cent were peddlers, 1.8 per cent were 
small businessmen and 1.8 per cent were in the military service. 
As previously mentioned, the remaining 27.5 per cent of the men 
were unemployed, students, or they did not specify their sources of 
income. 
It is noticeable from the jobs of rancho dwellers mentioned 
above that a great majority of them had wage-earning jobs instead 
of being in business for themselves. Ray, in his study of life in 
Venezuela's barrios also pointed out the fact that in contrast with 
squatters in other Latin American cities, those in Caracas do not 
seem to have a strong entrepreneurial inclination. Thus, many 
squatters are truly economically "marginal," in the sense that they 
do not seem to be fully participating in the city's economic system.5 
As far as education is concerned, the study showed that a 
quarter of the adult males in this community were illiterate. Sixty 
per cent of them had taken some courses at the elementary school 
level. This low level of education and type of jobs correlate sig-
nificantly. They are, in turn, related to the income levels of the 
families in the area: 35 per cent earned Bolivares 600.00 or less 
per month, 30 per cent earned between Bolivares 600.00 and 
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1,000.00 per month, and the rest earned more than Bolivares 
1,000.00. Among the families, a full 40 per cent stated that their 
income is earned by two or more persons and not just by the head 
of the family. 
As for as social life is concerned, some of the patterns which 
hove been found in rancho areas in Caracas by Roy were as 
follows: (1) the social assimilation of rancho dwellers into the city 
seems to be more successful than their economic assimilation, 
mainly because of on attitude of egalitarianism among the barrio 
residents; (2) women in the ranchos participate in social and 
political life actively; (3) rancho dwellers do not seem to maintain 
close ties with their places of origin; (4) rancho dwellers do not 
seem to hove close community sociability and cohesion.6 
In his studies, Roy found that the overage rancho dweller is 
not owed by people in authority or those who ore supposed to 
hove wealth and status. He tends to be self-assured, aware of his 
rights, and able to think for himself. This spirit of egalitarianism, 
according to Roy, makes it easier for the rancho dweller to find his 
place in the urban society. Women shore this egalitarianism too. 
They participate actively in community affairs. Many of them also 
refuse to accept jobs as maids and domestics because they feel 
that it is degrading. Roy explains the lock of close ties with the 
place of origin of the overage rancho dweller to the fact that most 
of them have been conuqueros or landless tenants, who did not 
hove a rich community-centered culture and who felt that they did 
not hove much which was left behind. Finally, though there ore 
exceptions, most communities do not seem to hove the cohesion 
and spirit which ore so true in Asian, African and other Latin 
American low income settlements. Roy attributes this lock of 
sociability to the heterogeneous character of the ranchos, the lock 
of community-centered culture in the rural areas mentioned above, 
and the need to constantly eke out a living. However, involvement 
in community projects seems to be generating a sense of community 
in certain barrios and community development programmes ore 
slowly having results.7 
Past, Present and Proposed Solutions 
Solutions to the problem posed by squatters and slum dwellers 
in Caracas hove basically been of two types: the provision of low 
cost housing and the improvement of conditions of the people in 
the ranchos themselves. Various types of low cost houses hove 
been constructed or subsidized by the government for the rancho 
dwellers. These ranged oil the way from single-family detached 
homes to superbloques or big apartment complexes which were 
constructed in great numbers during the regime of Morcos Perez 
Jimenez who ruled Venezuela in the l 950's. Improvement of con-
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ditions in the ranchos has taken the form of community develop-
ment and community organization, with emphasis on the involve-
ment and cooperation of the people themselves. 
The national organization charged with solving the housing 
problem in Venezuela is the Banco Obrero (Workers' Bank), an 
institution founded in 1928. The bank builds low cost housing and 
extends loans to people who want to build low cost housing. As 
early as 1943, Banco Obrero already had a full-scale housing 
programme, a notable project of which included Urbanizacion El 
Silencio, an effort to provide houses to families living in Caracas. 
At present, Banco Obrero has expanded its work beyond provision 
of housing and credit to include social work and community organ-
ization, especially through one of its units, the so-called "Depart-
mento de Urbanizacion y Equipamiento de Barrios," which attempts 
to cope with problems of slums and squatters with the help of 
the people living in such low income areas. 
Banco Obrero is concerned with the construction of housing in 
cities with more than 25,000 inhabitants. Credit is extended to 
families who own a piece of land, composed of not less than three 
persons, and who have a combined income of not more than 
Bolivares 1,200.00 a month. For families with incomes higher than 
this, the limit is a per-capita income not exceeding Bolivares 250.00 
per month. 
The maximum amount for low cost housing that a family can 
get from the Banco Obrero is Bolivares 30,000.00 ($6,500.00). 
Terms of the loan are for 30 years at 4 per cent interest per year. 
The family applying for a loan must already have a piece of land 
worth not more than Bolivares 40,000.00. When a person borrows 
from the Banco Obrero, the legal contract in favour of the muni-
cipality where the house and lot are located should be registered. 
The construction plans have to be approved by the municipal 
authorities. Finally, a budget of the total work to be done must be 
included with the application for a housing loan. 
Aside from single-family houses, such as the ones mentioned 
above, the Banco Obrero also enters into multiple family housing. 
The bank itself constructs the apartment complexes and sells them 
as condominiums. Each apartment should not cost more than 
Bolivares 20,000.00. They are payable within a period of 30 
years, at an annual interest rate of 4 per cent. People who pur-
chase the apartments are usually asked to give an advance 
equivalent to 10 per cent of the value of the apartment. 
Since 1928, Banco Obrero has built a total of 75,658 apart-
ments with 36,636 units of these located in the Caracas metro-
politan area. Obviously, this answers only a small portion of the 
housing market. One great limitation is the fact that the Banco 
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Obrero provides loans to people who have an income of at least 
Bolivares l ,200.00 a month. Since most rancho dwellers have 
much less than this income level, they usually cannot be helped 
by this organization directly. 
For people whose income is too low for extending credit to 
them, the Departamento de Urbanizacion y Equipamiento de 
Barrios of the Banco Obrero has developed specific approaches. 
Housing for families with incomes between Bolivares 200 to 600 
per month, for example, is carried out through a "self-construction" 
system, involving the efforts of the rancho dweller himself. This 
process is still experimental up to now but it promises to make low 
cost housing assistance to people who would not ordinarily be 
reached by the bank's programmes. 
For communities with a population of less than 25,000, the 
national organization charged with housing is the Vivienda Rural. 
This organization provides housing construction to people in the 
rural areas, especially those covered by land reform programmes. 
It is not too active in the Caracas metropolitan area, however, 
although conceivably, if it does its job in the rural areas well, 
there is a possibility that people will not leave the rural areas too 
much and the problems of Caracas will be lessened. 
Another organization which provides low cost housing is the 
Foundation for Community Development and Municipal Improve-
ment (Fundacomun), a semi-public organization which constructs 
houses in communities with l 0,000 to 25,000 inhabitants. A more 
important task of Fundacomun, however, is community develop-
ment, which forms part of the national plan for "Desarollo de la 
Comunidad" developed by the Oficina Central de Coordinacion y 
Planificacion (Cordiplan) since 1959. The plan coordinates national, 
state and community plans for community development and makes 
sure that the administrative machinery for this purpose is well 
integrated. Special attention has been given in this regard in co-
ordinating programmes of rural housing with community develop-
ment. 
The main efforts in the national community development plan 
are covered in four important problem areas: (l) environmental 
sanitation; (2) education and recreation; (3) transport and com-
munication; and (4) economic development and improvement of 
human resources. Experience in conducting these programmes has 
shown that their success depends not only on the size and types of 
communities covered but also on the degree of urbanization, the 
capacity of the leaders of the community and the cooperative spirit 
among the people. 
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In this type of programme, the contribution of the community 
is always important. It may take the form of labor, money, or 
other economic resources. In the development of projects, the 
particular resource of the community and of the government organ-
ization have to be well considered. Thus, sharing of efforts may 
take the form of the government agency contributing the financial 
means to construct a community centre, while the community's con-
tributions take the form of free labor. Such cooperation may also 
be found in the construction and repair of roads, waterworks sys-
tems, control of erosion of slopes during times of strong rains, etc. 
In the urban programmes of community development, three 
types of programmes have been introduced. First, there are pro-
grammes to rezone the urban areas so as to put the marginal and 
uncontrolled settlements under the control of the authorities and 
to prevent their invasion by ranchos. Second, there are pro-
grammes of relocation of rancho inhabitants to the superbloques, 
back to the provinces, or to new squatter developments within 
the city. Finally, there are programmes to renew the surroundings 
of the ranchos in such a way that their physical and social environ-
ments are improved. 
So far, these types of programmes have contributed a great 
deal to alleviating the conditions in the ranchos of Caracas. How-
ever, they are only palliatives and do not really provide lasting 
solutions. The improvement of life in the ranchos is closely de-
pendent on the improvement of life in the whole city and the 
country. In the final analysis, also, it is dependent on the improve-
ment of the life of the rancho dwellers themselves. 
In general, therefore, there are three phases which are in-
volved in evolving a solution to the problems of migrants, squatters 
and slum dwellers. The first phase is promotional and it involves 
the motivation of the people living in the ranchos to attempt to 
improve their own lot. The government can achieve success in this 
phase without too many problems by extending services to those 
who initially need them, such as to people requiring medical 
attention, family support, etc. The government enlists the co-
operation of the people at this stage and kindles their enthusiasm 
for programmes of training, skill improvement and employment, 
designed to improve their economic capabilities in the long run. 
The second phase of the process of improvement is skill 
development, which may be done by the government by com-
bining entertainment and training programmes in such a way that 
they do not appear like separate stages. The training should be 
done under real working conditions as much as possible. Technical 
competence in the job is not the only aspect in this training phase. 
Motivation and interest in the job are equally as important. 
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The third phase in the process is actual employment, which 
involves providing the opportunity for the skills to be applied. In 
this regard, jobs that command fair wages need not be held as 
more important than those where entrepreneurial ability is required. 
In fact, the latter types of occupations may be better for com-
munity improvement in the long run because they contribute to the 
rapid development of the individual. In the skill development 
phase, therefore, attention must be given to such things as admini-
stration of small enterprises, financial management, production, 
simple bookkeeping and other skills. 
More specifically, as far as conditions in Caracas are con-
cerned, there is a need for a number of actions which the govern-
ment has to take so as to cope effectively with the problems posed 
by rapid migration, squatting and the growth of slums. These 
actions require the participation of the national, state and muni-
cipal levels of government. They also must be based on full co-
operation of the citizenry because without this, the government's 
programmes will most likely fail. 
Some of these actions which have to be taken are: 
1. The government must adopt a land policy which will de-
termine what uses are to be allocated to all land in the Caracas 
urban area. Such a policy must be geared to present land uses 
and future developments. It must also be translated into specific 
control measures such as zoning codes, subdivision regulations, 
etc., which will contribute to rational use of land. 
2. A policy of urban renewal in the city is needed. This 
policy should specify what to do with large areas currently under-
going a process of deterioration and which are characterized by 
very high densities. Sparsely populated areas should also be con-
sidered in this renewal programme. In general, the scarcity of 
the land and the high costs involved should be considered side by 
side with human effects and aesthetics in an urban renewal pro-
gramme. 
3. The private sector must be encouraged to invest in urban 
amenities, especially housing. In particular, private banks should 
be able to increase their investments in housing. Business organ-
izations must also contribute to the urban services needed by their 
employees. The private sector, in general, should find low cost 
housing profitable enough to invest in it. 
4. Research and development must be encouraged so as to 
find out more about conditions in the urban environment and to 
develop new methods and techniques in construction, new mate-
rials, new urban concepts, etc. 
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5. Housing efforts of the government should be coordinated. 
There is a need, for example, for a National Housing Institute 
which would have the responsibility for the development of hous-
ing plans, especially for the rancho dwellers. 
6. There is a need for increased investment in public services. 
The transport system in Caracas, for example, is fast becoming 
inadequate. Schools are not meeting the demand. Communal ser-
vices which do not only extend the service but develop community 
unity and cooperation are also not provided widely enough. 
More important, the provision of such services should be done in 
a coordinated and rational manner, following a set of priorities 
which are determined on the basis of need and the meagre re-
sources available to the metropolis. 
7. Finally, there is a need for a full regional viewpoint in 
the efforts to solve the problems of Caracas. The division of the 
area into two districts does not contribute to coordination. The 
presence of overlapping layers of authority also adds to confusion. 
If the problems of Caracas are to be effectively solved, a regional 
development policy must be evolved. This should be supported 
by the necessary administrative machinery that would make sure 
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CONTRARY to the views sometimes put forward by European and 
American writers, urbanism in Nigeria (and indeed in some other 
parts of Africa) is not a recent phenomenon. It did not owe its 
origin to pax Britannia. Some Nigerian cities are as old as some of 
the ancient cities of Europe. Northern Nigerian cities such as 
Kano, Katsina and Sokoto participated vigorously in the world-
wide commercial activities that characterized the medieval period. 
Although the Fulani Jihad of 1804 to 1810 resulted in the destruc-
tion of a number of Northern towns, several survived and even 
thrived while new ones like Gwandu, Gombe and Katagum were 
founded. 
According to the estimates of population of cities of Northern 
Nigeria during the first half of the nineteenth century, Sokoto 
had an average annual population of about 120,000 (1825-27). 
There were four cities - Argonou, Deegoa, Kano and Zaria -
which had estimated populations of between 30,000 and 50,000 
each. There were at least twelve other towns whose populations 
ranged from l 0,000 to 25,000 during the same period. 
The pre-European urbanization of Western Nigeria was even 
in some cases more developed than that of the North. Although it 
is definitely an exaggeration to claim that in pre-British days, 
"every Yoruba (i.e., Western Nigerian) was a town dweller 
whatever his calling"1 the Yorubas were by and large town-
dwellers. Towns such as Ibadan, llorin, lwo, Abeokuta, Oshogbo 
and Ede had estimated populations which ranged from 50,000 to 
over l 00,000 by the middle of the nineteenth century. Next came 
Lagos, Oyo, ljaiye, Epe, ljebu-Ode, Ogbomosho, lseyin, Oke Odon 
and Addo with populations ranging from 20,000 to 50,000. In 
The author wishes to acknowledge his indebtedness to Mr. J. K. Akingbade of the 
Institute of Administration, University of lfe, for assisting on the earlier drafts of the 
paper. 
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addition, there was a large number of towns with populations of 
between 5,000 and 20,000. 
Unlike the Northern towns which were major trade centres 
closely linked with the trans-Sahara trade route and producing 
craft goods for the international market, Yoruba (Western Nigerian) 
towns were basically administrative centres. Economically, how-
ever, Yoruba towns were and, to a large extent, still are 'agri-
cultural towns' in the sense that they are agriculturally based and 
the product of intimate links between town and country. "The 
Yoruba living in the country traditionally looks upon the town as 
his real home and owes direct social allegiance to it."2 His farm 
is within walking distance from the town. He may stay on his 
farm for a while during periods of intensive work, but he will 
return to the town for all important events as well as do his 
shopping there. 
Thus most Nigerian cities of today, particularly those of the 
North and the West, have been in existence for a very long time. 
These urban centres are "an amalgamation of two contrasting 
levels of urbanization; a traditional, almost medieval, pre-industrial 
urbanization and an advanced, industrial urbanization."3 
Origins and Growth of Ibadan 
As far as Nigerian cities are concerned, Ibadan is a city of 
relatively recent origin. It was formerly a small Egba village4 
which later became a military camp in the nineteenth century. 
Ibadan grew because an effective power-class was able to guar-
antee internal peace and security to its inhabitants. Immigrants 
from many other parts of Yorubaland were accordingly attracted 
to it. Ibadan soon developed into a refuge camp for "fugitives 
from justice, wild and wicked men expelled from adjacent towns, 
rebels and robbers".5 
By the middle of the nineteenth century, Ibadan had grown 
remarkably. This was confirmed by the first European ever to set 
foot in the city, the Rev. David Hinderer of the Church Missionary 
Society who arrived there in 1857. At that time, he wrote that 
"Ibadan is a large Yoruba town (with a population of about 
l 00,000). Though Ibadan is professedly a town of warriors, or 
as they say, 'a war encampment', yet there is a good deal of 
industry to be seen in and about the town".6 
Right from the beginning, Ibadan attracted migrants from 
various parts of the Yoruba country and later from various parts 
of Nigeria. As a result of its location, it grew very rapidly during 
the second half of the nineteenth century and became the empor-
ium for trade in Yorubaland. In 1893, the British influence spread 
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to the city and Ibadan became part of the British protectorate. 
This development created conditions for peace and security and 
thus opened the way for more development. The construction of 
a railway system in 1901 ushered in new opportunities for the 
further development of the city. 
Ibadan is different from other traditional Yoruba towns in two 
respects. First, the layout of the city is not like those of other 
Yoruba towns because the head of the city is not an Oba (King). 
Since it is the presence of an Oba that gives town status to any 
settlement in Yoruba land, the Oba's palace is usually placed in 
the centre of the town.7 In front of an Oba's palace is usually 
found a market place for the town. Both the palace and the market 
form the hub from which all roads leading to various parts of the 
town and the neighbouring towns radiate.8 In Ibadan there is 
no such palace because the village head is not an Oba. He was 
regarded as a Bale and later, an Olubadan. 
Secondly, in a traditional Yoruba town, succession to chief-
taincy titles is hereditary. Again this is not so in Ibadan where 
there is an absence of hereditary rights to chieftaincy titles. A 
unique system whereby any member of the established families 
could, by promotion, rise to become the village head was adopted 
right from Ibadan's inception. 
According to the 1963 census, Ibadan had a population of 
627,379 as compared with an estimated population of l 00,000 
inhabitants in 1857. There have been rapid and significant in-
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It is seen in the figures in Table I that Ibadan's growth has not 
been particularly rapid, compared to the average rate of growth 
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of Lagos, the capital city. The rate of growth was relatively rapid 
in Ibadan, however, immediately before the Second World War. 
Unfortunately, relatively little information is available on whether 
Ibadan's population growth is primarily due to internal migration 
or natural population increase. Certainly, the growth in the 
1921-1931 decade is too fast to be accounted for by natural 
increase, however, indicating that internal migration played a 
significant part during this period. 
Government of the City 
In the early days of its existence, Ibadan was governed by the 
Olubadan {formerly Bale) and his chiefs. As already pointed out, 
the history of the founding of Ibadan did not recognize "the con-
stitutional pattern based on a sacred hereditary monarch, but gave 
political authority to men who showed the qualities of bravery, 
wealth, leadership, youthful vigour and experience which the city 
needed in the early difficult years."9 Junior chiefs were recruited 
from among the ranks of compound heads known as mogaji. These 
junior chiefs in turn could become senior chiefs in both the Oluba-
dan (civil) chieftaincy line and in the Balogun (military) chieftaincy 
line by promotion in the event of vacancies occurring. Any senior 
chief could by this process become the Olubadan. 
By the treaty of 1893, the city of Ibadan came under the pro-
tection of the Queen of England. This protection did not come 
as a result of any negotiation, but as a result of the coercion by 
the British representatives in Lagos. The British had direct dealings 
with the chiefs in whose hands they were content to leave the 
government of the city, subject, of course, to the pleasure of the 
Alafln (King) of Oyo and the British officials. The Alafln of Oyo 
was an Oba with a crown and since Ibadan had no crowned head, 
Ibadan was placed under the suzerainty of the Alafln of Oyo. 
The then Alafln of Oyo and the British Resident stationed at Oyo 
ruled the city with an iron hand. The situation was however 
reversed between 1931-1936 when a more sympathetic and under-
standing British Resident replaced the autocratic and extremely 
brutal one. He changed the name Bale of Ibadan to Olubadan 
(owner of Ibadan) and gave the lbadans almost complete control 
over their own affairs. This, of course, annoyed the Alafln of Oyo, 
but he could do nothing. 
During the colonial period, the city was governed through a 
system of indirect rule. A Native Authority was established by the 
colonial administration and the Olubadan, his chiefs and some 
other important persons in the community were constituted into 
this body. Their function was subject to the supervision and control 
of the British Resident and his officials, the District Officers. 
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In 1952, democratic local government was introduced in West-
ern Nigeria. The people had opposed the Native Authority system 
for years as it was contrary to their custom of mass participation 
in governing the city. Besides, the Native Authorities were very 
autocratic. It was therefore not surprising that as soon as Nigerians 
became Ministers of State in Western Nigeria they scrapped the 
Native Authority system. A local government law empowering 
the regional government to establish local authorities all over 
the region was enacted. 
In accordance with this law, Ibadan and its environs (a sort 
of metropolitan area) were constituted into a District Council. The 
Olubadan of Ibadan became the President of the Council while 
a third of the members were traditional chiefs who by virtue of 
their positions were made ex-officio members. The remaining two-
thirds were directly elected members by universal adult suffrage 
from the various wards into which the District had been delimited. 
In this democratically constituted Council, the real power was 
vested in the elected members. It is from among this group that 
the Chairman was elected and all the functional committees with 
the exception of the chieftaincy committee were dominated by 
elected members. This change brushed aside the power and 
influence of the chiefs. The Olubadan however remained the 
constitutional head of the council and as such he performed only 
ceremonial functions such as declaring open the annual general 
meeting of the council. 
In 1961 the Ibadan District Council area (metropolitan area) 
was considered too large to be effectively administered as a local 
government unit. It was therefore decided that the outlying dis-
tricts should be constituted into local government units and the 
city of Ibadan should constitute a separate unit. In order to keep 
the affinity of the people together a Divisional Council was also 
established - thus creating a two-tier system of local government 
in Ibadan. 
With time, however, the Divisional Council proved rather in-
effective. It constituted itself into a stumbling block and its relation-
ship with the district councils became far from being harmonious. 
The Council was subsequently abolished and the Ibadan City 
Council and the other Councils in the Ibadan area were given 
separate and autonomous existence. 
The Ibadan City Council has the powers to make by-laws regu-
lating certain social behaviours in the city. Among its functions are 
the provision of amenities in the fields of health, education (at the 
primary school level), works, transportation and administration. 
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Since the military authorities assumed political control in 
Nigeria in 1966, elected councils have been dissolved. In their 
place government officers were appointed sole administrators to 
manage the affairs of the Councils. Consequently, Ibadan City 
is at the time of writing, being ruled by a Sole Administrator with-
out any committee to advise him. 
Problems of Migration 
Ibadan, like the other towns in Western Nigeria, is basically 
still an "agricultural town". By this, we mean that it is an agricul-
turally-based town. Its dominance and its size are not necessarily 
the functions of an emerging modern economy. A large number 
of Ibadan's inhabitants still own their farms, living on them during 
the week and returning to the city on weekends and festival days. 
In such a situation, therefore, the problem of rural-urban migration 
is quite different from what exists in a modern metropolis such 
as Lagos. 
One interesting trait of internal migration to and from Ibadan 
is that within the lifetime of an individual, he may reside in the 
country or the city several times, depending on many circumstances. 
Some authors have cited this phenomenon, which is found in other 
African cities, as proof that the process of urbanization is not 
"irreversible," as has too often been thought. 
Two main factors have been proposed to account for this type 
of internal migration: the family, tribal and community ties of the 
African migrant and the land tenure system prevailing in most 
African countries. In the case of the primarily agricultural Yoruba, 
of course, these two variables are closely related. 
Influenced by the rural-urban dichotomy concept, many theorists 
have seen the process of urbanization as the eroding of family, 
tribal and community ties and their replacement with associational 
and functional bonds. In the case of African urbanization, how-
ever, we find that the erosion of such ties is very slow, that many 
of the traditional structures, in fact, are carried to the city by 
migrants. Ethnic ties are strong determinants of where a migrant 
will live in the city. The voluntary associations and wards he joins 
are mostly determined by his own ethnic identification.10 In fact, 
Cohen has even proposed that in the case of the Hausa in Ibadan, 
a process of "retribalization" occurs, by which the ethnic identity 
of the migrant is strongly emphasized and that values, myths, 
symbols and ceremonies from the traditional culture are consciously 
manipulated "in order to develop an informal political organiza-
tion which they (the Hausa) use as a weapon in their struggle 
for power and privilege within contemporary political situations."11 
Since the ethnic ties remain intact even in the urban area, the 
migrant African can return to his rural community with ease. 
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Several studies of lower income Nigerians reveal that the 
migrant does return to his "home town" quite often. This tendency 
is explained by one author in the following manner: 
Within the Yoruba culture, identification with one's 
home town/city is very strong. When a Yoruba man 
migrates to any other place, however successful he may 
become, he still maintains a link with his home town, 
identifies himself with that town, and in most cases, joins 
an ethnic association formed by other citizens of his 
home town residing with him in the new working place. 
To him, the new place, whether a large city or a metro-
politan center, is a "farm", and his original home town 
whether it is a village or a hamlet, is "home". If he is 
successful, this identification is expressed by setting up 
a house in his home town, building a show-piece mansion 
there, or, in rare cases, investing in economic enterprises 
in his town.12 
Another reason for the migrant's return to his place of origTn 
is the African land tenure system. According to Oluwasanmi, 
"The peasant cultivator is a sort of tenant at will who has posses-
sory rights in land which he enjoys in perpetuity and as long as 
he uses the land in a manner beneficial both to himself and to 
society."13 While the Nigerian farmer has undisputed right to the 
produce from the land, however, he has no power to sell the 
land to anyone. As such, to maintain control over it, he has to 
work it, usually with the help of his family, relatives and friends. 
Hence, the African migrant has to periodically return to his place 
of origin to work the farm, if he is not to lose it. 
Today, the dominance of Ibadan is perpetuated by its being 
the seat of the government of Western Nigeria. It has also 
attracted Nigeria's premier institution of higher learning - the 
University of Ibadan with its large University College Teaching 
Hospital and several other educational institutions. Ibadan is 
Nigeria's major cocoa market. On the whole its large population 
or size cannot be explained in terms of modern industry which it 
lacks. Ibadan's petty traders far outnumber persons engaged in 
any other economic activity. It is no doubt due to the lack of the 
development of modern industrial activities in Ibadan that there 
has been little metropolitan development around the city. Until 
it undertakes in sufficient degree those economic functions which 
promote and sustain metropolitan growth such a development 
cannot take place. 
Partly because of the industrial limitations, the growth of Ibadan 
has not been phenomenal. The population increased at an average 
annual rate of less than 2.0 per cent between 1857 and 1911; 
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by 3.6 per cent between 1911 and 1921; 6.2 per cent between 
1921 and 1931; 0.8 per cent between 1931 and 1952; and 3.3 
per cent between 1952 and 1963. During the past half century, 
the cumulative rate of growth of Ibadan has been a little over 3.0 
per cent per annum, which is only a little over the natural rate 
of growth of the total population. 
In spite of what has been said above, there is no doubt that 
there is quite a sizeable net inmigration to the city every year -
the migrants being principally school leavers seeking jobs in gov-
ernment departments, commercial houses, and the few industrial 
concerns in the city. The city's flourishing trade also attracts an 
increasing number of traders seeking profitable outlets for their 
wares. 
Although these migrants come from far and wide in the 
federation of Nigeria, they are predominantly drawn from the 
other Yoruba towns of the West. As the table below shows, Ibadan 
is overwhelmingly a Yoruba town. According to the 1952 Census, 
only 5.3 per cent of its residents are not Yoruba. Although this 
ratio could have increased since 1952, the overwhelming majority 
of the inhabitants of Ibadan (about 85 to 90 per cent) are still 
Yoruba. 
Table 2 
Ethnic Composition of Ibadan, 1952 
(in percentages) 
Western 
Ethnic Groups Ibadan Nigeria National 
Yoruba 94.7 70.8 17.0 
Hausa/Fulani 1.2 0.8 28.2 
Ibo 1.6 5.9 18.0 
Other Northern Ethnic 
Groups 0.5 0.3 11.3 
Other Southern Ethnic 
Groups 1.9 22.0 25.4 
Non-Nigerians 0.1 0.2 0.1 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: A. L. Mabogunje, Urbanization in Nigeria, op. cit., Table 27, p. 217. 
Unemployment and Underemployment 
The annual migration of school leavers to Ibadan (principally 
from the different parts of Western Nigeria) has inevitably created 
problems of unemployment since available employment oppor-
tunities in the city are not adequate to cope with the demand. 
62 
Some of the inmigrants lack any basic skills or sound general 
education, making them unemployable. 
Unemployment brings in its trail all sorts of social problems 
but the extended family system does make it possible for the 
inmigrants to stay with some relatives however distant, so that 
the problem of squatting for purposes of habitation rarely arises. 
The problem of overcrowding persists, however. The houses, par-
ticularly in the older parts of the city, are clustered together 
without proper ventilation. The migrants who stay in these houses 
contribute to this problem and to slum creation in the city. 
In addition to problems of unemployment, there are those of 
underemployment. Economists have for years assumed that under-
employment is a rural phenomenon. However, in urban centres 
in developing countries, underemployment is also a big problem. 
In Ibadan, underemployment is readily apparent among people 
who earn their living by small trading. A majority of petty traders 
are usually underemployed. The attraction of petty trading lies 
primarily in the fact that one can start with little or no capital. 
The result is that there are too many people engaged in the activity 
compared to what is economically justified. They remain in it, 
even though they are making rather meagre profits, simply because 
there is an almost complete lack of alternatives and more profitable 
opportunities. 
Slums in Ibadan 
Ibadan is an old native city. Although if has grown consider-
ably in size, its physical development has been haphazard. The 
older parts of the inner city have not been renewed. Town plan-
ning is far from being effective and there are no minimum 
standards laid down for housing. The city centre is therefore full 
of substandard housing, which can be called slums while the out-
skirts have most of the modern buildings. 
Squatting for trade and commerce is also quite common. 
There is a tendency for traders to put up sheds ('shanties') any-
where in the city without the prior permission of the City Council. 
This accentuates the problem of slums. 
It has been estimated that about 50 per cent of the city area is 
occupied by slum dwellings. Mabogunje states that "these are 
dwellings usually built of mud, having no identifiable sanitation 
facilities, and generally in conditions of physical deterioration."14 
Slums are concentrated in the inner core of the city and the older 
suburbs. In the newer suburbs, mainly in the east and north-west 
sectors of Ibadan, considerable jerry-building has also occurred. 
It is estimated, therefore, that combining the new and old slum 
developments, some 70 to 80 per cent of the population of Ibadan 
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Slum Clearance 
Ibadan being the capital city of Western Nigeria, the responsi-
bility for ensuring that it is a worthy capital is jointly shared 
between the state government and the city council with the latter 
being a prime mover. Unfortunately this has not been so in 
practice. In spite of internal migration to the city, the indigeneous 
population still predominates. This indigeneous population lives in 
the older parts of the city where the problems of slums are par-
ticularly serious. Unfortunately because of their large population, 
the indigeneous people dominate the Council and thwart any 
attempt to undertake slum clearance. As a matter of fact, they 
even refuse to accept that slums constitute a problem. 
The State Government on its part appears to have recognized 
several years ago that the older parts of the City need to be rebuilt. 
In the 1962-68 Development Plan of the Government a paragraph 
headed "Ibadan Slum Clearance' reads as follows: 
"It has been pointed out ... that Ibadan is one of the 
fastest growing cities in the Region. In addition, not only 
is it the Regional Capital, it is also one of the main cul-
tural centres in the country. If Ibadan is to continue to 
play its role in the economic and cultural development 
of Nigeria it is essential that it should cease to be two 
cities in one - a modern well planned suburban and an 
old unplanned centre full of slums. Preparatory to the 
launching of a slum clearance scheme, it is necessary to 
undertake detailed investigations into the economic, 
social and cultural problems involved".16 
Although the government earmarked some funds in the Plan 
for the slum clearance project, no positive action appears to have 
been taken since 1962. Ibadan still remains very much two cities 
in one. The recently published 1970/7 4 Development Plan even 
makes no reference to the need for a slum clearance scheme in 
Ibadan. Has the government quietly dropped the project in the 
face of the opposition from the city fathers? Or is it overawed 
by the enormous financial and social costs which the project will 
eventually involve that it has developed cold feet? 
It must be pointed out that the government has during the 
past twelve to fifteen years taken a number of measures designed 
to ameliorate the situation. In 1958, it set up a housing estate in 
the outskirts of Ibadan. This experiment has proved very success-
ful. The Bodija Housing Estate now provides dwelling houses for 
hundreds of upper and middle class families in Ibadan. Between 
1959 and 1966, the Western Nigeria Housing Corporation (WNHC) 
which is responsible for developing the estate had built 322 houses 
of varying standards. Seven different house-types have been built 
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to date to cater to differences in incomes and tastes. These range 
from a small detached two-bedroom bungalow costing between 
£Nl,OOO and £Nl,100 to a detached house in two self-contained 
three-bedroom flats costing a little over £N.4,000. (£N 1 =US $2.80). 
In addition, the WNHC provided mortgages to those who wish 
to build their own houses either on the Estate or elsewhere in the 
City. These mortgages are however not confined to Ibadan although 
about 60 per cent are on houses in the city. Between 1958 and 
1966, the Corporation spent £N2.00 million on mortgages. 
As already pointed out the development of the Bodija housing 
estate (and, indeed, of the other housing estates in the West) has 
benefitted the upper and middle classes. Practically nothing has 
been done for the low-income groups that constitute the masses 
and for whom scarcity of accommodation is most acute. Low cost 
housing is still in the realm of ideas rather than of possibilities in 
Nigeria. The cheapest house in the Bodija Estate is £Nl,OOO. The 
high cost of building materials and labour and the reluctance of the 
Corporation to use local building materials are two major factors 
responsible for the high cost of constructing the houses. However 
the estate has continued to have a demonstration effect on the 
private construction industry in Ibadan. Private developers have 
emulated the high standards of the estate. But in order to meet 
the specific needs of the low income people majority of whom 
are slum dwellers, there is an urgent need for the City Council 
to build Council flats which will be rented to low income people at 
subsidized rates. 
One other way in which the decongestion of the heavily popu-
lated parts of the city can be achieved is through town planning. 
Although there is a town planning authority for Ibadan which is 
charged with the responsibility of ensuring the orderly develop-
ment of the city, its impact has not been particularly felt because 
it has no overriding powers over land development in the City. 
There is no "master plan" for the development of the City. All 
the town planning authority does is to approve layouts for indi-
vidual developers. It also approves building plans in order to 
ensure that basic standards of sanitation, ventilation and con-
struction are maintained. But this activity of the authority is con-
fined to the newly developing areas within the City and excludes 
the older parts where most of the slums are situated. 
Wastes Disposal and Drainage Project 
In addition to the problems of slums, there is the menace of 
frequent and disastrous flooding of the city's two rivers. There 
are also the problems of drainage and solid waste disposal which 
have for years remained unsolved. The government has in the 
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1970-7 4 Development Plan decided to embark on flood control, 
sewerage, and the construction of solid waste collection and 
disposal facilities. These schemes which are expected to cost 
£N4.045M are made up as follows: 
Table 3 
Public Works Schemes in Development Plan 
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Source: Western State Development Plan 1970-74. Table xxv. 
Conclusion 
There is no doubt that Ibadan's dualistic nature will sooner or 
later have to give way to modern industrialism. The infra-structures 
for this are already being provided; viz., a £10,000,000 water 
project, the establishment of an industrial estate and improved 
transport system. Once Ibadan begins to attract industries the net 
migration will increase thus accentuating the social and economic 
problems of the City. The problem of slum clearance will then have 
to be faced squarely. Indeed the longer it is delayed the more 
expensive it will be. The government should insure that the City 
Council does not continue to preserve the dualistic personality of 
the City. In order to force the issue, it may be necessary to inject 
into the Council a large number of enlightened and imaginative 
leaders who can share the power now concentrated in the hands 
of the traditional urbanites. 
With regard to inmigration to the city particularly by job-
seeking school leavers, the time has no doubt come for the Govern-
ment to have a clear cut policy on rural-urban migration. Such a 
policy will not be a negative one of discouraging people from 
migrating from the rural areas but a positive one of ameliorating 
the conditions of living in the rural areas, of making them com-
parable to what obtains in the urban centres, and of providing 
economic and employment opportunities in the rural areas. In 
1962, an integrated rural development programme was launched 
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in Western Nigeria. This programme was aimed at achieving "a 
general development and awakening of rural areas by a planned 
attack on all factors which at present tend to inhibit the rapid 
economic and social development of the villages".17 The pro-
grammes consisted of five main elements: 
(a) an aided self-help low-cost rural housing programme; 
(b) an environmental sanitation scheme; 
(c) an agricultural improvement programme; 
(d) a rural industries programme; and, 
(e) the planning and reconstruction of villages. 
Had this programme of integrated rural development been suc-
cessfully implemented throughout Western Nigeria some of the 
pressures on the large cities would have been reduced. It would 
not however completely stop rural-urban migration. This policy 
of improving the conditions in the rural areas would have to be 
supplemented with an equally positive policy of improving the 
conditions of living of the masses in the urban areas. 
What is urgently required for the orderly development of 
Nigeria's cities, of which Ibadan is one of the most important, is 
for the Governments of the Federation to work out a comprehen-
sive national policy on urbanization which would include, inter 
alia, a plan for the transformation of the nation's traditional 
administrative towns into modern cities with a transportation net-
work to support industrial and commercial development. 
The sharply rising urban demands for social services and social 
overhead capital which are at present outstripping the financial 
resources of Nigeria's cities with the consequent deterioration in 
the quality of urban life make the formulation of a comprehensive 
national urban policy extremely urgent. Such a policy should 
ensure the allocation of the much needed resources to the cities, 
otherwise industrialization will be retarded and the growth of 
the national economy inhibited. The policy should also provide 
for the cultural integration of the inhabitants of Nigerian cities 
and for the preparation of inmigrants for productive economic 
activity. 
Unfortunately the very rapid rates at which Nigerian cities 
have been growing during the past twenty years has not yet 
dawned on policy makers. Indeed there has been an urban revolu-
tion in Nigeria during the past two decades. As the table below 
shows, some of the country's cities have been growing at an aver-
age annual rate of 8.0 to 11.0 per cent in some areas.18 
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Table 4 
The Growth of Towns in Nigeria 
Average Average 
Census Census annual Estimated annual 
Popula- Popula- rate of Popula- rate of 
tion tion growth lion growth 
Town 1952/53 1963 in% 1967 (in%) 
Ibadan 459,960 627,379 3.0 720,000 3.1 
Lagos 267,407 665,246 8.6 931,039 8.8 
Kano 131,316 295,432 7.6 415,210 8.9 
Zaria 92,434 166, 170 5.5 211,740 6.2 
llorin 71,296 106,692 4.0 127,465 4.1 
Kaduna 42,647 129,133 10.6 197,631 11.2 
Jos 39,050 94,451 8.5 120,641 8.5 
Port-Harcourt 59,548 179,563 10.5 
Onitsha 77,087 163,032 7.0 
Source: Leslie Green, Urbanisation and National Development, (1971). 
These figures of growth show a massive movement of people 
from rural areas to the towns - a fact which underlines the need 
for immediate action by the federal government in collaboration 
with the state governments. It can of course be argued that a rapid 
rote of urbanization is not confined to Nigeria and that it has now 
become a typical feature of developing countries particularly those 
in Africa. But this does not in any way absolve governments from 
having a comprehensive urbanization programme. Otherwise, a 
growing proportion of the urban population will continue to live 
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THE first settlement around Istanbul was set up near a little 
stream called Kurbagalidere at Kadikoy district, almost simultan-
eously with the foundation of Troy. The first settlement on the 
proper Istanbul peninsula was founded at a site called Sarayburnu 
today. It belonged to a Thracian tribe named Lygos. 
Subsequently, Greek colons (the Megareans) set up their 
colonies, first at Chalcedon (Kadikoy) and later-on at Byzantion 
(685 B.C.) The first city was a fairly rich Greek City possessing 
wholly traditional urban elements. The city flourished until 
Emperor Constantine decided to make Istanbul the capital of his 
empire. Between 324-336 A.O., a new city was constructed under 
the name of "Second Rome" and retained this name till the mid-
Vlllth century. The new imperial city was made up of fourteen 
regions and prospered with time. It did not follow the style of the 
old Greek city Byzantion. As a new settlement, it possessed the 
architectural spirit of the new Roman world. The Theodosyus walls 
fixed the limits of the city within the peninsula till the twentieth 
century. Developments through the end of the Justinian period 
established the general structure of the city. The slopes on the 
littoral of the Marmara Sea and along the coast of the Golden 
Horn contained the housing areas. The spaces remaining between 
the Golden Horn and the Marmara littoral formed the axes of 
concentration of monuments. This was especially true of the road 
which inter-connects the hills parallel to the Golden Horn and the 
Via Thriomphalis which goes from the present Beyazid to Aksaray 
and then to Cerrahpasa stretching from Altimermer to Yedikule. It 
is widely accepted that, before 1453 the population of Istanbul 
increased to 40,000-50,000. This population increased further on 
during the conquest. We can assume that, after the conquest, this 
population reached approximately 120,000 through immigration 
and compulsory settlements. 
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Arnold Von Harff acknowledges that Istanbul was a big city 
in 1496-97. In this period, the population should have been close 
to 200,000. It is estimated that more than one third of this popula-
tion settled on the hillslopes overlooking the Golden Horn which 
constituted the living quarters of the city, while it is generally 
accepted that the other third was settled on the Aksaray, Topkapi 
and Kocamustafapasa regions which were entirely evacuated 
during the last days of Byzance. 
It is estimated that during the last years of the reign of 
Suleiman The Magnificent, the population of Istanbul drew close 
to half a million. Parallel to the development in the old city, new 
settlements began to appear on the villages along the coast of 
the Bosphorus. The population of the city reached 900,000 in-
habitants at the end of the nineteenth century. The population 
census was the most reliable one made until this time and it was 
found that the city popu la ti on had reached 7 41, 148 inhabitants. 
In the same way, the demographic picture shows that the popula-
tion reached 793,7 49 in 1940; 860,558 in 1945; l,003,000 in 1950, 
and 2, 123,000 in 1965. 
Geographically, Istanbul is situated in the Marmara Region 
of Turkey. This region is a transition area between various con-
tinents, seas, climates and vegetal formations. The city boundaries 
of Istanbul are limited naturally by the Black Sea in the north and 
by the Marmara Sea in the south. The city is divided into two parts, 
an Anatolian side and European side, by the Bosphorus stretching 
from north-east to south-west. 
The Golden Horn separates the Istanbul peninsula where the 
old historical city is situated from the new development areas. 
These new developments have formed, on the European shore of 
the Bosphorus and begin at a locality called Tophane. 
The metropolitan area of Istanbul is divided into three sections: 
the Catalca peninsula, the Kocaeli peninsula, and the Bosphorus 
area. It covers 5,712 sq. km. or .7 per cent of Turkey's territory 
(774,810 sq. km.). The Marmara region where Istanbul is located 
includes l 0 cities (provinces) in an area of 72,579 sq. km. 
The climate of Istanbul is affected by its location in an area 
of transition between the Mediterranean Sea and central European 
climatic conditions. The northern part of Istanbul possesses the 
characteristics of the Black Sea coast climate, while its southern 
part has a resemblance to the Etesian climate of the Mediterranean 
region. The weather conditions of Istanbul are under the influence 
of air currents between anti-cyclone and cyclone regions and 
ambulatory depressions which change seasonally. The former ones 
produce dry and stable weather conditions in the region while 
the depressions cause abundant rains and atmospheric variations. 
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Political and Administrative Characteristics 
In general, there are four political and administrative levels 
of authority in the Istanbul urban area. There is, first of all, the 
City of Istanbul itself, settled in 685 B.C., incorporated in 1855, 
and currently having a land area of 277 square kilometers. Around 
the city is the Metropolitan Area of Istanbul, which has an area of 
1, 131 square kilometers. The next level, which may be referred 
to as Greater Istanbul, is under the jurisdiction of the Bureau for 
the General Plan of Greater Istanbul attached to the Ministry of 
Reconstruction and Resettlement of the central government. Finally, 
there is the Istanbul Region wherein the Istanbul urban area is 
located, which is planned by the Regional Planning Directorate of 
Istanbul created in 1958. This regional body is responsible for an 
area of 72,481 square kilometers. 
Within Greater Istanbul, the central government of Turkey 
is represented by an appointed Governor. Until the end of 1958, 
the Governor also acted as Mayor of Istanbul city. After 1958 
the City Mayor began to be elected by local citizens as in other 
cities in Turkey. 
Presently, there are 26 municipalities within the boundaries 
of Greater Istanbul, one being the central city and the remaining 
25 being administratively independent. The metropolitan area of 
Istanbul is smaller. Its boundaries comprise the central city and 18 
independent municipalities, including the district of Gebze on 
Kocaeli peninsula. 
In Greater Istanbul, construction, reconstruction and planning 
activities are conducted by various institutions. The most important 
of these is the Bureau for the "General Plan of Greater Istanbul" 
attached to the Ministry of Reconstruction and Settlement. The 
Directorate of Construction of the city, also attached to the same 
Ministry, concerns itself with problems of the gecekondu (slums and 
squatter communities) as well as the local plans of some of the 
municipalities. In spite of their autonomous positions, the city's 
Directorate of Engineering and Directorate of Reconstruction work 
with the Bureau for "General Plan of Greater Istanbul" on planning 
matters. Administrative agencies on the metropolitan level are 
charged with issuing construction permits. They also prepare 
detailed local plans for specific projects. 
At the city level, central government agencies are represented 
by their proper directorates (e.g. the Directorate of Health, Direc-
torate of National Education, etc.) Although a major part of urban 
services in Istanbul are performed under the responsibility of the 
municipality, the State takes on itself the implementation of some 
services such as education, health, etc., as a consequence of eco-
nomic insufficiencies of local administrative bodies. The financing 
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of the services are provided by the State, city, local administrative 
bodies and municipalities, either separately or collectively. In 
general, private institutions do not add too much to the perform-
ance or maintenance of city services. There are associations for 
the beautification of districts, prevention of traffic accidents, and 
the prevention of noise but they are not too effective. 
The Problem 
The average annual growth of Turkey's population has in-
creased between 1945-19 55 and decreased, relatively, between 
1955-1965. There is evidence that low fertility is responsible for 
the decrease in population growth in the period 1960-1965. This 
lower rate may be accounted for by the introduction of family 
planning at this time. 
The population of the East Marmara region1 which can be 
defined as a socio-economic spatial level between Istanbul 
Metropolis and the entire country, has increased 11.7 per cent in 
1960, and 12. l per cent in 1965. This region which is already the 
most developed and urbanized region of the country is roughly 
four times more dense (at 160 persons per sq. km.) than the rest 
of Turkey (which averages 40.5 persons per sq. km.). The greatest 
urbanized section of this area is, of course, Metropolitan Istanbul. 
Table l 
Population of Greater Istanbul in Relation to 
Other Parts of Turkey 
(In thousands) 
1945 1950 1955 1960 
Turkey 18,860 20,935 24, 131 27,810 
East Marmara 1,986 2, 187 2,683 3,235 
Istanbul 





While Istanbul Metropolis had 4.6 per cent of the country's 
population and 44.3 per cent of the population of Marmara region 
in 1945, these ratios increased to 6.7 per cent and 55.5 per cent, 
respectively in 1965. 
Urbanization 
If we take into account the extent of the global population 
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Fig. 11. LOCATION OF GECEKONDUS IN ISTANBUL 
a period of fifteen years (between 1950-1965) the ratio of the 
urban population growth,2 as compared with the totality of popu-
lation in Turkey has increased from 18.8 per cent to 29.5 per cent. 
Furthermore, 3.5 per cent to 4 per cent of the total population are 
added to cities, every year. As a whole, the urbanizing population 
in Turkey is increasing approximately between the ratios of 6 and 
8 per cent per year. In reality, the urbanization of East Marmara 
and the increase of population in Metropolitan Istanbul are not 
above this ratio, but a little lower, averaging yearly 5.5-6.5 per 
cent. However, in 1965, the Istanbul metropolitan area already 
comprised as much as 23 per cent of the whole urban population 
of Turkey, and 80 per cent of the urban population of East 
Marmara. 
From the point of view of administrative boundaries, only 6.5 
per cent of Turkey's population was living in settlements of 100,000 
to 500,000 and 8.5 per cent in agglomerations of 500,000 inhabitants 
and over in 1965. The greatest portion of the urban population in 
this last level lives in the Istanbul metropolitan area. In addition to 
the central city, there are six settlements of 10,000 to 15,000 in-
habitants in the urbanized section of Istanbul Metropolis. 
In the Greater Istanbul area, rural-urban differentiations are 
diminishing gradually. In 1945, 80 per cent of the total popula-
tion was living in the city. This ratio grew to 92 per cent in 1965. 
Of the people in the metropolitan area but outside the city, 93 
per cent are considered urban (i.e., they live in sectors which 
possess the characteristics of a continual urban organism where 
daily labour-housing relations are maintained). 
Urban Development and Migration 
Urban development, considered from the point of view of 
population only, depends on the natural increase of the population 
and migrations. The annual ratio of natural population increase 
in Istanbul is low, in comparison with Turkey. However, it is rather 
high for a city already as big as Istanbul, for it amounted to 19 .3 
in 1955-1960 and 16.4 in 1960-1965. 
One reason for the high rate of natural population growth in 
Istanbul may be the fact that migrants who come to Istanbul pre-
serve their rural characteristics, especially their high birth rate for 
a certain period of time. The natural increase in population 
reached 135,000 in the 1955-60 period and 200,000 between 
1960-1965. On account of this, a natural increase of 30 to 40,000 
people can be estimated annually. 
Since 1950, the increase in the Istanbul population has been 
caused by the great flow of migrants who came to the Metropolis. 
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(See Table 2). Net migration figures are as follows: 1945-50, 
7 4,000; 1950-55, 235,000; 1955-60, 221,000; and 1960-65, 
277,000.3 During the last fifteen years, a flow of migration amount-
ing to 40,000-50,000 persons annually has contributed largely to 
this urban growth. 
The migration coming to the Istanbul metropolis derives from 
various levels and sectors of the population. The greatest portion 
of the migration which took place in the periods of 1950-1960 and 
1960-1965, and which could be investigated substantially, origi-
nated from other regions of Turkey rather than from Marmara 
and sub-regions of East Marmara. The total migration to Istanbul 
amounted to 145,000 persons in 1955-1960, and 230,000 persons 
in 1960-1965. This made up 61 per cent and 83 per cent of the 
total migration in the country respectively. Migration originating 
from the Marmara region and the sub-region of East Marmara 
amounted to 33,000 persons in 1950-1960 and 55,000 in 1960-
1965. Apart from this, the number of migrants born in foreign 
lands4 came close to 60,000 persons in the first period. 
Table 2 
The Distribution of Incoming and Outgoing Migrations 








1. From outside of 1. From outside of 
Marmara Reg. . 145,300 Marmara Reg. 230,7 45 
2. From East Marmara 2. From East Marmara 
Reg. 8,400 Reg. 6,420 
3. From other Marmara 3. From other Marmara 
provinces 25,000 provinces 48,235 
4. Migrants of foreign 
birth 
TOTAL 
4. Migrants of foreign 
56,300 birth 3,898 
.. 235,000 TOTAL 298,328 
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OUTGOING MIGRATION 
1. To outside of 1. To outside of Marmara 
Marmara Reg .. 5,600 Reg. 8,000 
2. To East Marmara 2. To East Marmara 
provinces 2,700 provinces 1,800 
3. To other Marmara 3. To other Marmara 
provinces 2,300 provinces 1,500 
4. Migrants of foreign 4. Migrants of foreign 
birth birth 
5. Unknown outgoing 5. Unknown outgoing 
migrants 2,800 migrants 1,028 
TOTAL 13,900 TOTAL 12,378 
NET MIGRATION 
1. . 139,700 1. ... 222,745 
2. 5,700 2. 4,620 
3. 22,200 3. 46,735 
4. 56,300 4. 3,898 
5. 2,800 5. 1,028 
TOTAL 22, 100 TOTAL .... 276,970 
It is interesting to note that migration in 1960-1965 reached 
a greater volume compared to 1950-1960. Migrants coming from 
other parts of Turkey increased by 60 per cent in the 1960-65 
period, as compared to the migration in the previous period. The 
migration originating from the region itself showed also a similar 
increase in the second period. 
The Origins of Migration 
We can divide the origins of migration into Istanbul into two 
parts: (a) that coming from the sub-region of East Marmara, and 
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(b) migration from other regions ,i.e., Eastern and Western regions 
of the Black Sea, Central Anatolia and the Northeastern provinces, 
Thrace and the Aegean region. An analysis of the origin of 
migrants made between 1950 and 1965 revealed a more or less 
changing migration pattern. In general, the analysis shows that 
migration happens in regions where the rural density is above a 
definite saturation level; where the rural-urban balance is unfav-
ourable to rural sectors, and where the increase in agricultural 
incomes cannot keep pace with population increase. Apart from 
this, ease of transportation and existence of migration paths must 
be counted on as important factors. Short-term economic changes 
also have an effect on migration. During economically lean periods, 
migration from the provinces into Istanbul may increase sig-
nificantly. 
An analysis made according to administrative districts in the 
Eastern Marmara region gives the features of the migration typ-
ology for this area. In brief, migration seems to be insignificant 
from administrative districts where the rural population density 
is high but the productivity is also high. It is excessive from rural 
areas where the density is high but productivity is lower. It is also 
high from rural sectors where the density is low, and where these 
sectors are situated near a rapidly urbanizing area or have easy 
access to transportation facilities. Administrative districts where 
there is a lower rural density and scarce migration can be divided 
generally, into two parts: One part possesses traditional urban 
structures and the other has entirely rural characteristics and is 
remote from migration paths. But here, we should point out that 
the migration from the rural areas of Eastern Marmara where 
the urban structure is clearly determined, seems to flow toward 
urban cores within the region rather than the area of the Istanbul 
Metropolis. In other words, in a developed region, migrants from 
the rural areas can choose their own urban centres. This determines 
the degree of urbanization of the region as a whole over a definite 
period of time. 
Population Increase and the Development of Economic Sectors 
As previously mentioned, the population increase in Istanbul 
has been relatively high, especially during the 1960-1965 period. 
One of the fears of economic planners is that rapid population 
growth may increase unemployment because economic sectors 
such as manufacturing, services, etc., may not be able to absorb 
the economically active segments of the population. The situation 
in Istanbul as far as the relationship between increase in popula-
tion and the increase in employment rates in manufacturing and 
services are shown in Table 3.5 
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Table 3 
Population of the Urban Area and Number of People Employed 
in Economic Sectors 
(In Thousands) 
1950 1955 1960 1965 
No. Growth Rate No. Growth Rate No. Growth Rate No. 
Metropolitan 
population 1,003 1.31 1,321 1.27 1,675 1.27 2, 123 
Population of 
the city of 








industries 115 1.34 154 1.14 177 1.44 225 
Employed in 
services 190 1.23 234 1.20 281 1.09 309 
As shown in Table 3, employment rates in Istanbul seem to 
have kept pace with population growth, at least in the past fifteen 
years. The difference between the metropolitan population and 
the city population has remained quite unchanged in spite of a 
great population increase between 1955-1965 roughly on the scale 
of 160-170,000 persons in the metropolitan area. This increase 
may be due to migration showing that the rural population which 
has migrated to Istanbul has somehow incorporated itself easily 
to the urban organism. 
The manufacturing industry shows a higher growth rate in 
1960-1965, compared to the period between 1950-1955. The ratio 
of people working in the manufacturing industry, which was 
between 10 to 11 per cent during the 1950-1960 period, increased 
to 12 per cent in 1965, in proportion to the city's population. 
The service sector reached an even higher growth rate com-
pared to the manufacturing industry in 1955-1960, though it had a 
lower rate between 1960-1965. This correlation shows in some 
ways that, in Istanbul, urbanization is rather much more connected 
with the growth of the manufacturing industry and also, that there 
is a periodic relation between services and the manufacturing 
industry. 
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It is interesting to note that in Istanbul, the organized manu-
facturing industry6 shows a regular and high growth rate. In the 
manufacturing industry a growth rate of 50 per cent was possible 
between the years of 1960-1965. The tendency of the industry to 
get organized is becoming an influential factor for its capacity to 
absorb more people and this fact shows a more structural growth 
in the future. 
On the other hand, two important indicators relative to the 
connection between urbanization and the economically active 
population are: firstly, the rapid growth of the building sector 
which, by surpassing the urbanization speed, reached a ratio of 
1.50 in the period 1960-1965; and secondly, the stationary state of 
the unclearly defined (activities) group in this last period. It is 
possible that the rapidiy growing organized manufacturing indus-
try will create a large service sector in the forthcoming periods, and 
that this will lead urbanization, and directly migration, to new 
patterns. 
Housing 
The housing problem of the Istanbul metropolitan area has 
become worse since 1950, because of rapid population growth in 
the urban area due to migration. Since the city was not prepared 
to meet a migration on such a scale, the gecekondu building activi-
ties started and, by expanding rapidly, became what they are 
today. 
In Istanbul, where the population increases on an average 
of l 00,000 people every year, only 70,000 persons can be settled 
in normal standard dwellings and the remaining 30,000 are, by 
necessity, directed towards the gecekondus or low standard houses. 
In a census made in Istanbul in 1966, the number of gecekondus 
was found to be 120,000 and people living in these gecekondus 
numbered 600,000. At the growth rate mentioned above, we can 
estimate at the time of writing that these numbers reached 140,000 
and 720,000, respectively. As a result of this, we can assume that, 
33.9 per cent of the city population (presently 2, 123,000) lives today 
in gecekondus. 
These gecekondus are concentrated in 194 distinct settlements. 
The planners of Istanbul have decided that 79 of these gecekondu 
regions, being structurally defective as settlements, must be 
liquidated. The remaining 115 regions are considered "improve-
ment areas", which can be developed as settlements with some 
governmental assistance. 
Assuming that the population growth and house construction 
in Istanbul will maintain present trends and rates, new housing 
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requirements in the forthcoming five years, are estimated to be 
around 70,523 units until 1972. Therefore, it becomes necessary 
to build in the forthcoming two years, at least 13,500 to 14,000 
houses. If we add to these figures, the number of houses which, 
for various reasons have not been constructed since 1966 (about 
43,500 units), it is clear that Istanbul is confronted with a difficult 
situation. Owing to this situation, new gecekondu regions are 
expected to spread all over the city every year and the old ones 
may continue to expand rapidly in the Istanbul metropolitan area. 
Gecekondu (Slums) 
As previously explained, 33.9 per cent of the Istanbul popula-
tion resides in gecekondu areas. A majority of the population 
living in these areas are migrants from villages. As such, they 
have been used to living in more spacious settlements and have 
worked closer to nature. They have also come from environments 
where social control and restraints were more powerful. 
Research made in gecekondu areas shows that, due to the 
different nature of the urban environment, gecekondu dwellers are 
often faced with certain problems. These problems arise from 
living in jammed and crowded quarters under unhealthy physical 
conditions and, from difficulties encountered in adapting to the 
social life of the city. 
In most of the gecekondu areas, educational opportunities, 
even the learning of the three R's, are much lower as compared to 
other parts of the city. These areas are heterogeneous and dynamic. 
Some people in these sectors act as receivers and accomplices of 
criminals and contribute to crimes committed in the city. In gece-
kondu areas unemployed and destitute persons are numerous. 
The number of consumptives, persons having contagious diseases 
and others suffering from various illnesses is also high. Due to 
the low standard of water supply networks and especially of 
drainage, sewage lines and pits (in some cases the total lack of 
these services) contagious diseases originating from the gecekondu 
areas frequently threaten the whole city. On the other hand, these 
areas possess a high rate of fertility, in spite of the inadequacy 
of economic means. They have an excess of male population. At 
the same time, the ratio of younger people in these areas, is higher, 
as compared to other parts of the city. It is a fact that, although 
the incomes of people residing in gecekondus are higher than the 
incomes of people living in the villages, their income, compared 
with those of people living in normal urban dwellings, are much 
lower. 
Gecekondu regions are often deficient in services and suffer 
great privations in matters of road, water supply, sewage, open 
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spaces, public parks, playgrounds and recreational centres, sani-
tary and municipal services, etc. In researches made by the Minis-
try of Reconstruction and Resettlement in Ankara and Izmir, and 
by Charles W. M. Hart in Istanbul, it was concluded that deficiencies 
of municipal services in gecekondu areas have clearly reached 
their limits. The studies also showed that gecekondu dwellers have 
a low level of understanding, comprehension and appreciation of 
the requirements of urban living, especially in sanitary matters 
which are very important. The studies did find that gecekondu 
dwellers can contribute in some ways, to the solution of their 
problems, though there is a limit to this. 
Gecekondus are dwellings built by citizens on pieces of land 
they do not own and where they do not have any construction 
permit. They are built in a very short time and in haste, with 
mutual help in most cases, in order to escape the provisions of laws 
and regulations concerning "instant demolition during the con-
struction" and/or, in order to gain time until the obtaining of a 
court writ or a municipal committee decision and their execution, 
in cases of "being occupied and settled". In some parts of Istanbul, 
however, the nature of gecekondu buildings has changed and, in 
most places they have begun to develop into 2-3 storeyed flats con-
structed with a concrete shell. This aspect can be very clearly seen, 
for example, in the Gultepe gecekondu region which is built on 
parcelled lots in accordance with the law. However, in other parts 
of Istanbul, hundreds and thousands of gecekondus are built inces-
santly, entirely in illegal ways, in a single night, especially on eves 
of elections or during political upheavals when social control is 
weakened. The gathering and organizing by the gecekondu dweller 
into his gecekondu area, of other new gecekondu citizens, his fellow-
country-men, peasants from his own village, his relatives, in order to 
get organized against the police forces or to become a local political 
power or to gain ascendancy socially and morally, have turned 
these gecekondu sectors into strongholds in which it is impossible 
to enter for demolition purposes. 
It is clear that the fact of the construction of these gecekondus 
which are expanding in or around the city, and the differentiation in 
the living conditions between average citizens and these new resi-
dents will create certain negative effects and social frictions by 
reason of great psychological pressure exercised on persons living 
in these areas. Due to the insufficient capacities of local adminis-
trative bodies and municipalities, the efforts spent for the betterment 
of the conditions of this kind of settled and unremovable sitings 
cause delays in providing services and utilities. Specifically, diffi-
culties in educational possibilities and opportunities hinder the grow-
ing up of new generations. 
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Recognizing the need for providing urban services in the gece-
kondu areas, the national government, the city and the municipalities 
around Istanbul have tried to provide at least the basic services in 
these localities. Three priority areas have received the attention of 
these levels of government: roads and sewage, drinking water and 
electric power. The investments in these areas up to 1969 amounted 
to 117,083,000 Turkish liras for roads and sewage; 44,915,765 liras 
for drinking water and 41,920,437 liras for electric power. The 
distribution of these investments among the governmental levels is 
shown in Tables 4, 5 and 6. 
Table 4 
Expenditures for Roads and Sewage 
By By By The 
The Ministry The City Municipality 
Roads (in thousand (in thousand (in thousand 
Years (in km.) Turkish liras) T.l.) T.L.) 
1946-65 300 l 0,230. 
1966 32 7,654. 300. 3,214. 
1967 86 11,454. 13,801. 6,333. 
1968 73 13,734. 19,305. 4,715. 
1969 100 17.941. 2,898. 5,504. 
591 61,013. 36,304. 19,766-
(52.00) (31.00) (17.00) 
TOTAL: 117,083,000 TL. 
It is readily seen in Table 4 that a big part of the expenses 
for roads and sewage comes from the national government of 
Turkey, through the Ministry of Reconstruction and Resettlement. 
The share of the city of Istanbul in this expense was considerable 
in 1967 and 1968, though it decreased dramatically in 1969. 
According to the Greater Istanbul Plan, an estimated 1,200 kilo-
meters of road are needed to properly service 3,800 hectares in 
the metropolitan area. This means that the construction of an addi-
tional 604 kilometers of road with an estimated cost of 155,671,350 
Turkish liras is needed in the immediate future. 
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The share of the national government in providing drinking 
water to the gecekondu areas is considerably greater than the 
efforts of the city and the municipality combined. About 73.63 
per cent of investments in drinking water facilities since 1963 have 
been from national government sources. In fact, from 1963 to 
1965, only the national government invested in providing drinking 
water to gecekondu areas, with the municipality alloting funds for 
this purpose only in 1966 and the city government in 1967. 
Table 5 
Expenditures for Drinking Water 
{Investments) 
By The By The By The 
Years Ministry City Municipality 
1963-1965 8,966,237 
1966 4,894, 172 756,619 
1967 7,441,789 3,274,000 1,370,030 
1968 8,917,056 4,426,500 434,464 
1969 2,855,680 959,210 620,000 
33,074,934 8,659,710 3,181,121 
(73.63) (19.27) (7.10) 
TOT AL: 44, 915,7 65.-TL. 
With the expenditure of 44.9 million Turkish lira, water was 
brought to 76,644 gecekondus, extending this service to 64 per 
cent of the whole gecekondu areas in Istanbul. As instituted by 
the Ministry concerned, the Kartal Water Association provides 
water on the Anatolian side, while the Mahmutbey Water Associa-
tion satisfies the water needs of the European side of the city. 
Because of the construction materials used in the gecekondu 
areas and the fact that many of the dwellings are on marginal 
places, it has been difficult in the past to extend electrical services 
to them. In 1963, however, the national government started pro-
viding electricity to some areas. The municipality followed suit in 
1966 and the city in 1967. Up to 1969, more than 41 million 
Turkish lira had been invested in electricity, with the largest por-
tion of this (93.43 per cent) being spent by the national govern-
ment. By the end of 1970, the plans for Istanbul project that all 
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Past and Present Proposals and Solutions 
For some time now, Turkey has recognized that something must 
be done to correct the imbalances created by the migration of 
people to its urban centres. The desire to control and regulate the 
flow of migrants to metropolitan areas, has been embodied in 
the principles and priorities in the Second Five Year Plan, especially 
in the sections on "Regional Planning" and "Housing". 
In order to minimize the development differentiation between 
various regions in Turkey, the Plan provides for balanced distribu-
tion of investments within the country. The Plan calls for regu-
lating growth in developing areas, the evaluation of the develop-
ment possibilities and opportunities of various regions and the 
analysis of relationships between various economic and social 
activities over the national landscape. Through regional planning 
studies the development capacities of Turkey will be assessed 
according to the Plan and priority will be given to underdeveloped 
regions in investment programmes. 
The determination of growth points where the rate of urban-
ization will be high, will be supported as the propelling force of 
regional development according to the Plan. Regional plans 
guiding the sectoral activities and regulating the urban settlements 
will be prepared. It is hoped that these plans will be helpful in 
assisting the regulated development of economic and social activi-
ties of the regions, and specifically, for securing savings in infra-
86 
structural investments. It is also hoped that they will be of help in 
the distribution of services and in order to arrange opportunities 
for the development of regional industries. 
By taking into consideration the rapid growth of the city popu-
lation, the allotment of the scarce resources primarily to cities 
showing a tendency for development is supported by the Plan. 
From this point of view of either financing or house building, the 
State will take its necessary place in the housing construction market 
as a regulator and a supporter of "people who build their own 
houses". The efforts of people who build or improve their own 
houses will be supported by giving limited credits, large scale 
technical assistance and, if possible, by providing materials and 
inexpensive lands. 
The gecekondu problem is taken into consideration in the 
housing sector of the Plan. The concerned authorities will try to 
solve this problem by giving priority to the prevention of new 
gecekondu building and by utilizing, in this instance, the abilities 
of the "people who build their own houses". The problem of land 
ownership of gecekondus, it is hoped, will be solved without creat-
ing any difficulty in the future development of the city. 
The Five Year Plan provides that in order to minimize the effects 
of land cost increases and to prevent speculation, public controls 
on lands will be enforced in development areas. Public lands will 
be offered to the benefit and for the use of the community from a 
single source and as a means of supporting the construction of 
inexpensive houses. If necessary, a low renting system will be used. 
To summarize, the principles to be followed in the Plan for 
solving the housing problem are as follows: 
a. To secure, by taking necessary measures, the construc-
tion of as many houses as possible without exceeding 
the 20 per cent ratio of the total investments according 
to principles set up by the First and Second Five Year 
Development Plans. 
b. To secure the construction of a greater number of 
dwellings and thus, the settlement of a larger group 
of people, by restricting the building of luxury houses 
and choosing the least expensive type of public housing 
which will have no inconvenience as far as sanitary 
conditions are concerned. 
c. To lessen, especially, the straining negative effects of 
rentals on low income families by constructing low 
rental public housing. 
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d. To provide suitably priced lands to people willing to 
construct their own houses. 
e. To solve the land ownership problems of people resid-
ing in gececondu improvement areas and better their 
living conditions by providing public utilities and 
services. 
f. To get rid of the low standard gecekondus and slums 
which should be eliminated as settlements, by providing 
proper houses to people residing in these areas. 
g. To prevent the building of new gecekondus. 
Implementation of Housing Plans 
In order to restrict the construction of luxury houses in Istanbul, 
"public housing standards" were established and relative tax 
exemptions were instituted according to principles set up in the 
Development Plans. The main purpose of the "Gecekondu Law" 
(Law No. 775) which became executory on 30 July 1967, is to 
secure the improvement of gecekondus that can be improved, the 
elimination of dwellings that cannot be tolerated, and the pre-
vention of new gecekondu buildings. To achieve these goals, in 
the shortest possible time, the powers of the State, city govern-
ments and municipalities have been unified with the capacities 
of the citizens of Istanbul. 
To meet the requirements· of the growing city population for 
housing, it has been decided that some lands owned by the 
Treasury and municipalities are to be made into "gecekondu 
prevention areas," or places where suitable land is provided to 
low income homeless and landless families. In this instance, two 
gecekondu prevention areas on the European side of the city and 
four areas, on the Anatolian side, were allotted by the Ministry of 
Reconstruction and Resettlement. The sum of 10,888,675 T. liras 
was spent for the expropriation of personal properties situated in 
those areas. The other "prevention areas" were provided by 
Istanbul municipality and Kartal municipality. Both municipalities 
allotted 113 hectares, which can accommodate 4, 144 units to the 
gecekondu prevention scheme. 
It is estimated that the gecekondu prevention areas thus estab-
lished have enough capacities to entirely meet necessary require-
ments until the end of 1971. For these 46,224 units, however, 
3,626 km. of road and sewage canals must be laid and their water 
and electric power supplies must be provided. To accomplish this, 
a sum of 75 millions T. Liras, each year, must be allocated during 
the 1970-197 5 period. 
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Table 7 
Gecekondu Prevention Areas in Istanbul 
Area Capacity 
location (in Ha.) (number of units) 
Osmaniye 61 8,000 
Kucukkoy 69 4,000 
Okmeydani 80 
Sineklitepe 370 10,000 
Gulsuyu 347 14,000 
Maltepe 2 126 6,000 
Kartal 2.5 120 
lcerenkoy 110 4,000 
Kagithane 0.5 24 
Total 1,087.0 46,224 
Aside from places designated as "gecekondu improvement 
areas," the authorities in Istanbul have also planned certain places 
which are to be cleared of gecekondu dwellers. The destitute and 
low income families evicted from the "elimination areas" were 
settled, in the first place, in 1,659 units out of 3,732 planned units. 
The remaining 2,073 houses were distributed among needy and 
low income families. The levels of poverty and low income were 
determined by a scoring system worked out by the Ministry of 
Reconstruction and Resettlement. An income of 800 T.L. for two 
person families was used as a base. To this amount was added 
an extra 200 T.L. for each additional member of the family. The 
completed dwellings and prepared lots were distributed by giving 
priority to families having the highest points in this scoring system. 
For lots situated in "gecekondu prevention areas" three systems 
determined by the Ministry of Reconstruction and Resettlement are 
used. These are: 
a. The Ministry provides the land; 
b. The Ministry provides the 5,000 T.L. credit (without 
personal contribution); and 
c. The Ministry provides the 5,000 to 10,000 T.L. credit 
(with 25 per cent participation of the person or family 
concerned). 
As can be observed here, the purpose of this land contribution 
is to complement the limited saving capacities of needy and low 
income families with the technical assistance and financial support 
of the State. 
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One of the methods established by the Development Plan, for 
the purpose of controlling and regulating the gecekondu areas is 
providing assistance to "people who build their own houses". In 
Turkey, there is a tradition of working collectively through mutual 
help, called "imece". Thus, the method of assisting "people who 
build their own houses" can be seen as the bringing up of this 
tradition to a formal level, a kind of "supported imece". 
The contribution of the State in the implementation of this 
method is directed mainly towards these goals: 
a. The acquisition of land; 
b. Training of people before and during the imple-
mentation; 
c. The procurement of building materials and technological 
assistance; 
d. The construction of infrastructural installations and 
equipment; and 
e. The procurement of technical guidance. 
Up to now, the method of providing assistance to "people who 
build their own houses" in Turkey has been mainly used in villages 
requiring new settlements, regions that have suffered from national 
disasters or are susceptible to future damages due to disasters, and 
to gecekondu areas in urban centres. Several reasons account for 
the choice of these areas for assistance. In the first place, people 
who live in these places have inadequate financing capacities to 
enable them to buy or construct their own houses under normal 
market conditions. Land in these places is usually scarce and high 
priced, thus making it difficult for the people to afford it. Finally, 
these areas usually have a tradition of doing work collectively 
through mutual help. An atmosphere of cordiality and cooperation 
between government and citizens has a great chance of meeting 
with success in these places. 
Conclusion 
To sum up, although the problems arising from migration to 
Greater Istanbul of masses of people from rural and other urban 
areas are serious, the prospects that they can be adequately met 
in the future are good. Much of this prospect depends on the 
continued cooperation among the various levels of government 
in the Istanbul urban area. An important determinant, too, is the 
implementation of long term plans of the national government that 
cover the whole national landscape. 
Obviously, the problems of Istanbul have to be seen in the 
national context. The plan for regional balance throughout Turkey, 
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embodied in the Second Five Year Plan, if implemented, may 
result in developing other areas which will attract people who are 
now currently migrating to Istanbul. The more specific plans for 
the Istanbul urban area must also be implemented, if the problems 
are not to become worse. 
The current programmes for differentiating between "gece-
kondu improvement areas," and "elimination areas" in Istanbul 
are worth noting. Obviously, there is a need for low income settle-
ments in some parts of the metropolitan area and in the absence of 
governmental resources to build tenements and other forms of low 
cost housing, it makes good sense to take advantage of the skills 
and resources of gecekondu dwellers who are perfectly capable 
of building their own dwellings. In areas that can be put to more 
productive uses, however, eviction of gecekondu dwellers and their 
transfer to improvement areas may be called for. It is noteworthy 
in the Istanbul case that provisions for new lands are made when 
people are evicted from gecekondu areas. 
The governmental efforts to provide basic services to gecekondu 
areas in Istanbul is another interesting case of realistic planning. 
All levels of government are involved in providing roads and 
sewage, drinking water, and electricity to gecekondu dwellers. 
Though there may be some fear that provision of such services is 
a tacit admission of the legitimacy of gecekondu rights over the 
land they are occupying, the government's desire to extend services 
overrides it. After all, epidemics and other things that happen in 
the gecekondus may affect other parts of the city and providing 
the means to stop them there adds to the public good in the 
long run. 
Finally, the government's efforts to cooperate with "people who 
build their own houses" and to capitalize on the spirit of coopera-
tion among these people is a noteworthy approach. All over the 
world, one of the strengths of low income communities in urban 
areas is a spirit of mutual help and cooperation. That the Govern-
ment of Turkey has tapped this reservoir of potential resources 
speaks well of the quality of the planning for improvement of 
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KUALA LUMPUR, the capital of Malaysia, is situated strategically 
in the Klang Valley, the fastest-growing and most important indus-
trial complex in the country. Kuala Lumpur is composed of the 
Federal Capital with an area of about 36 square miles and the 
District of Kuala Lumpur which is approximately 355 square miles. 
The former is administered by the Commissioner of the Federal 
Capital and the latter by a District Officer. 
The city, founded in 1859, has since that date, developed from 
an essentially Chinese-dominated city, to become the colonial 
administrative centre of the Federated Malay States in 1896. From 
the early 1900s, with the growth of European-owned tin mines and 
rubber estates, the city became the centre of economic and political 
activities. By 1948, this immigrant-dominated city had become 
the capital of the Federation of Malaya. In 1957, with the inde-
pendence of Malaysia, it became the political as well as the uni-
fying centre where attempts were made to integrate the various 
cultures and diverse ethnic elements of the society. 
There has been a phenomenal rate of increase in the popula-
tion of Kuala Lumpur since its foundation and especially after the 
post-war years. In 1947, the population of the Federal Capital 
stood at 176,000, while the whole Kuala Lumpur district totalled 
291,000 persons. This figure had by the 1957 population census 
risen by approximately 80 per cent - that of the Federal Capital 
totalled 316,239 persons, while that of the Kuala Lumpur district 
totalled 477,238 persons. The breakdown in ethnic composition 
for the Federal Capital in 1957 was: Malays 47,615; Chinese 
195,832; Indians 53,506; and others 19,286, and that of the Kuala 
Lumpur district was: Malays 75,667; Chinese 299,825; Indians 
76, 106 and others 25,640.1 The most recent figure obtained by the 
Police for the Kuala Lumpur district (excluding Petaling Joya 
district) in April 1970 was 782,824 persons with the breakdown in 
ethnic composition being: Malays 207,548; Chinese 455,093; 
Indians 90,710 and others 29,473. 
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It can be seen that in 1957, of all the main racial groups, the 
Chinese community predominated in Kuala Lumpur, followed by 
the Indians and then the Malays. This was mainly due to the fact 
that it was only in the 1930s that migration of Chinese and Indian 
labourers to Kuala Lumpur and the other major towns and ports of 
Malaysia was restricted. Since that time, the portion of locally-born 
citizens has slowly increased so that ethnic distribution is becoming 
gradually stabilized. 
The phenomenal rate of increase in the population of Kuala 
Lumpur is, not surprisingly, correlated to the rapid industrialization 
of the city. The demand for labour has attracted people, not only 
from the countryside in the outlying districts of Kuala Lumpur but 
also from all over West Malaysia, to migrate to the city in search of 
better prospects. Hence, the present high rate of increase in popu-
lation, at an annual rate of 4 per cent leading to the rapid urban-
ization of Kuala Lumpur, is attributed to both natural increase in 
population, as well as the intense migration of people from the 
rural areas. Of the total increase between 1947-1957 almost 50 
per cent is attributed to in-migration.2 
Analysing the reasons for the migration of many people to 
Kuala Lumpur, Lam Thim-Fook concluded that "the main attractions 
to Kuala Lumpur of the large and rapid movement of population 
from elsewhere in the country are generally due to governmental 
actions; to its higher per capita income than elsewhere; and to 
the opportunities that virtually anyone can get money, status, fame 
or whatever they want here if they are prepared to work." More 
specifically, he mentions the following reasons: 
a. The making of Kuala Lumpur as the nation's capital in 
1957; 
b. The concentration of governmental projects - political, 
cultural and sports facilities - such as Parliament House, 
museums, and sports stadiums; 
c. The concentration of tertiary training institutions, such 
as the University of Malaya, the Language Institute, as 
well as internationa I training institutions; 
d. The concentration of commercial activities and their 
institutions; and 
e. The concentration of new industrial activities and the 
expansion of existing ones.3 
Rural-urban migration in Kuala Lumpur, as in other large urban 
areas, has brought in its wake various economic and social prob-
lems such as unemployment and underemployment, shortage of 
housing leading to squatting and slums, traffic congestion, racial 
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strife, increase in crimes and health and sanitary problems. In 
1962, the Kuala Lumpur/Petaling Joya area had 7.1 per cent of the 
males in the working force unemployed and 15.2 per cent of the 
females also unemployed. Since studies have shown that immi-
grants from the countryside tend to be less educated and untrained, 
most of those who find employment receive relatively less in pay 
than older residents. 
With less income, migrants also find it difficult to afford better 
housing. Many of them live in slum and squatter areas. Trans-
portation is also hampered by population congestion arising from 
migration: it was estimated in 1968 that more than 150,000 
vehicles of all types are on Kuala Lumpur's streets, which were 
meant for only 80,000 vehicles. Congestion in Kuala Lumpur has 
also had the effect of pushing desirable developments (especially 
for residential purposes) farther away from the centre. As a result 
of this urban sprawl, it is costing the city more to extend services 
to all its parts. All in all, the rapid expansion of the Kuala Lumpur 
conurbation due to internal migration has had a tremendous 
impact on the quality of life in the city, some of it, of a negative 
character. 
As a whole, the considerably high rate of in-migration from 
the rural areas to the cities, especially to Kuala Lumpur, from 1947 
onwards is largely the result of both socio-economic and political 
factors. The fact that the urban areas had better social and eco-
nomic facilities - adequate lighting, water supply, health and 
medical services, educational facilities, etc. - accounts greatly for 
their attraction. Politically, the rural-urban migration was height-
ened during the 1948-1960 Communist uprising (the Emergency) 
when towns were found to be safer places than the rural areas. 
The government also found it of the utmost political necessity to 
remove the Chinese squatters4 living on the fringes of the jungle, 
some of whom were known to be supplying the Communist in-
surgents with food and information, to new settlement areas or 
new villages where they could come under government surveil-
lance. The success of the government in making the Chinese 
squatters (who were at first suspicious and hostile of government 
intentions) adjust to their new way of life under the direct super-
vision of government authorities, was largely attributed to the 
various social and economic amenities that were introduced to 
these new villages. Thus, the creation of these new villages, 
accommodating a population of some 500,000 (80 per cent of 
whom were made up of the Chinese squatters while the rest Malays 
in the remote districts) had further accelerated the rate of urban-
ization in West Malaysia. This further explains the large number 
of Chinese in Kuala Lumpur from 1957 onwards when the boun-




With the rapid urbanization of Kuala Lumpur, the administra-
tion of the town which had been under the Town Board, was 
replaced by a Municipal Commission in 1948. Under this system, 
the town was administered by 15 Municipal Commissioners, two-
thirds of whom were elected and the remaining one-third ap-
pointed by the Resident Commissioner. The Municipality was 
responsible for the maintenance of sanitary and health services -
general health measures, night soil removal, anti-malaria control, 
markets, street lighting, fire services, repairs and maintenance of 
roads and bridges and buildings. The Municipality was a finan-
cially autonomous body with revenue collected mainly from gov-
ernment and quasi-government authorities from their properties 
in Kuala Lumpur. 
In 1952, the Municipal Commission became known as the 
Municipal Council with a Constitution providing for the presence 
of 12 elected members and six nominated members to be presided 
over by a President. The Constitution of the Federation of Malaya 
provided that the Municipality of Kuala Lumpur was also to be the 
Federal Capital. However, Parliament was not to have exclusive 
powers within the boundaries of the Federal Capital unless such 
arrangements were made with the Selangor State government. 
Thus, the municipality remained an autonomous body responsible 
for the various services, social, health and economic, without the 
added responsibility of looking after the water and electricity 
services. These were to be run by the State and the Central Elec-
tricity Board respectively, while public transport was to be run by 
a public company. 
The next important change in local government of Kuala 
Lumpur was in 1961 when the Federal Government assumed ad-
ministrative control of Kuala Lumpur.5 The Municipal Council was 
dissolved and the affairs of the Kuala Lumpur Municipality were 
administered by a Comissioner, assisted by the Advisory Board 
consisting of six official and five unofficial members. The office of 
the Commissioner was composed of seven departments - the sec-
retariat, health, engineers, treasurer, valuation, town planning and 
architect. Each had its own allocated responsibilities - the Secre-
tariat was in charge of administration as well as the fire brigade, 
the health department for sanitation among the hawkers and in 
the markets; the engineer's department had charge of the main-
tenance of roads, drains, bridges, street lighting, traffic signs, 
sewers, central depots and the open spaces; the valuation depart-
ment was in charge of the assessment of property in the munici-
pality, from which the main sources of revenue (amounting to 
almost 80 per cent of the municipality) came from. The town 
planning department took care of the planning of housing projects, 
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the clearance of slums and squatter areas, etc.; and the treasurer's 
department was in charge of finance and accounting, weights and 
measures, and from funds allocated from this department, the run-
ning of the municipality was carried out. On the whole, there was 
little conflict in the allocation of responsibilities of the various 
departments as their boundaries were all well defined. 
The Squatting Problem 
The rapid population growth of Kuala Lumpur from 291,000 
in 1947 to 782,824 in 1970 has resulted in many problems. These 
problems are made more serious by the fact that about 50 per cent 
of the population growth cited above was the result of internal 
migration. As previously mentioned, the growth of Kuala Lumpur 
as an administrative and commercial centre, the Emergency or 
Communist uprising, and the separation of Singapore from the 
federation have all somehow resulted in the increased importance 
of the Federal Capital and the movement of people to it. It is true 
that national development planning, with its emphasis on balanc-
ing development throughout the country may act as a counter-
vailing force to the tendency of growth to be centered in Kuala 
Lumpur. However, if the historical trends in other countries are 
followed in Malaysia, the "creeping urbanism" which is being 
brought about by such government programmes as the Federal 
Land Development Authority (FLDA) resettlement schemes may 
eventually result in increased growth of the central city. As rural 
areas become towns and urban places, the tendency for people to 
migrate from these places to larger urban centres generally becomes 
more marked. At least, this has been observed in many other 
developing countries. 
One of the most serious problems in Kuala Lumpur at present, 
a problem which directly arises from internal migration, is squat-
ting. A squatter shall be defined here as a person who settles on 
land without a legal title or right to it. Surveys conducted by the 
Office of the Comissioner of the Federal Capital in 1966 and 1968 
showed that about 37 per cent of the population in the Federal 
Capital are squatters.7 Some 26,500 families (185,000 persons) in 
Kuala Lumpur are squatters. In addition, many squatters also 
live in Selangor State, on the periphery of the Federal Capital. 
These people increasingly move into the central city with every 
opportunity they get. 
In the Federal Capital, there are about 20,000 dwellings classi-
fied as squatters. They represent some 25 per cent of the total 
number of dwellings in the area. The total land area occupied 
by squatters, taking only large concentrations of squatter settle-
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per cent of the total Federal Capital area. Of the land squatted 
upon, 2,350 acres or 78 per cent is State land, while the rest is 
private land. 
One of the problems of a multi-racial country like Malaysia, of 
course, is cultural harmony and the development of national unity. 
Malaysia is the most urbanized country in Southeast Asia, with the 
exception of Singapore, with 21 per cent of her population living in 
settlements of 20,000 and above. The cities of Malaysia, however, 
are largely non-Malay. The Chinese, who comprise less than 40 per 
cent of the total population outnumber Malays by more than three 
to one in cities of 20,000 and above.8 
In Kuala Lumpur, the Chinese make up more than 60 per cent 
of the total population. The proportion of Chinese among squat-
ters, however, is a bit higher - a 1966 survey by the Office of the 
Commissioner of the Federal Capital in conjunction with the Minis-
try of Local Government and Housing revealed that 67.2 per cent 
of 20,611 families living as squatters were Chinese. (See Table 1) 
Table 1 
Number o.f Squatters on State and Private Land 
State Land Private Land Combined 
No. % No. % No. % 
Malay 3,722 27.4 487 6.9 4,209 20.4 
Chinese 8,451 62.3 5,392 76.5 13,843 67.2 
Indians/ 
Pakistanis 1,373 10.1 1,004 14.3 2,377 11.5 
Others 19 .2 163 2.3 182 .9 
Total.. .. 13,565 100.0 7,046 100.0 20,611 100.0 
Table indicates that in Kuala Lumpur, Malays tend to squat 
on public lands while the Chinese squat on private lands. Since 
most private lands are near the centre of the city and public lands 
tend to be in the periphery, this means that most Chinese are living 
in the central business district, often at very high densities. Squat-
ting by Chinese is also extremely difficult to control because much 
of the initiative for regulation has to rely on the private land-
owner, who may be receiving some rent from the squatter. 
Rents on houses located in private lands tend to be higher than 
those in state lands. In a study of 3, 187 rent paying families 
living in state lands, it was found that 14.1 per cent paid $10 and 
below; 49.9 paid $11 to $20; 29.0 paid $21 to $40; and 7.0 per 
cent paid more than $40 per month. 
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The capacity to pay rent, of course, is related to family income. 
The survey conducted in 1966 showed that squatters on private 
lands tend to have higher income than those on state lands. While 
only 11.3 per cent of families living in public lands had incomes 
of more than $200 a month, 17.0 per cent of those who live in 
private lands were earning this much. For those at the income 
bracket $201 to $300, the proportions were 21. l per cent for those 
who live in state lands and 30. l per cent for private land squatters. 
The most serious problem with squatters on public lands is the 
fact that it is extremely difficult to extend urban services to them 
because this would be tantamount to recognizing their tenure on 
the land. Thus, while 58.0 per cent of households living on private 
lands had electricity, only 3.7 per cent of those living on state 
lands had this service. Water from the tap inside the house is 
available to 66.0 per cent of private land squatters and only to 
7.4 per cent of state land squatters. Finally, 96.9 per cent of 
private land squatters had some means of waste disposal (bucket 
system or better), while only 52.3 per cent of those who squat on 
state lands had this system of waste disposal. 
The Kampong as Squatter Community 
Large scale surveys such as the ones made by the Federal 
Capital of Kuala Lumpur tend to give the impression that squatters 
are scattered all over the city at random. Actually, they live in 
small communities, often distinct from each other because of ethnic 
origins. The Chinese, aside from those resettled near the periphery 
during the Emergency, tend to live close to the city centre. The 
Malays tend to live in settlements very much reminiscent of their 
rural kampongs, with attendance at the surau or mosque pro-
viding an index to the boundaries of the community. Malay settle-
ments tend to merge into each other. Hence, in Kampong Setor, 
a Malay community studied by McGee in 1962, the people had 
no mosque of their own but they attended meetings at Kampong 
Bharu, a larger legal Malay settlement. The community also 
merged with Kampong Maxwell on the northern side.9 
Physically, Kampong Setor closely resembles a rural Malay 
village: the houses were all built in Malay style, elevated on stilts 
with wood walls and in most cases tin roofs. All the household 
heads interviewed in Kampong Setor were born in rural areas: 
Selangor, Malacca and Negri Sembilan. The majority were single 
when they moved to Kuala Lumpur, and five out of 23 household 
heads who were married came first without their families. Most 
of the respondents had previously lived in other parts of Kuala 
Lumpur, mainly in Kampong Bharu, where they boarded as single 
persons. Eighteen of the 23 respondents had rural employment 
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before. The rest were also mainly unskilled, entering jobs with low 
status and low pay. 
Not surprisingly, most of the families in Kampong Setor main-
tained close links with their home villages. Many of the men who 
had come to Kuala Lumpur had gone back to arrange marriage 
with village girls and then returned with their wives to the city. Most 
of them returned at least once or twice to their home village and 
many sent money home to their parents. 
McGee found in his study that the majority of the household 
heads were very religious, attended mosque once a week and 
were attached to surau praying groups. Some grew a few vege-
table and fruit crops in their compounds. Finally, the sense of 
community was also strengthened by the common fear of eviction 
from the area. The kampong residents had elected a Ketua Kam-
pong (head of the kampong) who was responsible for contacting 
the authorities if the city government threatened eviction. 
All in all, McGee found many social elements in Kampong 
Setor that tended to make life almost as pleasant as in a typical 
rural community. He also concluded that: 
The problems of this kampong were remarkably few, 
even though its levels of income were low, an average of 
$100 Malayan per month; job stability was high, unemploy-
ment low; and in general, the squatter kampong gave every 
impression of rapid adaptation and assimilation to the 
problems of the urban environment. It could by no means 
be labelled a 'settlement of misery', but rather a 'settlement 
of necessity' - a necessity brought about by the lack of 
adequate city housing.lo 
Squatting as a Housing Problem 
The extent of squatting in Kuala Lumpur is an index to its 
housing problem. The First Malaysian Plan estimates that from 
30,000 to 35,000 low cost houses have to be constructed in 
Malaysia from 1966 to 1970. The bulk of the low cost housing 
programme is centered in the Federal Capital in view of the large 
squatter and slum population there. In 1967, the Ministry of Local 
Government and Housing launched the "first pilot industrialized 
low cost housing scheme" at Jalan Pekeliling in Kuala Lumpur. 
This project, which provides 3,009 dwelling units, uses pre-cast 
concrete elements developed by the Gammon-Larsen and Nielsen 
firm from Denmark. It is made up of four blocks of four-storey 
flats and shops and seven blocks of 17-storey flats, constructed at a 
total cost of $24.5 million.11 
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Aside from high-rise low cost housing, the Ministry of Local 
Government and Housing also engages in other types of housing 
schemes. Between 1961 and 1965, the Ministry and its prede-
cessor, the Ministry of the Interior, built 7,569 low cost dwellings 
throughout Malaysia. A total of l, 17 4 units were built in 1966 
and 1,697 were built in 1967. It was expected that in 1968, hous-
ing output would be l 0, 156 units; l 0,534 were scheduled to be 
finished in 1969 and 7,895 were expected in 1970. The types of 
dwellings constructed and planned were of many varieties, rang-
ing from Malay-type detached timber houses in the rural and 
coastal areas to terrace houses in semi-urban areas as well as 
multi-storey flats in urban areas.12 
A "Crash Programme" in Housing was also planned by the 
Ministry of Local Government and Housing in 1967. Under the 
programme, small schemes of 50 or 32 low hollow-block terrace 
houses on lands of 2.3 or 1.66 acres in the smaller towns which 
have had no low cost housing projects in the past would be con-
structed. Some 200 schemes consisting of over 8, 110 houses have 
been provisionally approved and an estimated 5,000 units were 
scheduled for completion in 1968. Under the programme, it was 
estimated that the value of the house plus land and infrastructure 
works comes to about $4,000. For the potential owner, the monthly 
installment would have to be from $30 to $35 a month over an 
extended period.13 
One of the primary considerations in any housing scheme, of 
course, is the ability of the tenants to purchase the dwelling or 
at least, pay economical rent. In the survey of squatters previously 
mentioned, 37.3 per cent of the sample said they could pay $21 
to $40; and l 0.2 per cent could afford more than $40. Considering 
that the high-rise flats will cost more to construct than the houses 
envisioned in the Crash Programme, it seems difficult to afford 
the houses meant for them. This is especially so, since aside from 
the monthly rents, down-payments are expected by the Govern-
ment. The survey showed that 85. l per cent of the people surveyed 
could afford $1,000 or less for down-payment while 14.9 per cent 
could pay more than $1,000. As for monthly installments for 
ownership of the dwelling, 79.9 per cent of the sample said they 
could pay $40 and below 20. l could pay more than $40 per 
month. 
Aside from monetary considerations, other factors contribute 
to difficulties as far as housing is concerned. Foremost among 
these is the large size of most urban families in Kuala Lumpur. 
The survey revealed that 21.8 per cent of squatters in the sample 
were composed of l to 4 persons; 78. l per cent had more than 
five members while . l per cent gave no data. Minimum standards 
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of housing in Malaysia have been worked out so that family size 
can be taken into consideration. Obviously, however, it costs more 
to provide housing for larger families. 
Doubling up in dwellings seems to be a problem in Malaysia, 
too. In the survey, while 78.8 per cent of the squatter families 
lived in one house, 19.5 per cent of the families were doubling up 
(two to four families in a house); 1.6 per cent had from five to 
eight families per house; and .1 per cent even had nine families 
and above living in one house. While doubling up may not lead 
to too much discomfort in the relative airiness of the kampong 
squatter area, it may lead to sanitation and other problems in 
the glass and concrete flats planned by the Housing agency. 
The location of the housing projects within the city of Kuala 
Lumpur seems to have been primarily decided by the cost of land. 
In other words, the decision to set up multi-storey flats where they 
are now is related to the high cost of land in other parts of the 
city. In addition to costs, however, another thing to consider is 
the relationship between the place of work of squatters and the 
place where they live. In most studies, it has been found that 
there is a logic in the location of squatter settlements: most of 
them are close to the squatters' place of work. 
In the survey of Kuala Lumpur squatters, it was discovered that 
the proximity of residence to work place was also true. As seen 
in Table 2, 7.9 per cent of squatters worked where they lived 
while 47.5 per cent lived less than three miles from where they 
worked. The distances seem to be shorter for squatters on private 
lands, where 12.8 per cent worked where they lived and 58.9 per 
cent lived less than three miles from where they worked. 
Table 2 
Distance Between Residence and Work Place 
State land 
No. % 
On site 720 5.3 
Less than 3 miles 5,635 41.5 
More than 3 miles 6, 197 45.7 
No data 1,013 7.5 












l, 118 5.4 
7,046 l 00.0 20,611 100.0 
Aside from the fact that proximity of place of work to residence 
is of considerable value to the squatter, whose income is small 
enough to feel the pinch of transportation costs, there are other 
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advantages of a societal nature which arise from such proximity. 
There will be less traffic jams, less smog, less time wasted in 
journey to work, and probably healthier walkers when the place 
of work is close enough to the residence. The logic of the selection 
of housing sites by squatters is seen in their mode of travel. The 
survey showed that 52.8 per cent used motorcycles or cars. About 
a quarter (24.6 per cent) used the bus, train, etc., while 7.5 per 
cent gave no information. These figures are arguments that low 
cost housing should be set up as close as possible to the original 
squatter settlements. On-site housing should be preferred to reloca-
tion. Aside from the fact that people find it easier to live in new 
types of housing if their commuting patterns are not disturbed too 
much, on-site housing may also contribute to peace and stability 
especially when the community structure prevailing in the old area 
is not disturbed too much by changes in the housing situation. 
Another problem which the housing designers has to take into 
consideration is the fact that for many Chinese people, the home is 
also the place of employment. In the survey of squatters, it was 
found that 69.9 per cent of the sample were "hawkers, small 
traders, skilled workers, clerks, drivers, etc." About 24.4 per cent 
were "unskilled labourers, part-time labourers, and unemployed." 
Only 4.5 per cent were "shopkeepers, professionals, executives, 
landed proprietors, etc." The designs of the low cost multi-storey 
flats, were primarily for residential purposes, unlike those in Hong 
Kong, where the mixture of residential and employment functions 
is recognized. To be more effective, there may be a need for 
redesigning some of the flats in the future. 
One of the most difficult problems linked to racial characteris-
tics, of course, is how Chinese, Malays and Indians as well as 
other ethnic groups can live together in harmony within the 
crowded tenements. Experience, so far, has indicated that because 
of cultural differences, the goal of integrating the low cost housing 
schemes is extremely difficult to attain. The Chinese, because of 
their residence in the central business district, can adjust relatively 
well to high-rise housing. Many Malays, however, with their 
attachment to the soil, find it difficult to adjust to concrete and 
glass. 
Mixing Chinese and Malays within the crowded tenements also 
heightens tensions and frictions that may remain latent without the 
phenomenon of proximity. The life styles of Chinese and Malays 
clash in some instances within the confines of the crowded flats. 
The smell of Chinese cooking, reeking heavily of pork, is irritating 
to many Malays. So are the many Chinese celebrations such as 
wakes, characterized by feasting and gambling. Little things like 
these become magnified because of propinquity. Solving the 
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problems arising from them require a great deal of expense 
because of design, training and other aids to adjustment to a more 
urbanized way of life. 
Other Problems 
Squatters and slums, of course, are not just parts of the housing 
problem alone. They also result in a host of other problems that 
are extremely difficult to solve. For example, the report of the 
Sub-Committee on Squatter Rehousing and Resettlement submitted 
to the National Operations Council in 1969 enumerated the fol-
lowing as problems created by squatters:14 
(a) squatters challenge the status of governments as 
agencies for maintaining law and order; 
(b) the predominance of squatting in Kuala Lumpur as the 
capital city reduces its image both at home and overseas 
and increases the sensitivity of the population; 
(c) squatting results in an increase in crime, juvenile de-
linquency and a wide variety of social problems; 
(d) squatter areas are also the seedbeds for thugs, secret 
societies and other racketeers to operate their activities; 
(e) squatting results in the loss of substantial revenue in 
the form of assessment rates, taxes, etc. to the govern-
ment; 
(f) as the number of squatters increases, their influence 
and resistance to eviction grows and as officials demon-
strate their inability to grapple with the issues, still 
more brazen squatting occurs taking advantages of 
official helplessness or acquiescence; 
(g) squatting not only affects the physical development 
of Kuala Lumpur, but also its economic, social and politi-
co I stability; 
(h) squatting huts are generally fire hazards as well as 
a menace to public health. 
A study of crimes in the state of Selangor since Independence 
shows a definite increase in murder, robbery, gang robbery and 
burglary between the years 1957-1968. (See table below). The 
most significant increase had been crimes normally associated with 
urbanization, viz. robbery, gang robbery and burglary. The figures, 
except for murder, went down considerably in 1969. This is mainly 
due to the racial disturbances in May of that year. Other possible 
reasons can be attributed to the emergency and curfew rules, 
increased police vigilance and the fact that a large number of 
secret society members have been rounded up since May, 1969. 
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Table 3 
Crime Rates in Selangor 
Crime 1967 1968 1969 1970 (up to April) 
Murder 25 46 156 6 
Gang Robbery 6 164 74 8 
Robbery 77 1,041 696 107 
Burglary 868 2,799 2,238 550 
It is difficult to establish the origin of criminals involved in the 
city's crimes. Police Headquarter's reports do not indicate their 
address but only age, sex, racial group and sentence passed. The 
study shows more Chinese than Malays or Indians are convicted 
for robbery and gang robbery. More Indians than either Malays 
or Chinese are convicted for crimes of violence like murder and 
assault. For thefts and burglary, an almost equal number of 
Chinese and Indians, and a slightly smaller number of Malays are 
convicted. 
Another feature of squatting in the Federal Capital, which 
lends to racial instigation and political exploitation, is its non-
integrated character. For instance, a census of Kampong Ken-
anga16 shows not a single Malay living in the area. Of the 838 
families with a total of 4,547 persons recorded, 796 are Chinese 
families, and there are only 177 Indians. This fact is mainly due 
to the multifarious and sometimes conflicting social, cultural and 
religious habits and practices of the different ethnic groups. Given 
a properly planned rehousing and resettlement scheme it may be 
possible to integrate the squatters under the same roof, but it will 
take some doing. 
Solutions 
The authorities currently dealing with squatters include: (a) the 
Federal Government, through the National Operations Council, 
The Ministry of local Government and Housing and the Commis-
sioner of Federal Capital; and (b) the State Government, through 
the District Office, Kuala Lumpur, and the State Development 
Corporation. The basic policies of both agencies are similar and 
are as follows: 
{a) that the problems of squatters be continually studied 
and that surveys be undertaken as and when necessary 
to formulate programmes to alleviate squatting; 
107 
(b) that priority be accorded to all squatters in the alloca-
tion of low-cost housing units; 
(c) that where land is available, multi-storey low-cost flats 
and resettlement schemes are built and squatters in the 
surrounding areas are rehoused in these flats and 
schemes; 
(d) that cognizance of the squatter problem is taken in 
the development plans of the State Government. 
To date the Ministry of Local Government and Housing and 
the Pesurohjaya lbu Kota Kuala Lumpur have built a total of 8, 165 
multi-storeyed flatted units17 for rehousing of squatters and low 
income wage earners at a cost of about $49 million (Malaysian). 
Currently, the Pesurohjaya lbu Kota Kuala Lumpur has six schemes 
designed mainly to cater to squatters. These schemes will cost 
approximately $11 million and provide accommodation for 2,358 
families in multi-storeyed flats. 
To date the Selangor State Government has constructed 7,546 
dwelling units for squatters and low-income groups at a cost of 
about $40 million, both within and outside of the Federal Capital 
limits. The Selangor State Government is at present undertaking 
eight schemes which are meant to cater to squatters. Of these, 
two schemes will consist of multi-storeyed flats providing a total 
of 826 units, which are expected to be completed by the end of 
1972. The remaining six schemes are resettlement programmes 
designed to meet the needs of squatters with a preference for a 
plot of land. There will eventually be 2,635 plots, of an average 
size of 3,000-4,000 square feet in these schemes. 
Financial limitations have restricted the amount of work that 
could be undertaken to rehouse and resettle squatters. It is en-
visaged that the cost of rehousing the entire squatter population of 
Kuala Lumpur will be about $150-$180 million. 
The experience of the Pesurohjaya lbu Kota is that very few of 
the squatters for whom low-cost flats are built really move into 
these units. One reason is due to the high rentals. Every effort is 
being made to reduce costs, but in the absence of cheap land, the 
need to repay loans at an interest rate of 6 per cent over 30 years, 
the high cost of site development and the absence of a long-term 
housing programme (for say 20 years), the rentals will continue 
to be at the present high levels. 
The non-availability of land remains the single most important 
problem, particularly to the Pesurohjaya lbu Kota, in tackling the 
squatter problems. There are no sizeable areas for development 
within the Federal Capital as the majority of land is either owned 
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privately, or owned by the State Government. Much of the land 
belonging to the State Government is under mining lease. Land 
available after mining usually needs considerable treatment before 
it can be built on. Added to this, wherever land is available, 
including mining land, they are usually choked with squatters. 
Prospects 
A policy of dynamism is required in tackling the squatters' 
problem - one which deals with the real aspects of the problem. 
Essentially, this calls for a two-fold policy: one dealing with squat-
ters who are predominantly urban and the other with those who 
are agriculturally oriented. 
In so far as the urban squatters are concerned, improvements 
must be made in the industrial and commercial sector to absorb 
as many of them as possible into gainfully occupied employment 
opportunities. Coupled with this, a practical and realistic long 
term housing programme, which not only meets with the basic 
requirements but is able to cope with the future demand for such 
units well before the problems arise, is needed. 
Improvements in the rural economic sector will certainly serve 
to cushion some of the impact of urbanization and its by-product 
of squatting. Squatters who are classified as agricultural must be 
resettled in agricultural colonies, either in the periphery of the 
city, or in other areas where land for such purpose is available. 
Some degree of influx of agricultural or rural people into urban 
areas will always remain so long as the rate of population growth 
continues to increase, the differentials in income between rural 
and urban workers remain and industry's need for labour and the 
attractions of city life continue. 
The building of new towns or the expansion of existing towns 
can help to divert settlements from the central area of Kuala 
Lumpur. A sound land settlement policy in the new areas can, in 
fact, be a means of redistributing populations to desired places. 
A comprehensive approach to the squatting problem in Kuala 
Lumpur requires consideration of at least eight specific aspects of 
programme and policy which are interdependent. These include: 
(a) a comprehensive survey, (b) general policy, (c) land policy, (d) 
housing policy, (e) legislation, (f) planning, (g) administration, and 
(h) financing. 
As Charles Abrams stated, squatter policies call for firmness 
with understanding. Squatters will settle where they can if they 
are not told where they may. They will build what they can afford 
if they are not helped to build where and what they should. There 
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should be less concern about what squatters will build than where 
they will build it, how the land is planned and whether essential 
utilities and services are available. Initial layout is more important 
than initial standards of the construction. Squatter houses will tend 
to improve with time and with better economic conditions, particu-
larly if the squatters are given a stake in the society and the 
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SINCE its founding in 1535, Lima has been the capital of one of 
the most important countries in Hispanic America. With the achieve-
ment of Peruvian independence in 1821, Lima became the capital 
city of the emerging republic. Due to its political importance, the 
city always enjoyed special status for it was not only the centre 
of bureaucratic and governmental services but also the place of 
residence for Peru's ruling classes and the point of concentration for 
the country's wealth. 
The Lima metropolitan area contains about 20 per cent of the 
population of Peru. It accounts for 60 per cent of industrial pro-
duction, 97 per cent of financial activities, 50 per cent of the eco-
nomically active population, 49 per cent of internal commerce, and 
82 per cent of the production of consumption goods.1 It is also the 
seat of institutions that influence Peruvian national development 
such as the Army, the Church and universities. 
The city of Lima itself, which forms the core of this agglomera-
tion of some three million people, has only 18.4 per cent of the 
metropolitan population. The other people reside in 22 distritos 
(districts), three of these in the provincia (special province) of 
Callao and 19 in the province of Lima. The districts within Lima 
province which form a contiguous densely settled area, are: Brena, 
Chorillos, La Victoria, Lince, Magdalena def Mar, Miraflores, Rimac, 
San Isidro, San Jose de Surco, San Martin de Porres, San Miguel, 
Santiago de Surco, Surquillo, Comas, lndependencia, Jesus Maria, 
La Molina and Villa Maria def Triunfo.2 
This paper was translated fram the original Spanish. 
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The population growth of Metropolitan Lima has been extremely 
rapid. During the period 1940-1961, the yearly rate of population 
increase in Lima was 5.2 per cent, as against 2.2 per cent for 
the whole country and 4.5 per cent for all other urban areas. 
While the national population increased by 6.1 million from 1940 
to 1968, Lima's population increased five times, from 0.5 million in 
1940 to 2.5 million in 1968. It is projected that by 1975, Lima 
would have a population of 3.3 million and that by 1990, a popu-
lation of 7 million is not inconceivable. 
Internal Migration 
Much of the rapid growth of the Lima metropolis has been due 
to internal migration. It was estimated by the National Planning 
Institute of Peru that between 1940 and 1961, one million people 
migrated from the internal regions of Peru to the coastal areas. 
To understand this massive movement of people, one must con-
sider the peculiar geographic and regional divisions within Peru. 
Broadly, one can divide Peru's 485,000 square mile territory 
into three regions: the desert coastal strip along the Pacific Ocean 
which makes up l 0 per cent of the country's land area and con-
tains 30 per cent of the population; the sierra or mountain region 
of the Andes, covering about 30 per cent of the land area where 
60 per cent of the population live; and the montana or jungle 
region which covers 60 per cent of the land area but is inhabited 
by only l 0 per cent of the total population.3 
In the sierra region where most of the people live, tillable land 
is extremely limited, mainly concentrated in river valleys and 
gorges. The pressure of population on the land is so strong that 
people tend to leave the sierras. They generally gravitate toward 
the densely populated areas along the coast. 
The 1961 census in Peru noted that out of the 24 departments 
in the country, 16 were losing population (net outmigrants ex-
ceeded net inmigrants). This trend is most badly felt in certain 
regions such as Ancash, Apurimac, Ayacucho, Cajamarca, Huan-
cavelica, Piura, and Puno departments. On the other hand, only 
two departments, Lima and Callao, serve as the destination points 
of these internal migrants. There is incipient migration toward 
the Amazonas and Tacna departments but this is almost insignifi-
cant compared to the inmigration to Lima and Callao.4 
About 45 per cent of the residents of Lima are migrants, 
according to the 1961 census. These migrants come from places 
of varying sizes as seen in Table I. 
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Table 1 
Size of Original Place of Residence of Migrants to Lima 
(1961 Census) 
Community Size Per Cent 
100,000 or over 7.2 
20,000 to 99,999 26.0 
5,000 to 19,999 17.4 
1,000 to 4,999 43.3 
999 or less 6.1 
From the census figures, it is clear that the internal migration 
in Peru contradicts the common assumption that it is the residents of 
poor and isolated places which migrate to large cities. The 
figures show that the great majority of migrants come from prov-
inces which contain important urban centres in different parts of 
the country. One index to the urban characteristics of the migrants 
when they reach Lima is their major occupation. The 1961 census 
showed that only 39.5 per cent of men worked in agriculture 
before migrating to Lima, while only 16.6 per cent of women 
were similarly engaged.5 
A survey of residents of three barriadas in Lima made in 1965 
revealed that a person's migration to Lima tended to occur between 
the ages of 11 to 21. This survey, involving residents of Cuevas, 
El Agustino and San Martin de Porres, showed that 22.9 per cent 
migrated to Lima before the age of ten; 58.7 per cent migrated 
between 11to21; and 7.2 per cent migrated after 31.6 
The same survey also revealed that adjustment to life in Lima 
was eased considerably by the fact that about 60 per cent of the 
migrants lived with relatives upon first arriving in the city. Of 
these people who lived with relatives, about 85 per cent, in turn, 
did so for a year or more.7 
The flow of migration to Lima does not seem to come directly 
from the sierra to the pueblos jovenes on the outskirts of the city. 
This is shown in the 1965 survey which indicated that only 2.8 per 
cent of the residents of the three areas surveyed came directly 
from the sierra. The pattern seems to be that migrants come from 
their hometowns to the inner sections of Lima, and then move to 
the new settlements on the outskirts. About 77 per cent of the 
respondents in this survey showed this pattern.8 The findings of 
a survey conducted by Mangin in 1967 in a community called 
Mariscal Castilla also follow this trend, as shown in Table 2.9 
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Table 2 
Migration Pattern of Adults in Mariscal Castilla 
Route 
Hometown-other town-Lima-Mariscal Castilla 
















According to Census figures, there seems to be no appreciable 
difference in the proportion of males and females among people 
who decide to migrate to urban areas. The reasons for migration, 
however, usually differ in relation to sex. A study which probed 
into the reasons for migration found that while 54 per cent of males 
considered "employment opportunity" as the main reason for 
migrating to the city, only 34 per cent of females gave this reason. 
On the other hand, 47 per cent of females said that "family ties" 
motivated them to move to the city, as against 18 per cent of the 
males who gave this answer. About 17 per cent of males con-
sidered "educational opportunities" important in their decision to 
migrate, 11 per cent of females shared this view. Some 12 per cent 
of males gave other answers while 8 per cent of the females did 
so. These figures show that the men usually come to the city to 
look for work while the women, because of their roles, are drawn 
by family ties. These usually mean that they come as wives of 
migrant husbands or as the parents of younger migrants. 
Migration to the city is usually due to reasons which are dif-
ferent from those that influence migration to the pueblos jovenes 
on the outskirts of cities. The Turner-Paredes survey cited above 
asked the residents of El Agustino, Cuevas and San Martin de 
Porres why they moved to these settlements. In general, the oppor-
tunity to own land seems to have been the strongest motivation for 
moving, followed closely by the desire to maintain family ties. The 
importance of different reasons for moving is shown in Table 3.10 
The Problem 
As in other countries, the main problems arising from the 
rapid migration of people from the countryside to the primate 
city are rooted not only in the possible frustration of aspirations 
held by the migrant before his coming to the city but in the actual 
pressure on facilities and services of necessity offered by the city 
to make life viable for migrants and residents alike. The service 
that usually feels this strain the most is housing. In Lima, the 
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Table 3 
Reasons for Moving to Pueblos Jovenes 
Reason El Agustino Cuevas San Martin de Porres 
Economic, desire to work 19.2 20.0 11.5 
High rents in the city 4.1 17.6 2.6 
Family reasons 31.5 9.5 14. l 
Land acquisition 13.7 30.6 56.4 
Better housing 9.6 4.7 3.8 
Others 21.9 17.6 11.6 
100.0 100.0 100.0 
communities of dilapidated dwellings and poorly serviced com-
munities variously called corralones, barriadas or pueblos jovenes 
dramatically illustrate this problem. 
In 1968, it was estimated that about half of the population 
of Lima lived in tenements and subdivided older houses (corralones) 
in the centre of the city. Another 25 per cent lived in suburban 
communities (barriadas or pueblos jovenes) which were usually 
located on vacant hillsides, sand dunes, river banks or barren flats 
not being used for productive purposes. These latter communities 
have been defined in the Barriada Law as follows: 
... the territorial zone of fiscal, municipal, communal 
or private property that is found on the outskirts of the 
populated centres of political-administrative capitals or 
in their surrounding suburban areas, in which by invasion 
and in spite of legal dispositions on properly, with 
municipal authorization or without it, on lots distributed 
without regard to officially approved plans, have been 
constituted groupings of dwellings of haphazard con-
struction, lacking one or more of the following services: 
drinking water, sewage, public lighting, sidewalks, 
vehicle routes, etc.11 
The definition of barriadas cited above clearly shows the 
problems that they create. These are: (l) lack of legal status of the 
settlements; (2) lack of governmental planning in setting up the 
settlements; and (3) the lack of urban services, at least initially. 
The fact that these settlements do not conform to governmental 
plans, of course, does not mean that there is no planning in their 
creation. Turner, Mangin and others have documented the way in 
which the invasions resulting in the creation of settlements have 
been carefully carried out. There are also increasingly effective 
attempts on the part of the settlement residents and the govern-
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argued that on balance, the activities of pueblos jovenes residents 
to improve their lot constitute one of the most developmental 
aspects of Latin American urbanization.12 
According to the results of a study of Lima migrants in 1967, 
a great majority of the respondents felt that they were "better off" 
in Lima than in their original place of residence. Only four per 
cent of the sample considered themselves adversely affected by the 
move to the city. The others attributed the gain in personal satis-
faction to the fact that they got a better job, higher income, better 
education and improved medical attention in Lima. In fact, over 
75 per cent of the sample stated that they found employment in 
Lima within three months after arriving in the city. 
In spite of this positive picture, the fact must be admitted that 
rapid internal migration is creating tremendous problems not only 
in Lima but in other cities of Peru as well. Table 4 shows that 
barriada dwellers made up from 6.2 per cent of the population of 
Cuzco in 1961 while they accounted for 67.5 per cent of Chim-
bote's population that same year. Considering that the growth rate 
of the barriada population is almost twice the growth rate of 
urban area populations in Peru, the proportion of barriada resi-
dents in the cities mentioned below would be considerably higher 
at present.13 
Table 4 
Population in Squatter Settlements in Peruvian Cities, 1961 
City Population In Settlements Per Cent 
Chimbote 66,783 45,065 67.5 
Iquitos 58, 110 36,000 61.9 
Arequipa 162,195 63,200 39.0 
Su Ilana 28,709 10,200 35.5 
Chiclayo 90,726 31,500 34.7 
Piura 81,405 28,200 34.6 
Trujillo 104, 198 34,500 33.1 
Lima (Metro) ....... 1,640,000 404,225 24.6 
Puca II pa 27,238 6,000 22.0 
Teena 27, 139 4,000 14.7 
Cuzco 81,057 5,010 6.2 
Some of the problems found in the pueblos jovenes of Lima 
may be directly traced to the illegality of these settlements, at 
least, in their early stages. The Turner-Paredes survey shows that 
54.8 per cent of the people interviewed in Cuevas obtained their 
land by being a member of an invasion group. About 8.3 per cent 
were invasion members in El Agustino and 2.8 per cent in San 
117 
Martin de Porres.14 Of the Mariscal Castilla residents studied by 
Mangin, 49.9 per cent were invasion group members.15 
Though the Peruvian Government has been one of the earliest 
administrations in the world to recognize and legalize squatter 
settlements, the legal question still hindered the provision of 
urban services in many settlements. Thus, a survey of Comas, a 
settlement of some 30,000 people located seven miles north of 
Lima's centre, revealed that there were practically no public 
hydrants in the area and people had to buy their drinking water 
from peddlers. Electricity was available, though at higher rates 
than in other parts of the city. A city-wide survey made in 1962 
showed that 56 per cent of 317 barriadas lacked water services 
of any type. It was estimated that 67 per cent of 320 barriadas 
were entirely without electricity while 24 per cent had some form 
of public lighting.16 
A survey of 154 barriadas conducted for the Fondo Nacional de 
Salud y Bienestar Social in 1960 showed that 89 of these com-
munities lacked public sources of water and 151 lacked private 
sources; 126 lacked any means of public sewerage; 136 lacked 
public health facilities; 150 lacked electricity; while only 5 com-
munities had access to streetcar service, 3 could use the railroads 
and 94 could use the city's bus system.17 
Since one of the main motivations for moving to urban centres 
seems to be that of finding employment, it must be mentioned that 
this objective is often the most serious source of frustration for 
people moving to the city. True, migrants do not usually have too 
much difficulty in finding work in Lima. The Fondo Nacional survey 
showed that only 4.7 per cent of the economically active members 
of the population in 154 barriadas were unemployed.18 However, 
this high rate of employment hides the fact that many of those 
who claim to be employed are actually seriously underemployed. 
Governmental figures estimate that 31 per cent of the labor force 
engaged in industry, 25 per cent of those in commerce, and 44 
per cent of those in services were underemployed in 1967. Under-
employment is specially critical among women, where the unem-
ployment rate is 6 per cent and the underemployment figure 42 
per cent.19 
The high underemployment rate among migrants who live in 
low income settlements becomes more readily apparent when their 
occupations are analyzed. The Fondo Nacional survey showed 
that only 1.2 per cent of male heads of families had professional 
and technical occupations, l 0.0 per cent were artisans, 12.5 per 
cent were mechanics or transportation workers, while the majority 
were unskilled workers (construction labourers, 18.6 per cent; 
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services and domestics, 12.8; peddlers and stallholders, 14.0; inde-
pendent workers, 15.7, etc.). Of the women, about 89.7 per cent 
were "economically inactive."20 
It is interesting to note that according to official government 
figures, the unemployment rate among migrants is less than half 
of the rate for non-migrants (3 per cent and 7 per cent respectively). 
As mentioned previously, however, the underemployment among 
migrants is higher (28 per cent) compared to non-migrants (22 
per cent). Primarily because of difference in jobs and the tendency 
of migrants to be underemployed, the monthly incomes for migrant 
and non-migrant groups are not the same. While migrants receive 
the equivalent of about $85 a month, non-migrants, who know 
the city job situation more and have had longer urban work 
experiences receive about $132.00 a month. 
From the factors mentioned above, it is clear that while to 
many individual migrants, the move to Lima has been beneficial, 
internal migration has also created many serious problems for 
the quality of life in Peru's capital. To understand these problems 
more clearly, and to seek ways and means of coping with them, it 
is necessary to look into the various types of low income settle-
ments that have grown in the Lima metropolis. 
Types of Settlements 
Because of commonly held characteristics, such as dilapidation, 
high densities and general poverty, the ordinary viewer of the 
low income settlements in Lima may be tempted to think that they 
are all the same. As pointed out by Turner, however, there are 
major differences between a tugurio (slum) and a barriada 
(squatter colony). Delgado also raises this distinction. Moreover, 
he goes to submit that any attempt to offer solutions to the slum 
and squatter problem in Lima must be based on a clear under-
standing of this distinction. To this end, he comes up with an 
"operational typology," which divides the settlements in eight 
categories, as follows: (1) high density internal barriadas (slums); 
(2) high density peripheral barriadas (slums); (3) internal settle-
ments in incipient consolidation; (4) internal settlements in ad-
vanced consolidation; (5) recent peripheral settlements; (6) periph-
eral settlements in incipient consolidation; (7) peripheral settle-
ments in advanced consolidation; and (8) peripheral settlements 
in rural areas.21 
In describing the high density internal slums, Delgado calls 
them "true enclaves of underdevelopment inside the urban con-
text," which are "characterized by manifestations of decadence." 
Densities in these areas fluctuate between 500 to 2,000 per 
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hectare. The character of these slums is shaped largely by this 
high density living. 
The degree of congestion is impressive; the absence of 
hygienic services is generalized ... the organization of 
the inhabitants with respect to local centres is very weak 
or non-existent; tenancy is by rent and, more frequently, 
by illegal possession; localization is next to working 
centres and nuclear zones within the urban area; and 
the possibilities of local development are virtually nil.22 
Examples of slums that fall under this category are: Huerta and 
Chacra Rios in El Cercado; Concentracion Ruggia and Ciudadela 
Chalaca in Callao; Leoncio Prado and Jardin Britania in Rimac; 
and Mendocita in La Victoria. Delgado estimates that there are 
about 60 internal slums in the Lima metropolitan area, represent-
ing about 15 per cent of the total population of the low income 
settlements. (See map on page 116). 
The same high density and dilapidation characterizes the 
peripheral area slums, with the major difference that they are not 
located in the central city. They tend to be fewer and smaller in 
size. Often, they are concentrated in places where land available 
for housing is limited by topography and other factors. Examples 
of these settlements are found in Puente Nuevo in Callao and Flor 
de Amancaes in Rimac. 
Squatter settlements just starting to consolidate are usually 
invasion areas that originally have high densities (around 400 
inhabitants per hectare). Usually, they have not been recog-
nized by the government or have just been recently recognized, 
so that the processes of planning, lot distribution and other activi-
ties related to legal distribution of urban services have not yet 
resulted in thinning of dwelling units. Examples of these types 
of settlements are Mirones in El Cercado, Huascaran in Rimac, 
Villa Victoria in Surquillo, Ancienta Alta in El Agustino, and Santa 
Rosa de Lima in San Martin de Porres. 
Squatter settlements characterized by advanced consolidation 
have usually reached the last stages of redevelopment, so much 
so that densities often thin to 350 inhabitants per hectare or lower. 
In these areas, there is residential planning, streets are wider, and 
basic services and infrastructures generally become available. 
Recent peripheral settlements are usually less than three years 
old. They are formed by people who come from the inner city 
slums, joined, perhaps, by more recent migrants from the prov-
inces. Essentially, they are "towns in formation." An example of 
a recent peripheral settlement is Ano Nuevo, resulting from an 
invasion in 1967, which saw more than 1,000 families settle in 
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private property located in the peripheral area. The success of the 
invasion was greatly due to the aid given by municipal authorities 
residing in the Comas district. 
Peripheral settlements in incipient consolidation are relatively 
hard to find in Metropolitan Lima, though El Progreso in Carabayllo 
and Acapulco in Callao may be considered as examples. Generally, 
such settlements are the results of experimentation in consolidation 
of recent peripheral settlement dwellers. 
Some of the most studied settlements in Lima are the peripheral 
settlements in advanced consolidation, mainly because they show 
what can be done when people organize to do things for them-
selves. Densities in these settlements remain under 300 inhabitants 
per hectare. The settlements themselves are usually located on 
the perimeter of the metropolitan area, in places with access to 
main roads. Examples of such settlements which started as inva-
sions but which developed to communities surpassing l 00,000 are 
Nueva Esperanza in Villa Maria del Triunfo, Pampa de Comas 
in Comas, and Santa Teresa de Villa in Chorillos. 
Finally, settlements within the metropolitan area may be con-
sidered as qualitatively different from the others mentioned above. 
They are similar to small settlements that appear along coastal 
roads in the rural areas. Still, because they will be enveloped in 
the growing urban conurbation in the future, they present an 
interesting phenomenon. Among the few cases of this type of 
settlement are El Carmen de Monterrico and Matazango in the 
Ate district near Lima. 
An important aspect of the typology presented by Delgado is 
the fact that a developmental progression is implied in the eight 
categories he proposed. By correlating the physical and social 
aspects of the settlements and their location within the metropolitan 
area, he suggests the existence of a process of consolidation which 
occurs in all settlements in the urban place. This method of analysis, 
essentially an optimistic one regarding the future of low income 
settlements, serves as a guide to the land use and land allocation 
policies of the government and suggests approaches for agencies 
that seek the improvement of the tugurios and barriadas. 
Even without the typologies presented by Delgado, however, 
it is still quite easy to grasp the picture of low income settlements 
in Lima by just looking at their location in the metropolitan space. 
This approach, which was used by Matos Mar and John P. Cole 
as early as 1955, becomes much more interesting when seen in 
the proper historical contexts of development. 
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In 1955, Matos Mar made a comprehensive survey of barriadas 
in Lima and found that there were 39 settlements at that time, with 
a total population of 119, 140 and occupying some 512.44 hectares 
of the city's land area.23 Only nine of the 39 settlements were 
founded before the Second World War (the oldest barriada, Arma-
tambo, was founded in 1924). Five barriadas were founded during 
the war years. The formation of barriadas seems to have acceler-
ated only after the Second World War, with 12 being founded 
between 1947-1950. This was followed by six in 1951 and seven 
in 1954. 
Updating his data in 1966, Matos Mar found that in eleven 
years, the number of barriadas in Lima had increased to 181 and 
that the area occupied by such settlements had increased to 
1,644.30 hectares. Furthermore, the percentage of barriada 
dwellers to the total Lima population had increased from 10 per 
cent in 19 55 to 19 per cent in 1966. 
As seen on the map on page 116, barriadas in Lima are located 
in various parts of the urban area. In 1955, Matos Mar defined 
these areas as: (1) the bed of the Rimac River; (2) the hillsides on 
the northeastern parts of the city; (3) inside the urbanized area of 
the city and (4) outside the urbanized area of the city. As Table 5 
indicates, the growth of barriada settlements has been fastest in 
the third and fourth areas. In the future, growth outside the urban-
ized area will surely expand more vigorously.24 
Table 5 
Growth of Barriadas Between 1955 and 1966 
Number Number Number of Number of 
Persons Families 
Location 1955 1966 1955 1966 
Bed of Rimac River 15 40 68,400 23, 166 
On the hillside 15 33 26,980 23,625 
Inside urban area 7 70 18,800 20,404 
Outside urban area 2 38 4,960 17,236 
Total 39 181 119, 140 84,431 
There are three specific reasons why barriadas in Lima have 
tended to concentrate in the four types of areas mentioned above. 
First, invaders tend to choose marginal lands for barriada sites 
because they feel that there will be less public opposition to this 
move. After all, unused lands near river banks or those located 
on steep hills have low value. Another reason for the pattern of 
settlement in Lima is related to the government's ownership of the 
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lands occupied. Many invaders believe that there will be less 
opposition to their moves if they occupy government land, espe-
cially public land which is not being used. Finally, as far as inner 
city settlements are concerned, choice of location is related to place 
of work. Most tertiary and service occupations are located in the 
central city. However, the central city slums and squatter areas in 
Lima are already saturated with low income people. Settlements 
outside the urban area are growing - mainly lured by the avail-
ability of land there, but also limited by transport costs and the 
longer travel time to place of work involved. Initially, at least in 
the construction stages, a few of the squatters find employment 
right in the settlements - as construction workers, carpenters, 
masons, plumbers, etc. Other squatters may earn something open-
ing up little stores or extending some services to the people in 
the community (dressmakers, shoemakers, beauticians, etc.). How-
ever, the viability of these low income communities will depend 
on the job opportunities available close by. Either that, or good 
low price transportation facilities must be introduced to link these 
comunities with the central city where jobs are. 
In 1961, the Peruvian Government passed the Marginal Settle-
ments Law (Ley Organica de Barrios Marginales) which is more 
popularly known as the Barriada Law. This law marks a change in 
the philosophy and approach of the government towards the bar-
riadas. It implicitly recognizes the nature and magnitude of the 
problem. The law seeks to transform existing barriadas into 
organized suburban towns and to prevent the formation of new 
barriadas through carefully planned urbanization. 
The passage of the Barriada Law also recognizes the inability 
of the government, alone, to solve the problem posed by slums 
and squatters. The investments necessary for coping with these 
problems are much higher than what the government can afford. 
For example, between 1949 to 1956, the Peruvian Government 
was able to construct only 5,476 houses for low income people. 
This was less than l per cent of the housing need for those years. 
It is no wonder, therefore, that within the same period, some 
50,000 families in urban parts of the country took matters into 
their own hands and invaded public and private lands, setting up 
their barriadas. 
Characteristics of Migrants 
Most studies that provide some information on the charac-
teristics of migrants to Lima have been done in the barriadas, 
though the inner city slums of Lima are much larger and the 
problems they represent are graver. Perhaps this is because the 
barriadas are, in the words of Solnit, "visually dramatic". Slum 
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formation is part of a natural process of urban aging and decay. 
The barriadas, set up by invasions which have sometimes resulted 
in riots and killings, attracted more attention. 
The barriadas of Lima, however, are only extensions of the 
slum problem in the city. As previously mentioned, most of the 
barriada residents have usually been slum residents. They might 
have been renters who got tired of the cramped rooms in slum 
adobe houses for which they were paying so much, or even slum 
home owners who were evicted from their inner city sites. In most 
instances, as exemplified in the story of Blas and Carmen told by 
Mangin,25 the barriada invaders are simple folks with positive 
aspirations who want a home of their own and a piece of land 
in the city and who band with other people of similar goals to 
take over a certain area. A survey of Pampa de Comas in 1956 
showed that more than half of the people had come to the barriada 
to be property owners and live in their own houses. A third had 
moved because they could not afford to live in Lima. Six per cent 
had been evicted from their rental quarters and saw the invasion 
as an opportunity to get what they wanted.26 
What they want, most of all is of course, land. Table 6 shows 
how the residents in four different low-income settlements were 
able to obtain land in the outskirts of the city.27 
Table 6 
How Residents Obtained Land in the Settlement 
Mariscal 
El Agustina Cuevas San Martin Castilla 
Invasion group member 8.3 54.8 2.8 49.9 
Permission from Ass'n 8.3 22.6 52. l 13.4 
Bought permission 2.4 15.5 1.4 
Moved individually 8.3 8.3 1.4 13.7 
Bought from someone 11.7 1.8 
Ownership transfer .... 41.7 11.9 14. l 2.4 
Got from government 1.7 9.9 
Renting .15.0 1.4 
Others 5.0 4.2 16.0 
--------- --
Demographic Aspects. Generally, residents of pueblos jovenes 
tend to be young. The Pampa de Comas Survey (1956) found that 
35 per cent of the settlement's population were under l 0 years 
of age. The study of Ciudad de Dios made by Matos Mar revealed 
that 55.3 per cent of the people were minors (below 18). Turner 
noted that "the barriada is established by young families with a 
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high proportion of very young children," although he proposed 
that ofter passing through certain stages, the ratio of infants to 
adults drop, the overage age of the adults rises, making the age 
structure in the borriodo more or less similar to that of the city 
as a whole.28 
Studies of people in Lima's pueblos jovenes show a high rote 
of literacy and relatively good education. The Matos Mor study 
showed that borriodo residents who were seven years old or above 
hod almost 90 per cent literacy. This is not so surprising in a culture 
that sees education as the key to economic and social mobility. 
However, though primary education is available to most Peruvians, 
only a few people ore able to go on to higher education. 
Generally, migrants to Limo tend to hove lower education than 
non-migrants. According to a Census study, while 69.1 per cent of 
mole and 61.0 per cent of female non-migrants who ore 15 years 
old or over hod finished at least one year of secondary school or 
higher, a relatively lower percentage of migrants were able to 
achieve this level. For moles who were 15 years or under when 
they arrived in Limo, 58.1 per cent were able to finish one or more 
years of secondary school (the corresponding figure for females 
was 38.6 per cent). For migrants who were 15 years or older 
when they arrived in Limo, the percentage of those who finished at 
least one year of secondary school was much lower (43.1 per cent 
for moles and 27.5 per cent for femoles). 29 
Tobie 7 
Education of Community Residents 
~----
Level El Agustino Cuevas San Martin 
No education 4.2 4.7 2.6 
One to two years 12.5 9.4 15.4 
Three to four years 33.4 21.2 19.0 
Primary, complete 27.8 42.5 29.2 
Secondary, incomplete 13.0 16.5 21.1 
Secondary, complete 5.8 6.2 5.0 
University, incomplete 2.9 2.6 
University, complete 1.4 5.1 
Other studies hove shown that one of the benefits of migrating 
to Limo is the opening up of educational opportunities, especially 
for younger people. Comparatively speaking, a greater propor-
tion of people in Limo achieve higher levels of education than those 
in other ports of the country. Statistics show that 75 per cent of 
oil limo residents who completed the first year of secondary school 
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in 1962 also completed their fifth year in 1966; in the country as 
a whole, however, less than one half of those enrolled in the same 
secondary school level in the same year were able to finish the 
fifth year in 1966. 
Children in the primary schools in Lima have a much better 
chance of going on to secondary schools. About three-quarters of 
primary school children in the city complete the primary school 
curriculum, compared to only one-third for the rest of the country. 
Economic Characteristics. With low education and few skills, 
most migrants to Lima find employment in secondary or tertiary 
sector activities. As mentioned previously, unemployment and 
underemployment among migrants are high. A study in 1956 
showed that only about a quarter of the total barriadas' popula-
tion in Lima was employed. Of the economically active popula-
tion, however, some 92 per cent were employed and 71 per cent 
had steady employment. Of the remainder, 27 per cent had occa-
sional or seasonal employment. Most people worked outside the 
barriadas. Those who found employment within the barriadas 
were shopkeepers or artisans and specialists of various kinds who 
helped their neighbors with construction and other jobs.31 The total 
labor force in the barriadas was divided into the following cate-
gories: labourers and artisans, 58 per cent; domestics, caretakers 
and gardeners, 16 per cent; peddlers or shopkeepers, 14 per cent; 
and public transport workers, 5 per cent. Some 8 per cent were 
unemployed. 
There is some evidence that the employment patterns of 
migrants change dramatically once they move to the urban 
centres. For one, people who formerly earned their livelihood 
from agricultural pursuits usually have to shift to other callings. 
This is shown in Table 8 where it is shown that while 39.5 of male 
Table 8 
Occupation of Migrants Before and After Migration 
(In Per Cent) 
Occupations 
Before Migration After Migration 
Men Women Men Women 
Professional, managerial 4.7 4.7 5.0 10.2 
Office workers, salesmen 16. l 18.0 27.6 32.5 
Agriculturists 39.5 16.6 1.2 .5 
Service workers 5.4 39.4 12.9 38.0 
Artisans, skilled workers 11. l l 0.4 42.2 15.7 
Labourers 23.2 10.9 11. l 3.1 
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migrants were engaged in agriculture before migration, there 
were only 1.2 per cent still working in this area afterwards. In 
most part, this shift is absorbed by employment in jobs that call 
for either skilled or unskilled work, which together accounted for 
more than half of the employment figures after migration.32 
The change of employment characteristics as migrants become 
more stabilized in the urban setting is shown further by Census 
figures which make a distinction between manual, non-manual, 
agricultural and other types of employment. The figures in Table 
9 reveal that the percentage of people employed in manual occupa-
tions tends to decrease with length of stay in the city while the 
percentage of people working in non-manual occupations tends 
to increase with length of stay. This is especially true among 
women, where 72. l per cent of recent migrants as against 42.3 
per cent of older migrants were employed in manual occupations 
in 1966.33 
Table 9 
Types of Employment of Migrants to Lima 
by Date of Migration 
Sex and Date of 
Migration Non-manual Manual Agricultural 
Men 
lnmigrated after 1956 36.8 56.9 2.9 
I nmigrated before 1956 42.3 53.0 1.6 
Native to Lima 49. l 47. l 2.1 
Women 
lnmigrated after 1956 24.8 72. l .7 
lnmigrated before 1956 56.5 42.3 .6 








Since the type of occupation available to migrants usually dic-
tates the level of pay and income derived by them, it is only logical 
to conclude that the shift in employment through time also means 
a change in the level of income received. A study of economically 
active males conducted by the Census Department showed that 
time spent in the city is directly related to level of income. Thus, 
Table l 0 shows that 30 per cent of native Lima residents as against 
22 per cent of older migrants and 12.4 per cent of recent migrants 
received Soles 4,000 or more per month. The percentages for these 
groups is reversed when one considers people receiving Soles 
1,000 or less.34 
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Table l 0 
Monthly Income of Migrants by Date of Migration to Lima 
Income Levels 
Less than Soles 1,000 
1,000 to 1,499 
1,500 to 2, 999 
3,000 to 3,999 
4,000 and above 
Migrated Migrated 
after 1956 before 1956 














One interesting fact about the economic life of squatters in 
Lima is the existence of many small activities having to do with the 
buying and selling of goods, the presence of small stores, ambula-
tory peddlers, little restaurants and artisan shops that cater to the 
need of the barriada residents but which also link the settlement 
to the outside economy. Mangin observed, for example, that in the 
barriadas he studied, "Many families obtain some income by 
operating stores, bars or shops in their homes; in the barriada 
I have studied most closely about a third of the households offer 
some kind of goods for sale.35 
In his study of Ciudad de Dios, Matos Mar did an intensive 
analysis of the 94 tiendas or small businesses in the barriada. 
Looking into their capitalization, he found 28 such places having an 
initial cost ranging from 1,000 to 8,000 Soles. Another 66 tiendas 
had initial costs ranging from 190 to 980 Soles. As for the things 
they sold, the small businesses generally dealt in soft drinks, liquor, 
fruits and vegetables, other foods and various little things needed 
by the people in the barriada. Most of the stores were small 
encomenderias, retail stores that sold diverse products and food 
items. Among the 94 tiendas studied by Matos Mar, there were 13 
restaurants which were sometimes attached to boarding houses, 
four bakery shops, two sellers of ice, two butcher shops and other 
small businesses.36 
All the economic aspects mentioned above highlight the fact 
that employment is still the most important problem in the bar-
riadas. It is true that a few jobs may be found in the barriadas 
themselves and that many of the residents possess certain skills 
that enable them to find jobs in the city. However, most employ-
ment opportunities are found in the centre of the city and living 
in pueblos jovenes in the peripheral areas entails additional trans-
portation costs to and from these jobs. One good thing about 
living in the settlements, though, is the presence of small businesses 
and stores that cater to the peoples' needs. Aside from performing 
this much needed function, the tiendas also provide some income 
to many squatters. 
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Community organization. As communities that are set up by 
cooperative efforts, the barriadas are usually tightly knit organiza-
tions with leadership structures and well understood procedures 
that create social cohesion. Settlements originating from invasions-
"often carried out with as much advance planning and organiza-
tion as a Marine amphibious assault" - usually maintain the 
strong community structure that made them possible in the first 
place. Such unity is often demanded by the fact that once set up, 
the barriada has to defend itself against property owners, govern-
mental agents, the police, and even other invaders. In Pampa de 
Comas, for example, some 200 diehard squatters formed an asso-
ciation for the defense of their property as early as 1945, when 
an influential landowner whose adjoining lands were squatted 
upon had the squatters evicted. From this association sprouted 
the "Confederated Government of Comas," which was composed 
of representatives popularly elected each July from each of ten 
zones of the community.37 
Describing the typical association in a barriada, Solnit points 
out the various functions of such an association through time: 
The typical barriada association acts as a semi-govern-
mental unit whose basic function, at first, is the protection 
of property and the development of the community. As 
such, it tries to obtain basic urban services and outside 
assistance from the national government. The associations 
are financed by assessments paid by barriada residents. 
An elected directors committee usually runs the internal 
affairs of the barriada, passing on applications to settle 
there by cutting out new lots out of vacant areas, on 
requests to sell, etc. 38 
In Ciudad de Dios, Matos Mar divided the 18 associations 
existing in the place into four types: (a) associations to seek solu-
tions to the housing problem, 3; (b) sports and athletic associations, 
8; (c) religious organizations, 4; and (d) organizations to further 
certain activities, 3. The first types of associations, which were the 
oldest in the community, were mainly composed of original 
invaders. They represented the local and communal governmental 
authority in the area. Usually composed of male adults (they were 
known as Asociaciones de Padres de Familia), they were mutual 
aid associations that continued to make decisions for the com-
munity even when formal bureaucratic governmental services were 
introduced.39 
For all intents and purposes, therefore, the barriada associa-
tions are the effective governmental units in Lima's low income 
settlements. They elect their own leaders once a year; collect 
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taxes (in the form of dues) from members; screen new applicants 
for lots; resolve land disputes; try to prevent land speculation; and 
organize co-operative projects. Their effectiveness, however, does 
not mean that they become isolated from the other organizations 
(especially governmental institutions) in the city. In fact, much 
of their use depends on how well they are able to link up with 
the whole governmental system. For official papers such as voting 
registration, certificates of marriage, birth and death and other 
needs, they go to city hall. They approach the police in cases of 
crimes and misdemeanors. They depend on the public schools for 
the education of their children. Health and sanitation services 
are extended to them by the proper government authorities. In 
these links with the government, the barriada associations have 
taken care that the welfare of the whole community is looked 
after. Most of the association members, aware that the govern-
ment is sensitive to the fact that the barriadas were initially set up 
against the law, take special pains to prove their law-abiding 
nature and loyalty to the government. In this sense, the barriada 
associations do not conform to the common fear that they are 
revolutionary groups just waiting for an opportunity to topple the 
government. 
Governmental Assistance Programmes 
When the first barriada invasions occurred in Lima, the Govern-
ment's immediate response was one of harsh retaliation. Most of 
the barriada residences were torn down soon after they were built, 
people were beaten up, and some even killd. However, the suc-
cess of some squatters in forcing the government to at least pretend 
not to see the invasion served to encourage others. Mangin has 
estimated that more than l 00 invasions have occurred in the Lima 
area in the past 20 years.40 
The Government's hard stand against the barriadas changed 
around the early l 960's, partly because of popular sympathy for 
the squatters and also because of the adverse reaction of people 
to the violence done by the police. The 1961 Barriada Law recog-
nized the problem posed by these settlements. The Corporacion 
Nacional de Vivienda (National Housing Corporation) implemented 
its provisions. In 1963, the Junta National de Vivienda or JNV 
(National Housing Board) was created to coordinate activities of 
agencies implementing the provisions of the Barriada Law. This 
new agency was the result of combining three units which were 
all related to the problem of housing development: the National 
Housing Corporation, the National Housing Institute, and the 
Housing Division of the National Health and Social Welfare Fund. 
130 
Formally, the JNV is charged with studying the housing problem 
in Peru, formulating a general housing plan, and planning and 
implementing the provisions of such a plan. The Boord was 
assigned "to bring about the remodeling, sanitation, legalization 
and eradication of the barriadas in the urban and suburban areas 
of the national territory, in accordance with Law No. 13517" (Bar-
riada Law).41 
For every squatter settlement, the improvement programme of 
the JNV usually involves four specific steps. First, a complete 
survey of the barriada is made, so as to find out the best way 
of developing it. Second, a basic development plan (remodelacion) 
is prepared for the barriada. Third, with the completion of the 
plan, the JNV extends legal land titles to the residents in the 
borrioda. Finally, with the resident already owning a piece of 
land, he becomes entitled to improvement loans extended by the 
JNV for housing purposes. 
In its activities, the JNV usually works through the formal bar-
riada associations mentioned above. In fact, the legality of such 
an association is based on its recognition by the National Housing 
Board. Each barrioda association has a president, a vice president, 
and 20 members of the directing board. These officers are elected 
yearly by the people. Barriada associations are organized on a 
city-wide scale through the Central Barriada Association, usually 
made up of five delegates from each of the Barrioda Associations 
in the city. 
The National Housing Board has been quite innovative in the 
pursuit of its task of improving not only the housing but the living 
conditions of the barriada people as well. Within a couple of years 
of its founding, it managed to make a survey of some l 00,000 
families throughout the country that lived in barriadas. It brought 
basic services, such as water and drainage to some 123,000 people 
by mid-1963. It also hastened the organization of formal barriada 
associations, which brought electoral participation in local affairs 
in Peru for the first time since 1922. Finally, the JNV launched a 
programme designed to help people to finish their houses by giving 
them loans. Initially, the loans were made in kind (roofing mater-
ials, lumber, adobe walls, etc.) but administrative problems dealing 
with such minute details forced the agency to give cash loans.42 
Though the JNV could help the new barriadas growing up in the 
suburbs, it was extremely difficult to extend the resources of the 
agency to old slum areas in the central city, slums that are so 
deteriorated that there is no other alternative but to tear them 
down. To cope with his problem, the National Housing Board 
offered land and "core housing" to slum dwellers who would 
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agree to move to suburban barriadas. A plot of land, some 1,600 
feet square, was offered to each family. A provisional dwelling 
constructed by the agency, a drinking water stand pipe and a few 
other amenities were given by the JNV, within the context of a 
"planned squatter settlement." With this initial help, many of the 
former slum dwellers found better homes and a better way of life 
in the areas around Lima. 
However well intentioned the Barriada Law was, it did have 
a basic defect. Those who formulated the law optimistically 
thought that after its promulgation there would be no more 
invasions and new barriada developments. Hence, the law applied 
to all existing barriadas in 1961, but treated all subsequent settle-
ments as illegal and not entitled to its provisions. Unfortunately, 
the expectations of those who made the law were not met. Other 
barriadas sprouted after 1961 for which new programmes must 
be formulated if the government is not to lose the benefits already 
gained from the existing programmes. 
Though the National Housing Board is the agency named by 
the Barriada Law to coordinate programmes for developing squat-
ters and slum settlements, the Peruvian Government also has other 
agencies with activities that directly or indirectly affect such 
settlements. For some time, the need for a coordinating machinery, 
especially at the top levels, has been felt. In December 1968, 
therefore, a staff agency in the office of the First Minister (Presi-
dent), was created. The Oficina Nacional de Desarollo de Pueblos 
Jovenes (National Office for the Development of Pueblos Jovenes) 
is charged with "studying, planning, proposing and coordinating 
the necessary solutions at the national level, in order to intensify 
the real and effective integration of the population of those areas 
into the social-economic development of the country."43 
Prospects and Problems 
Peru's approach to the slum and squatter problem is a happy 
mixture of realism and foresight. It takes advantage of the 
resources that the barriada dwellers have, tries to channel the 
efforts of squatters towards constructive ends, offers encourage-
ment to individual and group efforts at self-betterment and recog-
nizes the potentials for development of organized individuals. The 
programme is national in scope, and sees the problems of the Lima 
metropolis within a national development context. 
The problems of the barriada programme in Peru arise from the 
basic problems of the country itself. The political and economic 
instability in recent years has not helped matters any. Calamities 
in the countryside have added new flows to the migration to the 
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coast and the Lima area. Finally, the financial difficulties of the 
government arising from foreign exchange problems, which are 
in turn due to the political instability mentioned above, may greatly 
limit the scope of urban development activities in the future. 
The programmes of the National Housing Board, economically 
sound as they are, benefit mainly squatters and slum dwellers 
who have some income and other resources to begin with. The 
"planned squatter settlements" with their pre-built houses cost 
about as cheaply as any other public housing programme in the 
world. However, they are still beyond the ability to pay of the 
low income barriada dweller, who, ironically, is the one most 
needing assistance. 
Perhaps in the future a fully subsidized low cost housing pro-
gramme for Peru will become possible. Such a programme, how-
ever, will demand financial, land and other resources which cur-
rently seem beyond the capacity of government. When such 
capacity is achieved, however, it is good to know that the pioneer-
ing programmes of the Peruvian Government have provided the 
models which other developing countries can use in coping with 
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LIKE other developing countries, the Philippines is faced with 
the twin problems of rapid population growth and the mal-distribu-
tion of the existing population over the landscape. There are, at 
present, some 37 million Filipinos, and their number is growing 
at about 3.5 per cent per year. The urban population of the 
country, however, is growing at a much faster rate (in excess of 
four per cent per year). Furthermore, this urban growth is occur-
ring in areas that are already highly urbanized. The Metropolitan 
Manila area, already holding some ten per cent of the national 
population, also has one of the highest population growth rates 
in the country. In some portions of the metropolitan area, as in 
the national capital, Quezon City, the population is growing in 
excess of twelve per cent per year.1 
Table l 
Annual Rate of Growth for Metropolitan Manila, 
1903-1960 
Popu· Rote in Per Cent Popu-
Metropoliton lotion 1903- 1918- 1939- 1948- lotion 
Manila 1903 1918 1939 1948 1960 1960 
Manila 219,928 1.65 3.99 4.80 1.38 1,138,611 
Caloocan 6,660 4.85 5.20 4.24 8.39 145,523 
Makoti 2,700 10.23 5.01 2.17 9.38 114,540 
Mandaluyong 4,349 1.85 5.88 3.85 9.20 71,619 
Paranaque. 6,507 8.04 1.13 3.26 6.93 61,898 
Pasay City . 8,201 5.34 5.56 4.98 3.60 132,673 
Quezon City 3,062 6.89 7.74 1.01 12.15 397,990 
San Juan del 
Monte 1,431 8.89 6.35 5.39 5.33 56,861 
Source: 1960 Census of the Philippines as quoted in Elvira M. Pascual, Population 
Redistribution in the Philippines. (Manila: Population Institute, U.P., 1966), p. 64. 
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The rapid growth of the Metropolitan Manila population is 
mainly due to migration from other places in the Philippines. As 
in other developing countries, natural increase of population in 
the Philippines seems to be higher in rural areas. This may be 
due to such factors as the rising age of marriage in urban areas 
which reduces total fertility somewhat, and the spread of family 
planning methods in urban areas at a relatively faster rate. One 
factor contributing to rapid urban growth, however, is the gen-
erally lower mortality rate in urban areas.2 
As of 1960, there were 32 cities, 55 provinces and 1,322 muni-
cipalities in the Philippines. Studies of the internal movements 
among these politico-administrative units in the country show that 
the direction and rates of migration have changed somewhat since 
the l 930's. In 1966, a study by Pascual showed that the relative 
"gains" and "losses" of population among provinces were as 
follows:3 
Gained Population 
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Compared to a study made by Nava for the 1939-48 period, 
Pascual's findings reveal that "in general, provinces that showed 
a gain in people by migration in the 1948-1960 period show a gain, 
also, for the 1939-1948 period." However, there were some notable 
exceptions. While the city of Manila and Samar gained population 
in 1939-1948, they were losing population in 1948-1960. Camar-
ines Norte and Nueva Vizcaya, on the other hand, had ceased to 
lose population and were already gaining migrants in the second 
period.4 
These trends in the l 960's make up the latest patterns in the 
population distribution process in the Philippines. Early in its 
history, population growth in the Philippines centered around 
Manila and its surrounding provinces in the island of Luzon. Lesser 
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centres, such as Cebu and lloilo in the Visayas also grew fast but 
the colonial economic and political patterns of these early days 
stimulated the growth of Manila. In the first days of American 
occupation at the turn of the century, the tendency for growth to 
be centralized in Manila continued. However, a conscious policy 
of opening up new lands, a road-building and transportation pro-
gramme, as well as a campaign praising the prospects of Mindanao 
as the "land of promise" combined to generate more migration to 
Mindanao.5 
In the 1948-60 period, the movement to Mindanao has con-
tinued. At the same time, the attraction to the Manila area has 
not abated. In actuality, the city of Manila proper has not been 
gaining population. However, the whole Manila metropolitan area 
serves as a powerful magnet for migrants, as evidenced by the 
rapid growth of Rizal province, especially those portions that are 
adjacent to Manila. What we are witnessing in Greater Manila, 
therefore, is a process of metropolitanization. The already con-
gested city has burst its seams, and its continued growth has 
sprawled over to its surrounding areas. 
Metropolitan Manila: a Primate City 
The position of Metropolitan Manila as the primate city in the 
Philippines is shown in the fact that it is nine times larger than 
the next largest city, Cebu. The city's primacy is bolstered further 
by its continued growth of metropolitanization. The Philippine 
Bureau of the Census and Statistics still defines Metropolitan Manila 
as being composed of four cities and four towns in the province of 
Rizal (the chartered cities of Manila, Caloocan, Quezon and Pasay 
and the towns of San Juan, Mandaluyong, Makoti and Paranaque). 
Other studies, however, have argued for a wider and more realis-
tic delimitation of the Manila metropolitan area. laquian has 
argued for the inclusion of six other towns in the definition: 
Navotas, Malabon, Marikina, Pasig, Pateros, and las Pinas, making 
up a total of 14 local units in the metropolitan area.6 The National 
Planning Commission expands the definition further by adding 
five more towns to laquian's definition (Obando, Valenzuela and 
Meycauayan in the province of Bulacan, as well as San Mateo, 
and Taguig in the province of Rizal). Manahan, in a study of 
flooding in Metropolitan Manila, has suggested that two more 
towns in Rizal (Cainta and Taytay) have to be added to the NPC 
definition of the metropolitan area.7 Finally, the National Water-
works and Sewerage Authority (NAWASA) excludes Obando and 
Meycauayan in its Metropolitan Manila definition for purposes of 
water distribution although it includes the town of Antipolo, Rizal. 
The widest area definition of Metropolitan Manila that has been 
proposed, therefore, includes 21 local units {four cities and 17 
towns). 
137 
II. !LOCOS a MT. PROVINCE 
111. CAGAYAN VALLEY a BATANES 
IV. CENTRAL LUZON 
V. SOUTHERN LUZON a ISLANDS 
VI. BICOL PROVINCES 
VII. WESTERN VISAYAS 
'1111. EASTERN VISAYAS 
IX. SOUTHWESTERN MINDANAO a SULU 
X. NORTHEASTERN MINDANAO 
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Fig. 15. MIGRATION STREAMS TO AND FROM METROPOLITAN MANILA 
(1948-1960) 
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Even if the more restricted definition of the Bureau of the 
Census and Statistics is used, the process of metropolitanization 
in Greater Manila may be discerned in the changing patterns of 
population distribution. Comparing the 1948 and 1960 censuses, 
one notices that some districts of Manila proper (Binondo, Port 
Area, Quiapo, San Miguel, San Nicolas and Sta. Cruz) have had 
population decreases in the period while all the suburban towns 
and cities have increased their population. Quezon City, in fact, 
grew by 268.6 per cent within the period.8 
Table 2 
Population of Metropolitan Manila by District, 
City, and Town 1948-1960 


















































































































As implied by the lack of a generally accepted definition of 
what constitutes Metropolitan Manila, there is no one adminis-
trative nor political entity that encompasses the whole metropolitan 
area. The lack of formal regional organization may be traced to 
such factors as the rapid growth of the area and the resulting 
blurring of boundaries, the strongly held commitment to local 
government autonomy among local units in the Philippines, or 
the primarily political basis for the creation of cities and other 
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local government entities in the country. The Philippines is one of 
many countries that still fails to take economic, demographic and 
other factors in its creation of cities. As a result, places that are 
still predominantly rural have been given city status while a 
metropolitan area like Greater Manila still suffers from frag-
mentation. 
There is no set pattern of administration of urban services in 
Metropolitan Manila and other urban areas in the Philippines. 
There are certain services that are mainly the responsibility of the 
national government, the city or province or the towns while there 
are some which are shared among these various levels. However, 
many variations in arrangements exist, depending on political 
factors, the financial and technical resources available or historical 
precedents. For example, while the City of Manila provides free 
education from first grade to high school (and to a limited extent 
up to college) in other local units of the metropolitan area, much 
greater reliance on the central government is seen. 
The Problem 
As previously mentioned, the City of Manila experienced in-
migration in the 1939-1948 period and out-migration in the 1948-
1960 period. The rate of growth for the city has declined from 
4.80 in the first period to 1.38 for the second. A similar trend is 
seen for Pasay City. The outward movement from Manila and 
Pasay has been toward the adjacent towns and cities in Rizal 
Province. 
Since 1948, about two-fifths of the people who moved to 
Manila have come from the Visayan area. Another fifth came 
from provinces in Central Luzon. On the other hand, the process 
of metropolitanization may be seen by the fact that about one-
half of the people who moved to Rizal province came from Manila. 
Of the remainder, about two-fifths of Rizal in-migrants came 
directly from the Visayas.9 
Generally, migration studies have shown that a process of 
positive selection is involved in the decision to move. Thus, 
migrants tend to be better educated than people in their place of 
destination. They also appear to be more ambitious, resourceful, 
adventurous and more flexible and modern in their attitudes than 
the people of the places they migrate to. 
In the migration to Metropolitan Manila, however, this does 
not seem to be the case. Pascual's study showed that while in 
general, "the migrants on the whole were better educated than 
the total population," for the Philippines, the situation is reversed 
in Manila where the migrants contained a smaller proportion of 
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college educated than the population to which they migrated.10 Of 
course, this trend may be due to the fact that Manila already has 
the highest concentration of highly educated persons in the country. 
Compared to migrants to other regions, more people who 
move to Manila tend to be single. While in all regions, about 
60-75 per cent of migrants were married, only 54 per cent of 
Manila migrants were married. The bulk of migrants attracted to 
Manila are non-white collar types.11 
These characteristics of migrants to Metropolitan Manila reveal 
the problem which the largest urban area of the Philippines faces. 
As a whole, while migrants to the city may be driven by greater 
ambition, their lack of education and skills does not enable them 
to readily succeed in the highly competitive job markets existing in 
the city. Lacking funds and other resources, the migrants have to 
make do with what marginal services are available. Since the 
migrants themselves find it difficult to be integrated into the eco-
nomic, political and social system of the metropolis, they constitute 
an additional burden on the urban service system that exists. 
Squatting and Slum Dwelling 
One of the most serious manifestations of problems arising 
from rural-urban migration is squatting and slum dwelling. Based 
on the most recent data available, there are about 127,852 
squatter families (769, l l 2 persons) and 55,907 families (335,442 
persons) living in slum conditions in Metropolitan Manila, a total 
of 183,759 families or l, l 02,554 persons. Some 43.8 per cent 
of these squatters and slum dwellers live in the City of Manila 
proper. Another 17.8 per cent are in Quezon City and 13.1 per 
cent in Caloocan City.12 
Surveys of squatters and slum dwellers have shown that about 
93 per cent of these people are migrants to Metropolitan Manila. 
The volume of migrants to the primary urban centre of the Philip-
pines seems to have been increasing through the years. Of the 
squatters and slum dwellers surveyed in 1968, about 16 per cent 
moved to the city from 1946-1955; 14 per cent moved from 1956 
to 1960 and 28 per cent arrived from 1961 to 1965. The acceler-
ating rate of migration may be seen in the fact that 9 per cent of 
the people surveyed migrated to Manila in the two years of 1966 
and 1967. 
The pattern of migration to Manila indicates that squatters and 
slum dwellers did not move directly from their villages to the 
metropolitan area. Rather, the migration seems to have been 
multi-stage: first passing through a smaller urban centre or centres 
and then to Manila. Once in the metropolitan area, too, squatters 
142 
Table 3 
Estimated Number of Squatters and Slum-Dwellers 
In Metropolitan Manila, 1968 
(Families) 
Slum-
Squatters % Dwellers % Tata I % 
Manila 35,329 27.6 45, l 07 80.7 80,436 43.8 
Malabon 9,000 7.1 9,000 4.9 
Navotas 4,000 3.1 4,000 2.2 
Caloocan 21,650 16.9 2,350 4.2 24,000 13. l 
Quezon City 31,297 24.5 1,450 2.6 32,747 17.8 
Mandaluyong 15,250 11. 9 6,000 l 0.7 21,250 11.7 
San Juan 3,384 2.7 3,384 1.8 
Marikina 456 .4 456 .2 
Pasig 196 .2 196 .1 
Taguig 200 .2 200 . l 
Cainta 80 .0 80 .0 
Makati 971 .8 200 .4 1, 171 .6 
Pa say 1,939 1.5 800 1.4 2,739 1.5 
Paranaque 3,600 2.7 3,600 1.9 
Las Pinas 500 .4 500 .3 
Metropolitan 
Manila 127,852 l 00.0 55,907 100.0 183,759 100.0 
and slum dwellers seem to have moved around a lot. In the new 
slum and squatter areas, most of the people studied had moved 
from another community in the urban area before. 
As the map on page 139 shows, the heaviest concentration of 
slum dwellers in Metropolitan Manila is in Tondo, where an esti-
mated 46,297 of the city of Manila's 80,436 households are found. 
The location of Tondo close to the piers and open markets encour-
ages the location of low-income people because these are the 
places where unskilled laborers find employment. As for squatters, 
they are mostly found in the peripheral areas outside Manila 
proper, as in Quezon City, Caloocan, and along the railroad tracks 
leading to Makati and other Rizal towns. In the past two years, 
many squatters have been evicted from the Quezon City park site 
and transferred to relocation sites in Carmona, Sapang Palay and 
San Pedro Tunasan. Of late, however, there are reports that the 
squatters are staging a comeback. 
The economic, social and political problems arising from squat-
ting and slum dwelling are well known. Unemployment and under-
employment among these segments of the population are very 
high - studies have shown that the average family income among 
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squatters and slum dwellers is between 100 to 149 pesos per month, 
which is much below the minimum wage law rates. Family sizes and 
dependency ratios among squatters and slum dwellers are also 
high - the average household has six members and some 70 per 
cent of family members are dependents. 
Much of the blame for health and sanitation problems in Manila 
is heaped on squatters and slum dwellers. A recent report on 
Solid Waste Management for the Manila Metropolitan area pre-
pared by a WHO expert concluded that "Solid wastes storage, 
collection and disposal practices in the Manila Metropolitan area 
are in general well below any standards recognized as accept-
able by public health authorities."13 While the report put much 
of the blame for this on faulty organization, lack of financing, 
obsolete techniques and lack of public cooperation, the pictures 
accompanying the report which showed the disposal of solid wastes 
in esteros, streets, vacant lots and open spaces near squatter and 
slum areas spoke fluently about the real situation. 
As in other metropolitan areas all over the world, the presence 
of squatters and slum dwellers in Manila is associated with high 
incidence of crime and juvenile delinquency, social and personal 
disorganization, and breakdown in morals and socially accepted 
behaviour. Thus, the district of Tondo, which has more than half of 
Manila's squatters and slum dwellers, accounted for 35.8 per cent 
of reported crime victims in 1965. Tondo, also, has the highest 
percentage of "crimes against persons" among the districts of 
Manila.14 
Finally, there are also fears that squatting as an illegal act, 
if allowed and condoned by the authorities, may encourage further 
violation of other laws. For a long time, the revolutionary potential 
implied by the poverty and misery of slum life has been discussed 
in many studies, especially those dealing with Latin America. The 
efforts of radicals to recruit followers among squatters and slum 
dwellers have been mentioned by the authorities in the Philippines. 
Certainly, if nothing is done to alleviate the problem of squatting 
and slum dwelling in the Philippines, there is a possibility for fears 
to become reality. 
Characteristics of Migrants 
Many studies have been done in specific slum and squatter com-
munities in Metropolitan Manila.15 Such studies provide ample data 
on the characteristics of people who live in these communities. 
In general, the main motivation for moving to Manila seems to 
be economic. Instability in the countryside (in Central Luzon) due 
to the Huk rebellion in 1949-1953 contributed some migrants but 
in general, people seem to have migrated to Manila by choice, in 
the hope of finding something better there. 
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Once in Manila, most migrants live in slum and squatter areas. 
Specific reasons given for choosing particular areas include: 
l. Proximity to sources of employment. Since employment 
is usually in jobs requiring little or no skills, pay is low 
and migrants elect to walk to and from their place of 
work to save money. 
2. Availability of undeveloped or unused public lands or 
large private estates. A sense of social justice among 
most poor Filipinos is given as justification for occupy-
ing land which is not used by the government or rich 
people. Speculation in land is common in the Philippines 
and the idle land resulting from it attracts squatters. 
Leniency of legal authorities, abetted by political sup-
port, gives encouragement to squatting. 
3. Availability of poor or marginal lands. There are many 
areas in Metropolitan Manila which are not readily 
suitable for development. These include swampy areas, 
reclaimed land, river banks, places near noisy or smelly 
factories, the railroad tracks, roads rights of way, etc. 
Since most of these lands are not properly guarded, 
squatters find it relatively easy to occupy them. It is 
also argued that since these lands are not being used, 
the squatters can at least use them. 
4. Private lands owned by slumlords. In the case of slum 
dwellers, they are usually attracted to private lands 
where owners are willing to receive low rent payments, 
either because the land is marginal or because they 
cannot find other more fruitful uses for the land. Many 
such slum areas are close to the centre of the city where 
people are packed in hovels under most unsanitary 
conditions. 
As for the squatter and slum dwellers themselves, the surveys 
have revealed economic, demographic, social and psychological 
data about them. These findings are also summarized in a recent 
report as follows:16 
l. The average family income of squatters and slum-
dwellers is between Pl 00 to Pl 49 per month. About 
51.3 per cent of squatter and slum families earn less 
than Pl50 and about 14.8 per cent claim having no 
income or income that is so variable one cannot depend 
on it. 
2. The average size of squatters and slum-dwelling house-
holds is between five and six members. The degree 
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of dependency is high, with 70 per cent of household 
members below 18 years of age. About 32 per cent 
of dependent members are below school age, while 11 
per cent of those of school age are out of school. 
3. Doubling up in squatter and slum houses is quite fre-
quent. More than 30 per cent of houses in squatter and 
slum areas have more than one family residing in them. 
Home ownership, however, is quite high, with 67 per 
cent of families owning their houses and only about 
26 per cent renting (others are even rent free). 
4. Utilities are greatly lacking with water and roads being 
the most serious problems, followed closely by police 
and fire-fighting facilities. Barely a quarter of squatter 
and slum-dweller households have toilets and garbage 
collection is almost non-existent. Only electricity is ade-
quately provided, with about 70 per cent of households 
using electric lights and 42 per cent using radios. 
5. Squatters and slum-dwellers are very organized, with 
more than 65 per cent of household heads being mem-
bers of at least one organization. Membership provides 
not only a sense of community identity but political 
power as well. 
6. Most of the squatter and slum-dwelling families are 
migrants from the rural areas, with only about 7 per 
cent being originally from Metropolitan Manila. About 
a quarter of squatters and slum-dwellers are from 
Central Luzon, 20 per cent from Western Visayas and 
17 per cent from Eastern Visayas. Other regions where 
they come from are Northern Luzon, 14 per cent, and 
the Bicol region, 13 per cent. 
7. The most important reason given for going to Metropoli-
tan Manila was to improve means of livelihood. Most 
important reason for staying in the squatter area was 
"no other place to go to" and "closeness to job." More 
than three-fourths of squatters and slum-dwellers are 
unwilling to leave their area. They are almost unani-
mous in looking up to the government for help. 
Solutions 
Up to now, efforts to cope with the problems posed by squat-
ting and slum dwelling in Metropolitan Manila have concentrated 
on one approach - relocation. Squatters from lntramuros, F. B. 
Harrison, Malate and Ermita as well as those formerly occupying 
the Quezon City Park area have been relocated to Bago Bantay, 
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Novaliches, Sapang Palay, Carmona and San Pedro Tunasan. For 
most of these squatters, the government has provided free trans-
portation and rights to purchase the land at easy installment terms. 
In Carmona and San Pedro Tunasan, "core housing" has also been 
introduced, with the government providing the basic parts of the 
house (roof, posts, toilet and compacted flooring) and the relocated 
family adding the rest from its own resources. 
In most of the relocation projects, there are indications that 
relocation as an approach has not been overwhelmingly successful. 
Close to three-fourths of the original people relocated to Sapang 
Palay, for example, have abandoned the place and returned to 
the urban centre once more. The main complaints of relocated 
people have been distance from the place of work, lack of work, 
amenities and services in the new area, and high transportation 
costs to and from work. In many instances, land speculation in 
the new areas has also been widely practised, with sales of "rights" 
providing additional income to enterprising individuals. 
Low cost housing in tenements has also been tried in Metro-
politan Manila. The People's Homesite and Housing Corporation 
manages the Bagong Barangay Housing Project, the Macapagal 
Tenements and various middle-income housing projects in Quezon 
City. The four-storey row houses in Bagong Barangay have been 
praised by those who live in them though complaints have been 
heard about the seven-storey tenements built in Vitas, Punta and 
South Super Highway. In almost all these projects, however, there 
have been charges that people with relatively higher incomes have 
managed to occupy the dwelling units, mainly by purchasing 
"rights" of occupancy and tenancy. Thus, low cost homes designed 
for former squatters and slum dwellers have fallen into the hands 
of people who can afford more expensive commercial housing but 
who welcome the savings made possible by the cheap rents. 
The Department of Social Welfare (formerly Social Welfare 
Administration) has for some time conducted as one of its many 
programmes designed to help poor people a project to encourage 
squatters and slum dwellers who find life in the city too difficult 
to return to their rural places of origin. This has been a small 
project, however, and it has not really attracted too many people. 
Even when transportation is provided, many squatters and slum 
dwellers seem to prefer staying under difficult circumstances in 
Metropolitan Manila to accepting defeat and admitting failure 
by going home. 
Other approaches for solving the slum and squatter problem 
have been proposed and tried, sometimes on a pilot project basis. 
An urban community development programme has been introduced 
in Barrio Magsaysay involving such approaches as community 
organization, self-help, leadership training, etc. Since the pilot 
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project was primarily meant as a research venture, it resulted in 
useful information about the community and in indicating useful 
approaches but has lacked continuity as an action programme.17 
While the solutions mentioned above and others have been 
tried in Metropolitan Manila, the slum and squatter problem has 
not shown any signs of being abated. For one, all the efforts so 
far tried have been piecemeal, uncoordinated, sporadic and lacking 
in financial and technical support. The government machinery for 
coping with the slum and squatter problem has also been inade-
quate. As a frank report in 1968 stated: 
The government's efforts to solve the problem of squat-
ting and slum dwelling have been characterized by sporadic 
campaigns and programs more or less related to specific 
crises situations ... The result has been organizational 
confusion marked by overlapping of functions, repetition 
of efforts, passing the buck and other undesirable bureau-
cratic practices including corruption.18 
Problems and Prospects 
The population of Metropolitan Manila is projected to reach 11 
million by the year 2000 if present trends continue. If no solid 
programmes for solving the problems arising from rural-urban 
migration are introduced soon, the primary city of the Philippines 
might very well become a colossal slum before that time. There 
is evidence that most of the solutions proposed and used up to 
now have failed to stem the problem. What, then, can be done 
to make the prospects for Metropolitan Manila brighter? 
In terms of evolving a useful approach, there are certain basic 
things that have to be done first. Foremost among these is the 
formulation and adoption of a definite national policy and pro-
gramme which will embrace such aspects as the government's offi-
cial stand on squatting and slum dwelling, the desirable allocation 
of people and investment resources over the national landscape, a 
national housing programme, credit facilities for low cost housing 
and the governmental machinery to coordinate all those efforts. To 
solve the problems of Metropolitan Manila, they should be placed 
in their proper national context. Focusing on rural-urban migration 
as a phenomenon accentuates this basic premise. It is sad but 
true that the problems of the primate city of the Philippines affect 
and are affected by the problems of other places - and a solution 
to these problems demand a nation-wide approach. 
An effective way of making this national policy and programme 
manageable is by dividing the Philippines into well-defined regions 
and making a distinction between inter-regional and intra-regional 
solutions. The Manila urban region, for example, may be planned 
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in terms of what can be done to develop it. At the same time, the 
regional plan must jive with other regional plans prepared for the 
areas around Manila. In this way, solutions can both be com-
prehensive and intensive, and coordination can be facilitated. 
Finally, of course, a regional approach calls attention to the 
governmental forms currently used in the Philippines. While the 
regional concept is generally acceptable to most people, consider-
able opposition is encountered when reorganizations in the struc-
ture of government are proposed. Many studies both in the Philip-
pines and abroad have shown the evils of governmental frag-
mentation - both functional and areal. And yet, Philippine policy 
makers are engaged in this very process by dividing up provinces 
into smaller segments for political reasons. To solve area-wide 
problems, as is the case with those arising from rural-urban 
migration, area-wide solutions are needed. This is the main 
rational approach proposed here - and possibly the only hope 
for dealing with worsening urban problems in the future. 
As for specific approaches and programmes that have been 
used in Metropolitan Manila to cope with problems generated by 
squatters and slum dwellers, a close re-examination is in order. 
In the first place, the relocation scheme of the government which 
has resulted in the transfer of inner city and park land squatters 
to relocation sites in the peripheral areas does not seem to have 
fully succeeded. Many of the relocated squatters have trickled 
back into the city, setting up new communities in marginal lands, 
railroad tracks, roads rights of way, and unguarded private lands. 
There is an economic logic in the location of slums and squatter 
areas close to the city centre, where the jobs for unskilled and 
service people are usually more available. Low cost housing 
closer to the places of employment, therefore, should be considered 
by the authorities. However, land close to the centre of the city 
is very expensive. Even if high-rise tenements are constructed, the 
cheapest building methods will price these housing units way 
above the paying capacity of squatters and slum dwellers. 
Of late, the Philippine government has given in to the demands 
of squatters on reclaimed land in Manila and has started distribut-
ing small parcels of land to bona fide tenants actually occupying 
the pieces of land. The population densities in these communities 
of squatters are very high-higher even than what can be achieved 
by high-rise housing. However, distribution of land to squatters 
alone will not solve the problem. When services, amenities and 
community organization are not introduced as part of the land 
ownership scheme, there is a high possibility that conditions in 
such areas will deteriorate and they will become worse slums. 
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One serious shortcoming in public efforts to cope with the 
slum and squatter problem in Metropolitan Manila is the lack of 
credit facilities which land and homeowners can turn to either to 
acquire or improve their properties. Private banks rarely offer 
housing loans because they can get more from commercial and 
other investments. The government insurance system and the 
social security system do offer housing loans but these are mainly 
for middle income to high income customers with assured capacity 
to repay. The so-called low-cost housing schemes that have been 
launched by semi-private and private companies are also priced 
higher than what the average squatter or slum dweller can afford. 
All these, of course, call for subsidized housing by the government. 
The low cost housing currently being undertaken by the Philip-
pine Government, aside from being too limited (the Peoples Home-
site and Housing Corporation has built only a little more than 
12,000 housing units since its founding), has also been criticized 
for design, administration and maintenance aspects in housing 
projects. The seven-storey tenements using access ramps instead of 
elevators, for example, have been hit by architects and engineers. 
The community projects located in the suburbs have also been 
criticized for being too expensive and too far from the place of 
work. Finally, complaints have also been aired that in the alloca-
tion of low cost houses, people who have enough income to afford 
commercial housing have been awarded units while true squatters 
and slum dwellers have been bypassed. 
The grievances and complaints will continue to be heard for as 
long as the approach of the government to solving the slum and 
squatter problem is characterized by piecemeal attempts that 
emphasize only a single approach such as relocation, low cost 
housing, etc. What is needed, most of all, is a comprehensive 
approach made up of complementary programmes that respond 
to the housing problem. For housing encompasses economic, 
social, political and other aspects of urban life which should all be 
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SEOUL has been the capital city of Korea for over five hundred 
years. It has traditionally been the political, economic and social 
capital of the country, at least, since the founding of the Yi Dynasty 
by King Tae-jo in 1392. The city's importance, however, has been 
greatly enhanced since the Second World War and the Korean 
War, especially after 1945. The destruction of the country because 
of the Korean War as well as its division into a northern and a 
southern sector have unsettled the lives of many people. Many 
of these uprooted people have migrated to the urban areas of 
Korea, especially to Seoul. 
As of the census of 1966, it was known that Korea had a 
population of 29, 170,000. Of these, 9,780,000 (or 33.2 per cent) 
were living in cities, 3.8 million in the city of Seoul alone. Already 
accounting for about 13 per cent of the total national population in 
1966, Metropolitan Seoul was projected to have a population of 
4.3 million by 1968 and 5 million at the time of writing.1 
The dominance of Seoul over the whole of South Korea is 
beyond question. As one of the world's largest cities (the city of 
Seoul proper ranks 11th in size among the world's cities while 
the metropolitan area ranks 22nd), it cannot help but dominate 
the whole nation. All of the central government headquarters and 
facilities are concentrated in the country's capital. Practically all 
large industries, manufacturing and cultural institutions are also 
in Seoul. About 61.9 per cent of all colleges and universities in 
Korea are in the Seoul area. So are 65.4 per cent of all the nation's 
college and university students. 
The dominance of Seoul is seen when its population is com-
pared to the population of Korea's other cities. As Table l shows, 
Seoul is almost three times as large as the next ranking city, 
Pusan. The three remaining urban centres are all less than a 
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million. In fact, in 1967, Korea had only two cities over a million, 
two from 500,000 to 999,999; 13 from 100,000 to 499,999; and 
15 from 50,000 to 99,999. The relative rankings of these urban 
centres is readily seen, however, when it is known that 53.5 per 
cent of the country's urban population is concentrated in the two 
million and above population cities (Seoul and Pusan).2 
Table 1 
Population of Korea's Five Largest Cities 
·~--~--------
Cities Population 
1955 1960 1966 
Seoul 1,568,7 46 2,412,808 3,805,216 
Pusan 1,045, l 83 1,180,076 1,429,726 
Taegu 487,252 675,644 847,494 
Kwangju 233,043 328,256 404,859 
Chon ju 124,116 186,930 220,344 
The growth of Seoul in relation to other urban places in Korea 
is best understood when seen in historical perspective. For this 
purpose, it is useful to divide the period since the Korean War 
into three historically distinct stages. The first stage (roughly 
between 1956 and 1960), saw heavy investments in rehabilitation 
and reconstruction of the damages wrought by the war. Infra-
structure projects, especially transportation and power lines were 
constructed during this time. As the nation's capital, and a city 
that was heavily damaged, Seoul also got the heaviest invest-
ments. Of course, jobs and other opportunities generated by 
these investments attracted people from all over. As such, Seoul 
grew by 9.6 per cent per year and gained some 940,000 people 
during this period.3 
The second stage in Seoul's post-war development is covered 
by the First National Economic Development Plan period (1961-
1965). During this stage, there were attempts to develop the indus-
trialization of the country systematically. Spatial considerations 
were included in the planning and programming of the country's 
development. As such, cities other than Seoul also benefitted from 
national government investments. Pusan, for example, received 
considerable investments within this period. An entirely new indus-
trial town, Ulsan, was also set up, resulting in a 6.7 per cent annual 
rate of population growth in the area. Some planners still believe 
that the decentralized investments during the first plan period 
were not in accordance with rational investment criteria. Never-
theless, the investment in social overhead projects (railroads, ports, 
power) to areas other than Seoul had the effect of somewhat 
lessening the central city's primacy. Within this period, Seoul's 
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population growth rate went down to 7.3 per cent per year though 
even this resulted in an additional one million people to the city. 
Finally, the third stage in Seoul's development is the Second 
Five Year Economic Development Plan period (1966-1970). As 
the period draws to a close, there are already certain perceptible 
trends. During this time, Seoul's population growth rate has 
stabilized to a little above 7 per cent per year. The tendency to 
invest in areas other than Seoul has also continued. The spec-
tacular growth in other urban areas begun during the second 
period are already bearing results. In fact, there is a possibility 
that with decentralized development in the whole of Korea, the 
population of Seoul may stabilize in its growth rate at a level 
quite close to the national growth rate of 5.2 per year. However, 
even at that level, the fact that the absolute number of Seoul's 
population is already about five million will still add a large 
number of people to the city's population. This absolute growth 
will naturally strain the city's services further. 
Internal Migration 
The population of Seoul was estimated at 200,000 at the end 
of the 19th century. It was set at 350,000 by 1930 and 900,000 
by the time of the Liberation in 1945. In a little less than half a 
century, therefore, the city's population increased about four and 
a half times.4 
However, in less than 25 years, Seoul's population since World 
War II has increased to a little less than five million! A great 
portion of this increase is definitely due to migration (migrants 
to Seoul made up about 70 per cent of all migrants to cities, large 
and small). The city's rate of growth, which has averaged about 
8 per cent per year, is too high to be explained by natural 
increase alone. 
A study of migration in Korea has revealed the major ten-
dencies in this phenomenon.5 In the first place, population move-
ment in urban areas in the period 1960-1966 accounted for 60 
per cent of the national population increase, according to this 
study. Of these urban population movements, some 40 per cent 
involved rural to urban movements; 34 per cent included move-
ments between cities; 15.5 per cent involved movements from 
urban to rural areas; and the rest included other types of migra-
tion patterns. 
Population flow into the Seoul metropolitan area is the most 
dominant of the migration patterns. There are three main com-
ponents of this flow. First, there is a movement into Seoul from 
rural areas of Chung Nam and Gyeonggi provinces, which are close 
to the capital. Second, there is another flow into Seoul originating 
from the same provinces but which passes through smaller 
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Table 2 
Population Growth in Seoul 
Year Pap~latian Increase % 
1956 1,503,865 -71,003 -4.51 
1957 1,666,005 162, l 40 10.78 
1958 1,756,406 90,401 5.43 
1959 2,093,060 337,563 19.22 
1961 ................. 2,577,018 131,616 5.38 
1962 2,983,324 406,306 15.77 
1963 3,254,630 271,306 9.09 
1964 3,424,385 169,755 5.22 
1965 3,470,880 46,495 1.36 
1966 3,805,261 334,381 9.6 
1967 3,969,218 163,957 4.3 
1968 4,330,000 360,782 8.3 
Sources: 
Seoul Population Projection, The Special City of Seoul, 1966. The Seoul Statistical 
Yearbook (1968), The Special City of Seoul, 1969. 
regional urban centres, such as the capital cities of these provinces. 
Finally, there is an urban to urban flow into Seoul from the second 
largest city, Pusan, which first attracts people from the provinces 
and smaller cities but then loses them to Seoul.6 
·----------------
500 1,000 z,ooo 4,000 a,ooo 18,000 3z,ooo 
Fig. 17 INTER - PROVINCIAL NET MIGRATION FROM CITIES TO CITIES 
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The study cited above has concluded that migration move-
ments in the urban areas of Korea are largely determined by the 
size of the urban area, the functions that it serves, and the oppor-
tunities that it offers. Generally, smaller cities have higher out-
migrants than in-migrants. However, cities performing specialized 
functions, such as Taejeon (a transportation hub) and Ulsan (a 
manufacturing centre) tend to absorb more in-migrants though 
they are relatively small. In fact, these smaller centres are even 
getting migrants from the larger cities, because they offer more 
opportunities for certain people.7 
Internal migration in Korea also varies according to the dis-
tance travelled by migrants. Generally, it is known that long 
distance out-migration ends in dominant national centres, such as 
Seoul. It tends to originate from poorer areas, such as Gyeongsang 
and Jeonra provinces, widely known as double-cropping regions. 
Areas within these provinces that do not have too many services 
and facilities or which are economically depressed, generally con-
tribute to the number of long distance migrants. Medium or short 
distance migrations, on the other hand, tend to be terminated in 
smaller or medium-size cities. Some of this migration is bound for 
specialized centres, such as the army base area, mining and 
manufacturing area, etc. Most of it, however, is movement within 
the province. 
Reasons for Migration 
Studies on the reasons behind massive migration to the cities 
of Korea have emphasized a differentiation between "push" and 
"pull" factors. Two studies have tended to show that the bulk of 
migrants to the Seoul metropolitan area give "economic" reasons 
for their movement. The first of these studies was conducted by 
the Seoul municipal government. It dealt with 67,860 in-migrants 
who entered Seoul from January to June 1965. Of this number, 
28 per cent said that their main reason for going to Seoul was "to 
get or look for jobs." Another 6 per cent came because of transfer 
in their means of employment and 5 per cent migrated because of 
transfer of schools. The question on how their economic situation 
was prior to arrival in Seoul revealed very interesting answers. 
About 43 per cent said that their living conditions were "difficult" 
or "very difficult" in their places of origin. Only 8 per cent said 
their conditions were "sufficient", while the rest said they were 
not too bad or gave ambiguous answers. Generally, therefore, 
most of the migrants to Seoul came with expectations that their 
life in the metropolis would be better. 8 
A more intensive study by Man Gap Lee used a set of 23 
factors that could be roughly divided into "push" and "pull" factors 
to explain the reasons for the migration of people to Seoul. The 
first nine "pushing" factors were: poverty, war and social turmoil, 
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escape from traditional life, family bankruptcy, social class distinc-
tion, difficulty with employer, natural disasters, spread of epidemic, 
and land reform. The other nine "pulling" factors were: to find a 
job, to establish a private business, employment opportunities, 
education, cultural resources, desire for urban life, personal rela-
tionships, marriage, and anonymous refuge. In addition to these 
18 factors, five other factors which were neither pushing nor 
pulling but which depended on circumstances were also used: 
disedse, to show skill or talent, change of office or occupation, 
skills learned in military service, and superstitious prophecy.9 
Studying a sample of 505 households randomly selected from 
families registered with the administrative offices (dongs) in Seoul, 
Man Gap Lee came up with most interesting findings. Out of the 
sample, 118 persons or 29.2 per cent did not indicate the reasons 
for their movement. The remaining 323 respondents, however, 
gave specific reasons, as shown in Table 3: 
Table 3 
Reasons for Moving to Seoul 
Reasons 
1. Occupational matters (includes looking for a 
job, taking a new job assignment, etc.) 
2. Education, for migrants and for their children 
3. Oppression under the Communist regime 
4. Poverty in place of origin 
5. The Korean War 
6. Private business affairs 
7. Desire for an urban life 
8. Miscellaneous reasons 












Based on the findings mentioned above, as well as on other 
patterns revealed by the study, Man Gap Lee concluded that 
"pulling" rather than "pushing" factors were generally responsible 
for the movement of people to Seoul. In this, he tended to con-
tradict previous studies made by others.10 In another study of 
Taegu City conducted by the same author, however, he concluded 
that the predominance of the "pushing" factor may be found in 
the case of other cities in Korea. 
The Seoul study by Lee also pointed out that the reasons for 
migration may vary in their "pulling" or "pushing" character in 
accordance with the periods when they occurred. For example, for 
respondents who moved to Seoul after the Korean War and the 
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return of normalcy, job-related reasons were most important. On 
the other hand, people who migrated because of poverty tended 
to be those who migrated during the unstable periods after the 
liberation of Korea and the chaotic period of the War itself. Of 
course, most of the respondents who said that Communist oppres-
sion was responsible for their migration came to Seoul between 
1945 and 1949. 
Finally, the intensity of the reason added to the frequency of 
response also provides some variations. Professor lee asked his 
respondents whether the factors they mentioned as influencing 
their decision to migrate were responsible "greatly", or only "to 
some extent", in the making of such decisions. He found that high-
intensity factors included "social turmoil", and "family bank-
ruptcy", on the pushing category but the pulling factors were 
also strongly felt. These included "looking for a job", "education", 
"establishing a private business" or "changes in the office or 
occupation of the respondent". Some factors, such as "escaping 
from traditional life", "personal relationships in the city", and "to 
show talent or skill", were rated as influential "to some extent" 
by most respondents. On this basis, Professor lee concluded that 
these factors may not be strong enough to immediately trigger 
off migration but that they build up through time and eventually 
cause the person to migrate. 
Patterns of Settlement 
The influx of people from rural and lesser urban areas into 
Seoul has had a most dramatic effect on the character of the 
urban landscape. One of the more immediate effects of rapid 
migration, of course, is higher population densities. In Seoul, this 
fact has been countered by expansion of the metropolitan unit's 
boundaries. In 1963, the administrative boundary of the city of 
Seoul was expanded so that it now reaches an approximate 15 km. 
radius from the city centre, compared to 10 km. before. 
A study by Tai-joon Kwon indicates that most migrants into 
Seoul agglomerate along the major transit lines directly connected 
to the city's Central Business District (CBD). Kwon cites three major 
factors that influence the pattern of land development in Seoul. 
Foremost among these is the tendency of most settlers to consider 
transportation cost and time spent in journey to work. Since most 
jobs ore in the Central Business District, most migrants want to 
live close to the city centre. Other factors, such as availability of 
water and other city services, distance to schools, fire protection or 
availability of cultural facilities may also enter the decision to 
locate but the transportation factor seems to be dominant.11 
Since the transportation cost and time factor is important, the 
physical network of the public transport system in Seoul also 
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affects the pattern of settlements strongly. Most of the city's major 
road building projects have been done to extend the mass trans-
portation lines radially from the existing CBD. In addition, the 
city government's "Housing Site Development Projects" have also 
served to emphasize radial road developments. 
Finally, Kwon notes that the bulk of Seoul's economic activities 
are tertiary in nature (estimates for population engaged in tertiary 
activities range from 88.5 per cent in 1959 to 76.4 per cent in 
1965). Tertiary activities, by their very nature, demand "intensive 
interpersonal transactions", which encourage high densities in 
specific places. Hence, the decision of people to stick to the centre 
of the city may be mainly due to the predominance of tertiary 
activities. There is a possibility that when primary or secondary 
economic activities become more important, the pattern of settle-
ments in Seoul would also change. In fact, by mapping residential 
uses in the city through time, Kwon already sees a tendency for the 
CBD to "purify" its functions, pushing residential uses farther away 
from it. 
One important factor in settlement patterns, especially for 
residential purposes, is the availability of relatively cheap land 
on which to set up housing for low income people who tend to 
predominate among the new settlers in Seoul. Increasingly, with 
new developments, such lands are getting harder and harder to 
find in the CBD. As such, many low income settlements, which may 
be classified as slums or squatters, are increasingly being found 
in other parts of the city. Favorite places for such settlements are 
marginally used lands, such as those near streams and rivers, on 
steep slopes near hillsides, or in areas that are close to places con-
sidered as nuisances (noisy or smelly places, garbage dumps, etc.) 
For example, such low-income settlements as Don Am Dong, 
Myung Yun Dong, Hyun Jeo Dong, Hong Eun Dong, Su Saik Dong, 
Ha Wang Sip Ri Dong, Ok Su Dong and Sung In Dong A are on the 
mountainside; Choong Wha Dong, Tab Sib Ri Dong and Yong Du 2 
Dong are on streamsides; and Song Jeong Dong is on the riverside. 
These places have tended to attract low income migrants because 
property values there are low enough for the new settlers to 
afford them .12 
In the final analysis, it is the capacity to pay of migrants 
(which in turn depends upon what economic activities they are 
engaged in) which is the main determinant of where they will 
locate. If they can afford more transportation money and more 
time in their travel to work, people will be willing to locate farther 
away from the centre of the city. Unfortunately, the per capita 
income of people in Seoul is rather low - ranging from U.S. $157.3 
in 1965 to U.S. $281.2 in 1968. At this income level, the factors 
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we mentioned above are strong influences on the decision of where 
to settle. Already, the expansion of the metropolitan area is 
resulting in longer and more expensive trips. The busy tempo of 
life is also increasing the number of trips a person has to make -
the average trip per person per day has increased from .6 in 1964 
to .95 in 1968. With Seoul bursting at the seams and expanding 
some more, all these relationships between income, movement and 
settlement activities are likely to change the face of the city in 
the near future. And such changes may not necessarily be in 
accordance with the wishes of the planners and officials of Seoul. 
Problems of Rapid Growth 
The rapid growth of Seoul from a city of barely 100,000 after 
the Second World War to a city of 5 million at present has, natur-
ally, resulted in a host of serious problems which include housing, 
security, water, sewerage, transportation and other aspects 
demanded of a good urban way of life. These problems have 
been growing through the years, in spite of the efforts of the 
national and local governments to solve them. Of late, metro-
politan-wide approaches are starting to be used in Seoul. These 
reflect an increasing understanding that " ... Population explosion, 
ramifying differentiation of urban functions, traffic jams, housing 
and water shortage, flood, air and water pollution, garbage piled 
up, and noise . all these problems augment the citizen's 
dependency on the metropolitan administration for solution."13 
Housing. One of the immediate effects of rapid migration to 
Seoul is an acute shortage in housing. The shortage has also been 
gravely aggravated by the fact that the Korean War destroyed 
an estimated 600,000 houses or one fourth of the total housing 
supply at the time. Combined action by the government and the 
private sector has tried to cope with the housing problem but as 
of the end of 1965, it was estimated that the total number of 
houses in Seoul was no more than 345,657, which was barely 51 
per cent of the housing need. By 1970, it was estimated that some 
798,000 households would be living in Seoul. With the housing 
supply only amounting to an estimated 453,000, the shortage and 
the other problems that come with it are obvious.14 
The components of the housing need are well known. First of 
all, there is population growth due to natural increase (the dif-
ference between births and deaths), which is set at about 2.3 per 
cent per year. To this rate must be added the population growth 
due to migration, which accounts for another 7 per cent per year. 
From 1962 to 1966, it was estimated that the housing need created 
by these twin factors contributing to population increase amounted 
to 165,000 new housing units annually. 
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Table 4 
The Housing Situation in Korea, 1968 
Nation Cities Rural Areas 
Population 29,752,791 10,152,899 19,599,892 
Households 5,210,420 1,866,187 3,324,233 
Housing Units 3,885,996 982,507 2,903,489 
Shortage of 
Housing Units 1,324,424 903,680 420,744 
Percentage of Ho~sing 
Shortage 25.41% 47.91% 12.66% 
Percentage of Annual 
Household Increase 2.84% 6.61% 1.14% 
Space per Household 7.5 Pyung 7.1 Pyung 7.7 Pyung 
Space per Person 1.3 Pyung 1.2 Pyung 1.3 Pyung 
Number of Persons per 
Household 5.7 Persons 5.5 Persons 5.8 Persons 
Source: Ministry of Construction 1968 
Aside from housing needs due to population increase, there 
are also needs arising from the deterioration and depreciation of 
the existing stock of housing. Many of the houses in Korea, even 
in the cities, are made of wood and other materials which are 
susceptible to the elements. Korea's wet summers and cold winters 
contribute greatly to housing deterioration. Finally, one con-
tributor to housing need is the desire of most people for better 
quality housing. As the income and living styles of people go 
up, they aspire to better housing. This qualitative need must also 
be answered for better urban development. 
All in all, it has been estimated that up to the late l 960's, 
Korea needed some 205,000 houses every year. During this same 
period, construction averaged only 73,413 units per year, fulfilling 
only about a third of the housing demand. Of course, with this 
much of a housing deficit, conditions could only become worse 
without governmental programmes in support of housing. This 
is especially so in the cities where a shortage of 47. 91 per cent 
existed in December 1967. 
Happily, the government has recognized the housing need and 
has planned for the construction of new housing. In the First Five-
Year Economic Development Plan, the government planned to build 
60,000 units of housing. It also planned to acquire 2.7 million 
pyung (one pyung equals 36 square feet) of land for housing 
estates. However, by the time the plan period ended, the govern-
ment actually built only 40,000 units and invested only 80 per 
cent of the targeted amount for the plan period. 
In the Second Five-Year Economic Development Plan, the gov-
ernment planned the construction of some 500,000 housing units, 
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470,000 to be constructed by the private sector and 30,000 by the 
central government. The plan envisions the massive participation 
of the private sector in housing. However, with foreign exchange 
and other financial difficulties, it is now becoming apparent that 
this anticipation may not be fulfilled and that the government must 
take a more active role in the housing field if it is to solve the 
problem. 
Since the early 1960's Korea has been devoting a slightly 
increasing proportion of its Gross National Product (GNP) to hous-
ing. The proportion has risen from 1.2 per cent of GNP in 1964, 
to 1.6 per cent in 1965. Compared to countries under similar 
stages of development, this percentage of resources earmarked 
for housing is quite low. More has to be done in the future not 
only to keep up with the housing deficit but to provide adequate 
housing for future generations of Koreans. 
Protective Services. The concentration of people in urban areas 
is generally associated with a rise in deviant behavior which 
includes crime, juvenile delinquency, vice, drug addiction, etc. 
Government must provide a system by which the common citizen 
is protected from his fellow citizens who violate the laws or the 
rules of the society. In addition, concentration brings with it such 
hazards as fires, floods, and other disasters and calamities. Pro-
tective services should cover these dangers too. 
In Korea, as in other developing countries, crime rates in urban 
areas tend to be much higher than in other parts of the country. 
In 1965, for example, the cities of Seoul, Taichun, Taegu, Inchon, 
Kwangju and Pusan accounted for 51. l per cent of all the crimes 
committed in the nation. The city of Seoul alone, which had 
62,860 crimes committed during the year, accounted for 45 per 
cent of the grand total of 139,665 for the whole country.15 
When it is considered that the police force in Seoul and other 
cities have to be faced with other duties aside from crime detec-
tion and control, the inadequacy of protective services in the city 
becomes readily apparent. It must be remembered, too, that the 
troubles with North Korea also occupy the time of the local police. 
Rumors and actual cases of infiltrators coming in from the North 
become the concern of the police. At the same time, the police 
also have to undertake traffic planning and control, and other 
traditional services. With their outmoded equipment, limited 
transport capabilities and general lack of training and support, it 
is a wonder that the police forces in Seoul and other cities in Korea 
are doing as good a job as they are performing at present. 
Unemployment and Underemployment. The migration of so 
many former peasants to the city is one of the main causes for 
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unemployment and underemployment in Seoul and other urban 
centres in Korea. As already mentioned, seeking jobs and eco-
nomic betterment is one of the main motivations for migration. 
The result of the influx of untrained and unskilled people to Seoul 
in 1965 was an unemployment rate of 23.5 per cent. Out of the 
total labor force of 1,012,600 in Seoul, some 238,200 were unem-
ployed. In 1966, the number of unemployed went down to 
188,098 but this is still very high compared to the national unem-
ployment figure of 7.4 per cent.16 
Aside from the high unemployment rate mentioned above, 
there is also considerable underemployment in the Seoul metro-
politan area. Unskilled people find it very difficult to find regular 
full-time employment. Many of them make do with occasional 
jobs which do not require special skills or training. Many of these 
jobs are in the tertiary job sector such as personal services, domes-
tic jobs, etc. Since 1956, tertiary industries in Seoul have gone 
down from 87.2 per cent of the total industry employment figures 
to 76.4 per cent in 1965. This seems to be an appreciable decrease. 
However, primary industries have only risen from 4.4 per cent of 
the total employment in 1956 to 5.8 per cent in 1965. The bulk 
of the increase in employment was in secondary industries, which 
rose from 8.4 per cent in 1956 to 17.8 per cent in 1965.17 These 
employment figures show that the shifts in industrial employment 
has been rather gradual while the population growth in Seoul has 
been dramatically and drastically changing. If the main industrial 
sectors of the metropolitan area do not show a higher rate of 
increase in the future and the current population trends remain 
the same, unemployment and underemployment problems in Seoul 
will be compounded. 
Planning and Administration. The Seoul metropolitan area has 
expanded four fold since 1936 - from 133.94 square kilometers 
at that time to 613.04 square kilometers in 1967. The influx of 
population, however, is resulting in more urban sprawl and there 
is a need for a more effective planning and administrative machin-
ery to keep this growth under control and to channel it to desirable 
growth patterns. In general, there is a need to redevelop the 
central section of the city, where structures hastily set up after the 
Korean War are now in critical stages of deterioration. At the 
same time, there is a need to control the sprawling growth of the 
fringe areas of the city because continued growth will tax urban 
services seriously and make administration more difficult. 
An index to the difficulties involved in planning Seoul rationally 
is the amount spent for land readjustment. In 1966, 4.684 billion 
won was spent for this purpose. As more infrastructures are built 
by the city, more and more privately owned land will be used 
and this commands a high price in the market. 
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Until lately, city administration in the city of Seoul tended to 
be negative. Administrators seemed to be reacting mainly to 
problems, rather than actively using the limited resources of the 
administration to plan and effectively marshal urban growth for 
developmental purposes. Recent administrators, however, seem 
to have taken a more positive and long range perspective: with 
long term plans for the metropolis and serious attempts to live up 
to Seoul's role as an international city. In spite of some problems 
with the housing schemes and other cases of administrative fail-
ures, the general picture seems to warrant more optimism. At least, 
moves toward unified city administration as well as attempts to 
decentralize activities to other local government units within the 
Seoul metropolitan region have been taken. More and more, a 
regional focus is being used in Seoul, a focus which seeks to allo-
cate the proper activities to the governmental levels that can do 
them best. If these approaches are followed through, some positive 
developments in the future can be expected. 
Solutions, Problems and Prospects 
As mentioned above, in spite of the many serious problems 
faced by Seoul, there are certain activities being carried out or 
planned by the proper authorities that make for a more positive 
prospect. Some of these approaches are: the trend toward more 
coordinated regional development; more comprehensive planning 
for the metropolitan area; and improved investment in specific 
services, such as in housing. All these activities are geared to 
fulfilling the developmental potentials of Korea's main city and 
designed to making the quality of life in Seoul much better. 
Planners at the national and local levels have recognized for 
some time that if the problems of Seoul City are to be solved, they 
have to use a framework which also considers the areas around 
the city itself. Administrative and political officials have responded 
positively to this suggestion. In December 1967, the Mayor of 
Seoul took the initiative in forming the "Metropolitan Regional 
Council for Administrative Coordination." This body was composed 
of the mayors of Seoul, Inchon, Soowon, and Euichung-bu as well 
as the administrators of seven other neighbouring counties located 
within a 50 kilometer radius from the centre of Seoul. A regional 
development plan encompassing the local areas mentioned above 
has also been prepared.ls 
The regional plan recognizes the dominance of the central city 
and allots three specific land uses for it: the central sector, the 
inner circle and the external circle sectors. Around these sectors 
will be a green belt area, which is then followed by a peripheral 
area and environs sector. Areas beyond the green belt will be 
set aside for the construction of satellite towns which are designed 
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to absorb industry and working populations which will otherwise 
flock to the central sectors. Growth will be in the form of a con-
centric circle centered on Seoul. 
A network of varied transportation means will connect the 
various sectors laid out in the plan. High speed railways are 
planned, which will link the five sectors of the regional area 
together. A canal is also proposed to be dug between the cities 
of Seoul and Inchon. The capacity of Kimpo International Airport 
is to be doubled. Finally, expressways and lesser highways will 
stitch all important points of the region together. All in all, the 
regional plan for the metropolitan area hopes to place specialized 
land uses in a concentric circle around the city and to connect 
these areas by a rapid transportation and communication system. 
In addition to this plan for the development of Seoul metro-
politan region, another plan has also been proposed. This other 
plan suggests a linear-axis development corridor as the develop-
mental framework for future growth. This corridor will extend 
between Seoul and Inchon for 25 kilometers and between Seoul 
and Soowon for another 30 kilometers. Some central business 
district functions formerly concentrated in the Seoul city area will 
be dispersed to "developmental nodes" in this corridor. Business 
activities will be moved out to areas along the linear-axis, away 
from the present area which is currently limited by mountain walls. 
Residential and other uses will then be located close to these 
business and other high activity areas, so as to minimize transport 
time and costs. The spider-net transportation system currently 
available in Seoul is expected to be overloaded in the very near 
future. The proponents of the linear-axis regional plan argue that 
locating high-activity uses within the corridor will solve the present 
transportation problems.19 
Whether the first or the second scheme will be adopted and 
implemented in the development of the Seoul metropolitan region, 
there will still be many problems to be solved if the area is to 
achieve rational growth. The main question, of course, is related 
to financing. The realization of the bold schemes outlined above 
will require vast sums of money. What level of government should 
be primarily responsible for the raising of this money? How are 
the expenses to be shared so that other sectors of the Korean 
economy will not be jeopardized? 
One thing stands out in debates on the development of the 
Seoul metropolitan area, and this is the fact that Seoul, as an 
urban entity, already dominates the whole of Korea. Will the 
improvement of conditions in this premier city be good in the long 
run for the rest of the country? The central government has only 
limited resources for development. If most of these are invested 
164 
in the Seoul metropolitan area to solve its problems, what will be 
the effects of these on other parts of the country? 
Questions of national policy, therefore, are involved in con-
sidering the problem of the Seoul metropolis. The Republic of 
Korea would do well to formulate such a policy and to make 
sure that the regional and focal plans for all urban places in the 
country are integrated into a national plan that pursues the guide-
lines set down in the policy. Otherwise, rural-urban migration to 
developing urban centres will only accelerate and negate the good 




Summary of Discussions 
in the Manila Seminar 
on Solving the Slum and 
Squatter Problem 
10 
The format followed in the Manila Seminar had the authors 
delivering their papers, followed immediately by an Open Forum 
where the participants and members of the audience were able 
to ask questions, volunteer information, seek clarification or express 
opinions. What follows is an abridged and edited version of the 
most important points taken up in these discussions. Only those 
portions relevant to the subject of how the slum and squatter 
problem is being solved in various countries are included in this 
chapter. Broadly, these solutions may be divided into: (1) efforts 
to limit, deflect or influence migration patterns; (2) use of a national 
urban policy; (3) area-wide organization of urban regions; (4) low 
cost housing schemes; (5) private sector efforts; (6) site and service 
approaches; (7) finance; (8) land policies; and (9) slum clearance. 
Limiting Migration 
FLOOR: It is obvious that squatting and slum dwelling are 
caused by the massive migration of people from the countryside 
to the cities. What ways and means have been used to stem the 
flow of migrants to the city and how successful have these been? 
Which of these would you suggest to ease the problem in our 
own countries? 
SPEAKER: I am sorry to say that based on reports from Study 
Groups cooperating in INTERMEJ projects, there has been very little 
success in limiting migration to cities. This is true, especially, in 
large metropolitan areas. Even in socialist countries where more 
direct control measures have been used, they have not been too 
successful. Under "personal identification systems", for example, 
a person is given the right to housing, stores, and access to jobs, 
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only in the area where he is registered as a resident. If you are 
a resident of City A, for example, and you migrate to City B, you 
will have a hard time there because you will not be allotted a 
house, you cannot find a job, and you may not even be allowed 
to buy things from the government store. It is one thing to make 
such rules, however, and quite another thing to implement them. 
Somehow, people are very ingenious when it comes to finding 
loopholes in rules. 
In Mainland China, it was known that there were large-
scale attempts to make urban people move to the countryside 
during the Great Cultural Revolution. Young people, especially, 
were told to return to the countryside and work there. However, 
as far as we know, this and other attempts have not been too 
successful. The cities in Mainland China are as densely populated 
and troubled as those in other countries. 
FLOOR: What about "counter magnets", and other approaches? 
SPEAKER: I am glad you mentioned those. More and more, 
planners are learning that indirect influences rather than control 
measures may have greater success in solving this problem. In 
India, for example, planners are setting up industrial estates at 
some distance from the city to encourage people to move there. 
Such estates are conceived of as more or less self-contained units, 
with employment, residences and services for people who live in 
them. The same approach is being used in Malaysia and in 
Singapore. An industrial town is being built six miles from Kuala 
Lumpur, for example, and another one is expected to be finished 
by 1972. In some ways, the channeling of investments to the 
lligan area in the Philippines, may be seen as an attempt to 
convince people to move to Mindanao instead of flocking to 
Greater Manila. The main problem with a "counter magnet" 
approach is that people generally will invest in places where 
markets, labor, services and other amenities are already existing. 
This means in the big cities. It takes a lot to convince investors 
to locate in other urban places. 
FLOOR: You mentioned location in other urban places. Why 
do people have to be urbanized? Can't the government carry out 
programmes that will keep the people on the farm? Many coun-
tries have agricultural development schemes that improve the lot 
of farmers. The rural community development programmes in 
India, Pakistan, Malaysia, Taiwan and the Philippines extol the 
merits of the local community, popular participation, and basic 
democracies. The cities are already very crowded and full of 
slums and i;quatters. The rural people have to be told that they 
are better off with their fresh air and healthy environment. If 
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they learn how miserable life in the urban slums is, maybe, they 
will not migrate. 
SPEAKER: That is a very big "maybe". Unfortunately, experi-
ence shows that people will migrate to cities when they want to, 
regardless of what they are told. And once they get to the city, 
they rarely return to the country. Sociologists tell us that the 
process of urbanization is irreversible. The ironical thing about the 
point you raised is that governmental and popular efforts to 
improve the lot of farmers usually have the effect of hastening 
migration to cities. In the first place, the rationalization of agricul-
ture reduces the number of people needed on the land. Under 
conditions of underemployment, which are prevalent in most 
underdeveloped countries, better agricultural techniques bring 
about rural unemployment, which may then push people to the 
cities. Also, frequent contacts with "change agents" who usually 
come from urban areas make people curious and whet their 
appetite for city living. When combined with mass media messages 
and other appeals, this curiosity results in migration. 
But this need not necessarily be the case. People can be 
influenced to stay in the rural areas if these places are "urbanized" 
to such an extent that their lives become better. A policy of 
"creeping urbanism" can be pursued whereby agro-industrial 
estates, commercial farming, and other agricultural ventures that 
use modern methods result in an improvement in the farmers' 
lives. These may be the forerunners of your industrial estates and 
new towns which act as "counter magnets". In fact, if these urban-
izing centres become prosperous enough, they may even attract 
entrepreneurs and other innovators from the city who have found 
life there too burdensome and are looking for new challenges. In 
this way, you get the "spread effect" from urbanization that Myrdal 
has been talking about. 
FLOOR: Speaking of urban to rural migration, what do you 
think of the proposal to "decongest" the city by moving people 
to rural areas? You mentioned that this was not successful in 
Mainland China. How about in other countries? 
SPEAKER: Well, as I mentioned, urbanization seems to be an 
irreversible process. We have heard reports of the Philippine 
experience where a programme to pay for the transportation of 
people returning to their provinces has not been overly success-
ful. The results of homestead or agricultural colonization schemes 
have been sad, too, when they involved former urban people. 
FLOOR: I agree that people who have failed in the city will 
not return to their hometowns even if you pay their transportation. 
Nobody wants to admit that he failed to find his fortune in the 
city. But this is not the same as saying that people will not return 
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to the rural areas once they have seen the city. That may be true 
if you send them to rural areas where life is so different that their 
life is endangered. However, if you send them to ogro-industriol 
estates, commercial farms or other places where they ore assured 
a decent way of life, I am sure they will agree. Especially slum 
dwellers who are down and out. They will take the chance if the 
prospects seem good enough. 
SPEAKER: But would you want the "down and out" people 
to be your workers in these developmental schemes? I am afraid 
that as far as the cities in the developing countries ore concerned, 
the policy makers must face up to the fact that people want to 
move to the cities. Others may be pushed by the difficulties of 
rural life - and we don't want those "down and out" people in 
the cities, either - but generally, at least, from all the surveys 
I have seen in many countries, the main motivation for cityward 
migration seems to be the search for economic betterment. This 
is a very positive motivation and it should be used for all its worth. 
Instead of worrying about decongesting our cities, it may be 
more realistic to think about rechanneling and rationally influenc-
ing the migration going into the cities. In most Latin American 
cities, for example, and to a limited extent, in Africa, they have 
used the idea of "reception areas", which are planned for the 
housing of newly arrived migrants. These dwellings are usually 
located on the outskirts of the city. They give the migrants some 
temporary shelter with sanitation services. Sometimes, as in the 
Moroccan scheme, a minimal amount is asked as rent. In all 
instances, the reception areas are also staging areas. Once the 
migrant family finds a job, a home nearer the city, or a better 
place, he moves out of the reception centre. Government workers 
staffing the centre help the recent migrant with his needs. In this 
way, squatting does not get out of hand and the allocation of 
people over the urban area is done with some planning. 
FLOOR: The reception centre idea is good when migration is 
coming in trickles and does not reach critical levels. What happens, 
though, when the city gets inundated with migrants, as in the case 
of natural disasters and calamities or political upheavals, etc? I 
am afraid that much more than planned reception is called for, 
even in the best of circumstances. The problem, really, is much 
larger than a city or even a city region can handle. It is a national 
problem. This is why all levels of government must be involved 
in finding solutions to it. 
A National Urban Policy 
SPEAKER: I agree. What is really needed is an urban policy 
that the government can follow in improving urban development 
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nationally. Such a policy, of course, should not be seen as a nega-
tive tool. Its main purpose will not be to limit urban growth in 
certain areas but to encourage it in others. The Chief Executive 
or the Legislature in a country, or both, should adopt such a 
policy and incorporate it into the country's long range economic 
and social development plan. This long range plan {perhaps, a 
five year plan), should then be divided sectorally and territorially, 
so that regional and metropolitan-wide plans become integral 
parts of it. Lack of integration between long term, medium term 
and short term plans is a common fault in most developing coun-
tries. Most plans also do not have a spatial component. Ideally, 
the plans of the cities should flt into regions, and regional plans 
should flt into the national plan. All these, in turn, should be 
geared to the achievement of the national policy I was talking 
about before. 
FLOOR: That is all very good. However, in most countries, 
various types of plans are the responsibility of different levels of 
government or types of government agencies. Even if the central 
government comes up with an urban policy, there is no guarantee 
that it will be followed. What can be done about this? 
SPEAKER: Many ways have already been tried in various 
countries to bring about the coordination needed to implement a 
national policy. The power to coordinate may be lodged in a 
national ministry, say the Ministry of the Interior. An inter-govern-
mental coordinating committee for urban affairs may be created, 
with central and local governments represented in it. Informal 
contacts may also be used, with various heads of local govern-
ments, for example, entering into an informal agreement to check 
with each other every time they do something that may have 
repercussions in other areas. 
FLOOR: How about local politicians? Usually, they do not 
want the central government or political leaders of other local 
governments to be meddling in their affairs. Central city politicians, 
for example, may not want to surrender some of their powers to 
suburban or national politicians. In the face of this, how can 
various types of local government get together? 
Area-Wide Organization 
SPEAKER: I am personally convinced that we often make 
politicians the scapegoats for urban problems. We accuse them 
and attribute our failures to their sins. Certainly, there are some 
bad politicians but there are also many who want to see cities 
develop. As for bringing local governments together, it is obvious 
that more and more, metropolitan problems are becoming too big 
for any one local government to solve. Automobiles and rapid 
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transit are making traditional political boundaries obsolete. More 
and more, people are living, working and doing things in various 
parts of the city. It is very difficult to ask them to pay for the 
services they consume in each of these various places for they move 
around too much. So, some form of area-wide action is called for. 
Since people are acting area-wide, local governments must also 
adjust to the scope of their activities. 
I think this observation is certainly relevant in the case of 
fully developed countries. local autonomy is good and local 
officials ore right in insisting on it as they do here in the Philippines. 
However, autonomy should be granted to the correct level of local 
government. If the problem to be solved demands region-wide 
action, autonomy should be devolved at the regional level. In fact, 
in some countries, regional governments have already been intro-
duced to make for more efficient metropolitan government. In 
Toronto, for example, the Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto 
has been created and has jurisdiction over many services in the 
metropolitan area such as transportation, police and others. In 
some countries, "multi-tiered" governments are being introduced 
too. Thus, aside from local units such as towns and cities, a 
regional government encompassing the whole area may also be 
used. In this way, area-wide coordination is achieved. 
FLOOR: Area-wide governments may be more efficient but 
don't they also entail the risk of becoming "super-governments" 
that get out of control? Even when the heads and officials of 
regional governments are elected by the people, they generally 
become too engrossed in larger things and become inaccessible. 
Besides, central governments usually impose regional governments 
on local units. In Manila, for example, there is a current debate 
now on whether there should be a Metropolitan Police Command. 
The central government is in favor of this move because it will then 
be able to take power from local units. I think this is wrong. It is 
a violation of the principle of local autonomy which is guaranteed 
in Philippine law. 
SPEAKER: As I said, I am for local autonomy. But it is the 
level that counts - at what level is power to be delegated and/or 
devolved? If the police problem in Manila demands metropolitan-
wide action, then, perhaps, there should be a unified command. 
I don't know the exact situation. All I am saying is that the 
matter should be studied, and proper action should be guided by 
research, not by doctrine. 
Low Cost Housing 
FLOOR: In the paper on Malaysia, it was mentioned that the 
Malaysian Government has built high-rise tenements near the 
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centre of Kuala Lumpur. May we know why this was done? Were 
the tenements successful or unsuccessful? What problems have 
been encountered in constructing and running them? 
SPEAKER: The Malaysian Government has constructed high-rise 
tenements near the centre of Kuala Lumpur because people with 
low income want to live near the centre of the city where their 
jobs are. When the tenements were constructed, the squatters 
who used to occupy the area were moved to temporary tents. 
Then, they were assisted in moving to the tenements when they 
were finished. It is only to be expected, of course, that there will 
be some problems in an undertaking as large as this. For one 
thing, the tenements, even when the most efficient methods of 
construction were used, were still quite expensive. Many former 
squatters could not meet the down payment nor the monthly 
amortization for the units. Many Malays, also, were not used to 
living many stories above the ground. They have been rural 
people and want to be close to the earth. Thus, they preferred to 
live in the kampongs, in their little shacks, rather than in the con-
crete tenements. 
FLOOR: How about racial integration in the tenements? 
SPEAKER: This is a serious problem, and a national agency has 
been created, to find some solutions. As you know, Kuala Lumpur 
is 58 per cent Chinese, 26 per cent Malay, 11 per cent Indian and 
4 per cent others. All these groups have their own culture and 
life style. When you bring them together at very high densities, 
which is the case in the tenements, some problems are sure to arise. 
At present, most of the people living in the tenements are 
Chinese. They are usually the ones who can afford the down 
payment and monthly payments. Also, they are more used to 
apartment living, having had a great deal of experience in this 
by living in the centre of the city. The Malays want to live in 
houses that are airy and close to the ground. They prefer to be 
closer to nature. 
There have been cases of Chinese and Malays living close 
together and they have resulted in complaints and trouble. Malays 
object to the smell of Chinese cooking, for example, especially 
pork smell. Being Muslims, they do not want to smell pork, espe-
cially when they are praying in the evening. Other Chinese customs 
also disturb the Malays - such as their long wakes when some-
body dies, their gambling sessions that last long into the night, 
etc. These may be small things, but they are very irritating to 
Malays who are not used to them. I don't know how we can 
provide solutions to all these problems. In the design of the 
buildings, maybe. Make them soundproof and smellproof. In later 
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buildings, separate social halls and parlours for various groups 
hove been included in the design. But all this will be very costly. 
Besides, the very idea of high density living requires interaction 
among the people, which, hopefully, then develops into a sense 
of community. If the people go their own separate ways, there 
will be little sense of community and the housing projects may 
deteriorate. Perhaps, if we introduce the innovations gradually, 
there will be greater success. 
FLOOR: As mentioned by a previous speaker, one of the main 
problems in low cost housing is how cost con really be mode low 
enough for squatters and slum dwellers to be able to afford them. 
Con you tell us what is being done to solve this problem? 
SPEAKER: Yes, well, one of the most commonly used methods 
for minimizing housing costs is the pre-fabrication of housing com-
ponents and their assembly in prepared housing sites. This works 
well if the housing programme is big enough so that economies 
of scale con be used. It also helps if local materials such as sand, 
grovel, cement, local iron bars, wood, etc. ore used in the process. 
Standardized procedures for manufacture of housing components, 
transportation to construction sites and actual erection of buildings 
ore also most helpful. In other words, there ore many technological 
innovations in construction now available and they should be 
applied to the housing problem. 
FLOOR: Isn't pre-fabrication and moss production a bit ill-
conceived in that it neglects to use the resource which is most 
abundant in the slum and squatter communities? I om referring 
to the men and women living in these communities. They hove 
lots of skills, as shown in the fact that they construct their own 
dwellings. Their main problem is employment. And yet, employ-
ment opportunities ore token away from them because pre-fabrica-
tion methods ore used. 
SPEAKER: You are talking about a different thing, then. The 
participation of the squatters and slum dwellers in the construction 
of housing is a very good idea but it does not necessarily cut down 
costs. It may redistribute the costs, with some of it being shouldered 
by the people and the bulk of it by the housing agency, but the 
total costs themselves may or may not be reduced. In some coun-
tries, such as in the Philippines, Korea and certain countries of Latin 
America, the people themselves hove been involved in housing 
construction through what is coiled "core housing". In some 
resettlement areas outside Manila, the housing agency provides 
the relocated squatter with a half-finished house - with a roof, 
four posts, a hardened floor and a toilet. The squatter or slum 
dweller finishes the house with whatever materials he con afford, 
gradually improving it as his economic status improves. 
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This approach, however, is not used just to cut costs. The 
greater motivation is to help the relocated squatter develop an 
identity with the house, to make him really committed to its im-
provement because he has already invested in it. This is especially 
important in the case of squatters relocated to areas which are 
often not too close to the squatter's place of work, or which do 
not have services and other amenities. If the squatters do not 
become attached to their new houses, they may abandon them. 
This just results in total waste. 
In Seoul, the concept of core housing has been used in the 
construction of what are called "citizen apartments". Unlike in 
Manila, these are high-rise apartments located close to the city 
centre. However, the apartment units are also unfinished - they 
have no partitions, paint and other finishing touches, though water 
and heat are provided. People who buy the apartments are bound 
to improve them - and most of them do so, as their economic 
means make it possible. Unfortunately, in the case of some apart-
ments, the building contractors have cut too many corners. As a 
result some of them have collapsed, killing some occupants. How-
ever, the concept itself is good. As I mentioned, it may or may not 
cut down costs but by distributing the costs between the govern-
ment and the people, things become a bit easier. 
FLOOR: May I mention, also, that in the Philippines, we have 
tried the scheme of "aided self-help" in the construction of low 
income houses,in the Sapang Palay relocation area. Squatters, we 
have found, usually have some construction skills, such as car-
pentry, hollow block making, masonry, etc. These skilled people 
are employed by the government in construction, and they earn 
points for their work. Aside from their pay, which is quite low, the 
people are able to get lumber, hardware fixtures, cement, and 
other things they need for their own homes. In this way, the 
housing agency and the squatters themselves benefit from the use 
of the squatters' skills. 
Private Sector Efforts 
FLOOR; I think that the private sector, too, has a lot to do 
and say about low cost housing. We have been talking here as 
if it were primarily a governmental responsibility. In the com-
munity where I live (a city in the Philippines) a group of school 
teachers got together and set up a housing cooperative. They got 
some housing loans through this cooperative, purchased a piece 
of land, and are now in the process of setting up their own homes. 
The main role of the government here has been providing credit 
and also technical advice. I think if we want commitment, this 
is about the best way of bringing it about. 
175 
SPEAKER: Yes, that's an excellent point. I also want to add 
that in the case of big businesses that set up their factories on the 
city's periphery, it may be a wise idea for them to provide low cost 
housing for their employees. They can certainly get loans from 
the government for this purpose. And even if they have to take 
this service from their own investments, I think it will still be 
worth it. The proximity of the employee's residence to his place of 
work may cut down on tardiness, absenteeism and other problems. 
Employees may also regard the housing as a fringe benefit, that 
creates strong loyalty to the company. 
FLOOR: May I say, at this point, that in many countries, private 
organizations often recognize the slum and squatter problem much 
earlier than the government and that they usually do something 
about it. I represent a Church organization, for example, and our 
Industrial Mission has been working in many parts of the world, 
trying to improve the lot of low income people. We engage in 
vocational training programmes, to give the migrants much needed 
skills, because we see employment as the key problem. The people 
in the slums are not lazy and they do not want to depend on others, 
least of all the government. If you give them a chance to help 
themselves, they really accomplish miraculous results. 
SPEAKER: I agree with the previous speaker when he stressed 
the role of private organizations. However, I have often wondered 
what the net impact has been of these efforts. I am not talking 
about the programmes run by the organization of the previous 
speaker but in my observation, some of the private efforts are 
doing more harm than good. For one thing, they tend to be 
paternalistic - with the private organizer leading the slum and 
squatter people, organizing them, and encouraging them to speak 
out for their rights. Often, this type of activity results in troubles 
such as riots and demonstrations. I realize that the actions are 
motivated by the idea that those in power are either too thick-
headed or too preoccupied to listen to the normal complaints of 
the underprivileged. But, in many cases, the organizers do not 
even try to use the normal channels. They assume they will not 
be listened to, and they make trouble right away. I think this is 
very disruptive and does not accomplish anything so far as 
rational efforts are concerned. 
FLOOR: Mr. Chairman. I am also not talking about the gov-
ernment programme that the previous speaker is working in. Gen-
erally, however, the feeling on the part of squatters that govern-
ment officials will not listen to them is true. It certainly has been 
the case in the communities I have been working in. When we 
first went into this community, we made a survey and asked 
the people what government agencies have been doing in the 
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place, what sort of programmes exist, etc. The overwhelming 
response was nothing. The people said they were aware that 
there were social workers assigned to the community but they 
have not seen them yet. In fact, they don't want to see them 
because they are sure that once the social workers start making 
surveys, this would be a sure sign that relocation is being planned 
by the government. The squatters want government to leave 
them alone. This is why the efforts of private organizations are 
needed because, somehow, services must be extended to these 
people. 
SPEAKER: I agree with the previous speaker that squatters and 
slum dwellers must have access to urban services. Such services, 
however, are usually governmental. Therefore, while private 
organizations may supplement public efforts, we have no choice 
but to seek ways of making such public services available to begin 
with. One of the main problems when dealing with squatters is 
that they don't have a legal existence. They reside on lands 
illegally, and the government, if it is to strictly implement the law, 
should not tolerate this violation of the law - least of all, provide 
services to those who have broken the law. However, I think this 
legalistic reasoning is obsolete. The fact is that the squatters are 
there. Even if you evict them, they will come back. You can 
arrest all of the squatters in Metropolitan Manila but how do you 
jail more than a million people? So, governmental programmes 
must be created to cope with this problem in a new way. 
Sites and Service Approaches 
FLOOR: Somebody has suggested "planned slums" for solving 
the squatter and slum problem. What do you think of this idea? 
SPEAKER: I won't use that term, but I think it is a good idea. 
We in the planning field call it less colorfully as a "sites and service 
approach". Basically, the proposals are the same. The government 
earmarks certain areas in the metropolis as slum or squatter reloca-
tion sites. These sites are parcelled out into house plots, services 
such as roads, water, toilets, school, firefighting and police are 
assured, and then the plots are allocated to former squatters or 
slum dwellers, who build their own homes. Government workers 
assist the people and they insist on certain very minimal standards 
of construction to minimize dangers from fire, epidemics, etc. The 
land may be sold to the squatters at very low prices and with long 
term payment arrangements. Or the government simply assures 
land tenure through long term leases. Studies have shown that 
people are more generally interested in security of tenure, anyway. 
If they feel secure, they will most likely do more to improve their 
houses. 
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FLOOR: Isn't this a very expensive programme? Suppose the 
land is close to the centre of the city and has a very high market 
value? Isn't it more rational to build high-rise houses so you can 
have higher densities? 
SPEAKER: I agree that it is expensive but it is certainly not as 
expensive as high rise buildings. And studies show that densities in 
high rise dwellings are usually lower than in slums and squatter 
areas. In fact, in Singapore, when slum dwellers are transferred 
to high rise units, they say that about a third to a half of the former 
slum dwellers cannot be accommodated in the new units. Also, 
my advocacy of sites and service schemes does not mean that 
the government should not go into other types of housing schemes. 
Sites and service should be seen as only one of a varied set of 
approaches. Certainly, for people who can afford to pay higher 
rents or who have a life style more suited to apartment dwelling, 
high rise buildings should be constructed. However, for people 
who are too poor or who do not want to live :n apartments, sites 
and service or other schemes should be used. 
May I add that another good thing about a site and service 
approach is that it combines the efforts and resources of the people 
themselves with the efforts of the government. This makes for a 
fruitful partnership. To make such a scheme work, the people 
usually have to organize and govern themselves. Surely, in an 
urban environment where there is a great danger of becoming 
apathetic, this is very important. In other words, we are interested 
not only in providing services but in the manner in which such 
services motivate people to do things for themselves. 
Finance 
FLOOR: Almost by definition, the underdeveloped countries 
who have the worst housing problems, are also the ones who can 
least afford expensive programmes. How do you propose to 
finance high rise tenements, sites and service schemes and other 
approaches proposed here? Economists have shown that invest-
ments in housing is highly inflationary. They have argued that 
developing countries should invest in sectors with much higher 
returns to capital than housing. Since the stability of the currency 
of developing countries is always a problem, how do you find 
enough funds for housing without causing a problem, how do 
you find enough for housing without causing inflation? 
SPEAKER: I admit that finance is a limiting factor but the 
problem is not as serious as many economists will make us think. 
Right now, most developing countries devote less than three per 
cent of their Gross National Product for housing. I think this is too 
low. Many of these economies can devote more to housing. 
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Also, considerable debate has raged regarding the question 
of whether investment in housing is inflationary or not. I happen 
to believe that it is not. Economists have a way of setting up their 
accounts in such a way that they measure output in financial cost 
terms. I think this is a mistake. Housing is a social investment. 
It has products which are not only measurable in financial terms. 
Take a newly married man, for example. Let us say he pays 
the down payment on a house and lot. Knowing that he has his 
obligation to pay, he is most likely to exert more effort - work 
longer hours, maybe, take on another job - so he can meet his 
obligations. Having a home to go home to, a palace he is proud 
of, he has higher morale, greater stability, and because of this, 
higher productivity. Surely, all these things are important to 
development. Yet, economists measure only the money invested 
in the house in their national accounts. That is why they say the 
investment is not productive. Not directly, maybe, but in the long 
run home ownership, because of the factors I mentioned above, is 
developmental. 
FLOOR: I am afraid that if we discuss housing finance in these 
grand theoretical terms, we will get nowhere. Will somebody 
please tell me how housing is financed in various countries? 
SPEAKER: Sorry about the theoretical discussions. This is what 
you get with a bunch of professors on the panel. Anyway, the 
most common method of financing housing is to use the capital 
funds which are readily available to the government through its 
financial institutions. Some countries, such as Japan and Korea, 
have National Housing Banks, with capital stocks provided by the 
central government or borrowed from international lending 
agencies such as the World Bank. Other countries, like the Philip-
pines, use some of the funds of the Government Service Insurance 
System and the Social Security System for housing loans. Resorting 
to the open market for capital funds is rarely done, mainly because 
of the economists' argument that investing such "expensive funds" 
in housing is not very developmental. You see, there is no escaping 
that line of thinking because it is still a major influence on financial 
policy. 
In some countries, funds for housing are taken directly from 
the proceeds of specific taxes. In many Latin American countries 
it is said that the housing industry is paid for by drunkards because 
a percentage of tax on alcoholic beverages is usually allotted for 
housing. In other countries, a percentage of the net income of 
local governments is earmarked for capitalization of the housing 
bank. In these countries, the central government sets up a credit 
institution for local authorities with shared funds, and the local 
units then pursue housing programmes with borrowings from this 
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institution. Of course, the capital funds are not used for housing 
alone. Long term capital investments are also financed through 
loans from such institutions. 
FLOOR: How about savings and loans associations? Housing 
cooperatives? Do you think these will work in the developing 
countries? 
SPEAKER: I am sorry to say that although these schemes have 
worked well in the technologically advanced countries, they do not 
seem to have been too successful in developing countries. Perhaps, 
a certain cultural atmosphere is needed to make them work. The 
habit of saving must be inculcated into the minds of people first. 
Also, there seems to be a need for trust in financial institutions and 
in cooperative efforts. Strangely enough, in almost all developing 
countries, there are traditions of cooperation such as the Philippine 
bayanihan, the Indonesian gotong rojong, the Turkish imece, etc. 
Yet, when these traditions are used for financial cooperatives, they 
do not thrive as easily. Perhaps, when money comes into con-
sideration, when people are talking hard cash, it is hard to be 
positively emotional and warm and cooperative. I don't know. All 
I know is that for small activities, cooperative traditional institu-
tions work fine. But when they are used for large housing schemes, 
they somehow break down. 
Land Policies 
FLOOR: Speaking of traditional values, what do you think 
of the belief that people in developing countries love land so much 
that they are willing to pay high prices? In most developing coun-
tries, speculation has driven the price of urban land so high that 
it adds to costs. Would you advocate a policy of taxing idle lands? 
SPEAKER: Yes, I would, but not mainly for financial reasons. 
The real reason for taxing unused land is to penalize speculation 
and to reward land use. In too many countries, tax rates are based 
on improvements on the land. This may have an inhibiting effect 
on the developer. But I would go further than just taxing land - I 
think that a more comprehensive policy is needed. Certainly, 
urban land reform is as important, if not more important, than 
rural land reform. 
In many developing countries, huge tracts of land in the 
urban area are often owned by single individuals, institu-
tions or business people. Considering the high value of such land, 
there should be a conscious government policy to break up such 
monopolies. In fact, urban development has been rational where 
the government has owned more land in urban areas. Stockholm 
is an excellent example of this. I doubt if the city would have 
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been able to cope with its problems as rationally as it has, if 
the city fathers had lacked the foresight to buy up as much land 
as possible when this land was still cheap. 
FLOOR: Isn't this problem only true in the case of market econo-
mies, though? This doesn't seem to be a problem at all in socialist 
countries where the government owns all the land to begin with. 
Yet, a previous speaker has said that the problems in these coun-
tries are just as serious. 
SPEAKER: From the planners' viewpoint, I would say that, yes, 
the socialist countries do have less of a problem when it comes 
to the rational use of land. However, this is not to say they do not 
have urban problems. Essentially, whether the land is owned by 
the government or by private individuals, there must be some way 
of putting some value on it - and admittedly, it is often a very 
inaccurate device. In planned economies, there are other devices 
being developed and used such as scarcity factors, type of land 
use, etc. But there must be a way of measuring the value of the 
land in the total context or it will be impossible to allocate land 
use rationally. 
FLOOR: In some developing countries, the question has been 
raised that land in urban areas is so valuable that it is almost 
criminal to have certain sectors controlling it. land is a public 
resource. It should belong to the people. There is no justice when 
a rich man uses more land than he needs while others live in con-
ditions of misery. What do you think of these arguments? 
SPEAKER: I agree that in many developing countries, the 
concept of private ownership of land should be reconsidered. But I 
would not go to the extent of nationalizing land or confiscating 
it from private owners. I believe that the government should try 
to buy the lands in whatever manner possible. Through expropria-
tion, perhaps, using fair market value, assessed value, or some 
such formula which is fair and just. Then, the government should 
rationally plan the use of land to achieve its development goals. 
Slum Clearance 
FLOOR: I have been listening to all the discussions since the 
start of this Open Forum and frankly, I am disturbed. Everybody 
speaks of fairness and justice and how we should help the 
squatter and slum dweller. Has anybody thought of fairness and 
justice to the landowner? There is this person, he has worked very 
hard, and he has done quite well. He buys himself some land, 
hoping to save enough later to build his own home. What happens? 
When he is ready to do so, he finds that somebody else has 
squatted on it. He goes to the police, they cannot do anything. 
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They will not do anything. The politician supports the squatters -
he has their votes. So, what is this person to do? 
I believe in justice, and justice says that if some people are 
occupying somebody else's land illegally, the government must 
protect the owner's rights. The late Mayor Lacson of Manila and 
the present Mayor have done the right thing. They have evicted 
the squatters from city lands with court orders behind them. I 
think there should be more of this. Perhaps, when squatters know 
that the government can deal with them in a tough and firm 
manner, they will be less aggressive in grabbing what is not right-
fully theirs. 
SPEAKER: I sympathize with the previous speaker. He has 
hit upon a very sensitive aspect of the question we are all discuss-
ing now. I must say, at the outset, that I agree with his idea that 
justice must be upheld. But the process used to do this must be 
a well thought-out one, so that it does not result in more injustice. 
For example, when the Mayors of Manila evicted squatters from 
the central city, what happened? We all know that it did not solve 
the problem. It just transferred it somewhere else. The squatters 
were relocated to Sapang Palay, Carmona and other relocation 
sites that are far from the central city. So, they just drifted back 
to the city. Instead of solving the problem, the slum clearance 
scheme only spread it. Now, we don't have slums and squatters in 
Manila alone - they are in Quezon City, Caloocan City, Makati, 
and all over the metropolitan area. 
In Taiwan, the government has a slogan: "Build First, Demolish 
Later." If we had something like this, if we had planned the 
relocation process properly, provided land or housing where the 
evicted squatters could have been placed first, then, perhaps, we 
would not have had the confusion in Metropolitan Manila. This is 
the problem. We tend to think of the problem in bits and pieces. 
There ore squatters in one area, evict them. That solves one 
problem. But it leads to other problems, and we don't have solu-
tions that anticipate those. 
I am not against slum clearance as a matter of principle. 
There are many areas in the central city which are too valuable 
to be devoted to housing, any type of housing. It is more rational 
to devote them to commercial or other uses where they will be more 
productive. However, before this is done, before the squatters on 
these lands are removed, there must be provisions for housing 
which they will like, or at least find tolerable, so that the solution 
used will have lasting results. If we only disperse the squatters 
so that we can use the land, then this does not solve the problem. 
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As for the question of justice, I doubt if we will ever really 
have justice in a society where a large segment of the population 
is living at sub-human conditions. It is no solution to appeal to 
laissez faire and say that I worked hard for my land, I have a 
right to use and enjoy it. If you work hard enough, then you can 
get your land too, and I will not interfere with you if you don't 
meddle with my business. It is too late for that. In a very real 
sense, every man is his brother's keeper now. Desperate people 
will resort to desperate means, and some squatters are desperate. 
So, the total resources of the society must be used to solve its 
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The International Association for Metropolitan Research and 
Development (INTERMET) is a network of Study Groups all over 
the world bound by a common interest in the development of the 
Metropolis, a belief in the effectiveness of multi-interest groups 
in coping with urban problems and in cross-cultural exchanges of 
ideas and information in the field of urban affairs. There are about 
40 Study Groups which are members of the association. They are 
served by a Secretariat located in Toronto, Canada. 
The Study Groups that make up the association are composed 
of individuals who are interested in the Metropolis - its problems 
and potentials for development. Study Group members are govern-
ment officials, professionals, academics, businessmen, civic leaders 
and other concerned citizens. They are interested in research on 
metropolitan affairs, the translation of information to policy, and 
the pursuit of action programmes that improve conditions in the 
Metropolis. The multi-interest nature of the Study Groups is 
uniquely suited for combining these efforts into a concerted pro-
gramme of activities. 
INTERMET conducts research projects on problems common to 
metropolitan areas, acts as an information network for the 
exchange of ideas, approaches, methods and techniques for solving 
metropolitan problems, performs advisory and consultation services 
for member Study Groups, and disseminates information about the 
state of metropolitan affairs. These functions are oriented to the 
major metropolitan areas of the world. The Association serves 
as a link among these metropolitan areas, which share common 
problems as well as similar developmental prospects. 
Origin 
To commemorate Canada's Centennial in 1967, the Bureau of 
Municipal Research of Toronto decided to hold an international 
programme that would bring together the largest metropolitan 
areas in the world in a discussion of common problems and solu-
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tions. The "Centennial Study and Training Programme on Metro-
politan Problems" brought to Toronto some 40 Groups from as 
many metropolitan areas. After the international conference 
which climaxed the programme, there was unanimous agreement 
that a continuing organization is needed so that the work started 
in the programme may be pursued further. This organization, form-
ally established in 1969, is the International Association for Metro-
politan Research and Development. 
Structure 
The basic unit of INTERMET is the Study Group which is com-
posed of persons representing various disciplines and who are all 
concerned about the problems and future of the Metropolis. The 
groups are formed on a metropolitan basis. Metropolitan areas 
that they represent are generally those that have a population of a 
million or more. 
A central Secretariat located in Toronto serves the Study Groups 
that make up the association. For the initial period of developing 
the international organization, the Secretariat was located within 
the Toronto Bureau of Municipal Research. However, since the 
granting of a charter to INTERMET in 1970, the Secretariat is now 
independent of the Bureau. 
The highest deliberative body of INTERMET is the General 
Council, which is composed of the chairmen of the Study Groups 
from all over the world. The Council lays down the basic policies 
of INTERMET, makes sure that such policies are properly imple-
mented, and reviews the programmes of the organization from 
time to time. 
Directly responsible to the General Council and acting for and 
on its behalf is the Executive Committee composed of about 14 
persons drawn from member Study Groups, representatives of 
major financial sponsors and authorities on metropolitan affairs. 
The Executive Committee is responsible for the continuous opera-
tion of the association and has direct supervision and control over 
the central Secretariat. Representation in the Execuive Committee 
is both world-wide and inter-disciplinary. 
Associate Membership in INTERMET is granted to international 
organizations, universities, research institutions and other entities 
interested in metropolitan affairs. Acceptability of such organiza-
tions as associate members rests with the Executive Committee. 
Functions 
To achieve its general objective of finding ways and means 
of coping with metropolitan problems, INTERMET conducts joint 
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research projects, acts as a network for information exchange and 
makes available consultation and advice to member Study Groups 
on metropolitan affairs. In the performance of these functions, the 
organization is supported by the central Secretariat which is com-
posed of professional and technical persons from various cultural 
and academic backgrounds. 
Research-Action Projects 
In its research projects, INTERMET believes in a methodology 
that combines research and action. Such projects are almost always 
focused on key policy issues. The data gathf1red from them are im-
mediately translated into policy proposals and action programmes, 
for the adoption and implementation of public bodies that can help 
improve metropolitan conditions. The fact that the INTERMET 
Study Groups are composed of persons from academic and govern-
mental sectors makes them uniquely suited for this function. The 
research findings are immediately made available to public officials 
who are in the Study Groups, for possible action. In this manner, 
the Study Group acts as an informal coordination point for govern-
mental actions affecting the Metropolis. 
Some of the research-action projects currently being, or about 
to be undertaken by INTERMET are: 
Project A. Rural-Urban Migrants and Metropolitan Develop-
ment. A comparative study of eight metropolitan areas that have 
migrants who live in slums and squatter settlements. Some of the 
issues being studied in this project are: reasons behind rural-urban 
migration, the nature of the slum or squatter community, func-
tions served by the slum or squatter community, problems posed 
by rapid migration, etc. Metropolitan areas participating in this 
project are: Bandung, Indonesia; Caracas, Venezuela; Ibadan, 
Nigeria; Istanbul, Turkey; Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia; Lima, Peru; 
Manila, Philippines; and Seoul, Korea. 
Project S. The Quality of Life in the Urban Environment. A com-
parative study to find out how the quality of life may be improved 
in metropolitan areas by looking at a broad framework which 
includes man and his relations with his environment, technology, 
institutions, society, etc. Some of the issues to be studied are: pollu-
tion of water, air, soil and other segments of the urban environ-
ment; inequalities in the level of urban living; crime, vice, drug 
addiction and juvenile delinquency; planning and urban design; 
education, training and reshaping of human values; and man and 
his institutional environment. Metropolitan areas invited to par-
ticipate in this project are: Belgrade, Yugoslavia; Buenos Aires, 
Argentina; Leningrad, USSR; Madrid, Spain; Philadelphia, USA; 
Prague, Czechoslovakia; and Toronto, Canada. 
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Project C. Improving Decision-Making in the Metropolitan 
Region. A comparative study that attempts to improve decision-
making capabilities in urban regions by looking into the relative 
effectiveness of certain management approaches. The study seeks 
to develop a suitable approach for top executives and decision-
makers that will enable them to assess the options available to 
them as well as the costs and benefits entailed in each choice. 
Some of the management approaches to be studied are: informa-
tion technology, social accounting, systems analysis approaches 
and operations research techniques. Metropolitan areas partici-
pating in this project are: Athens, Greece; Budapest, Hungary; 
Detroit, USA; Glasgow, UK; Naples, Italy; Nagoya, Japan; and 
Vancouver, Canada. 
Project D. Problems of Megalopolis. A comparative study of 
the prospects and problems of administering very large urban 
areas, especially in regard to providing amenities and services 
coping with area-wide problems such as pollution and transporta-
tion, and making effective decisions under conditions of political 
and administratve fragmentation. Some of the issues to be studied 
include: the effects of scale on programmes for providing ameni-
ties and services; implications of large and complex institutions 
on citizen participation, community identity and access to decision-
making centres; and the place of the metropolis in comprehensive 
regional and national development plans. Metropolitan areas 
invited to participate in this study are London, UK; Moscow, USSR; 
New York, USA; Paris, France; and Tokyo, Japan. 
Project E. The Implementation of Plans and Policies in Metro-
politan Regions. A comparative study of the factors that affect the 
process of implementing plans and policies designed to improve 
conditions in Metropolitan regions. Some of the issues to be 
studied in this project include: the role of social and political 
factors in plan and policy implementation; administrative tools and 
techniques that facilitate implementation; the value of participation 
in plan formulation and implementation; and inter-governmental 
relations in plan and policy implementation. Metropolitan areas 
invited to participate in this project are: Boston, USA; Karachi, 
Pakistan; Milan, Italy; Rio de Janeiro, Brazil; and Singapore. 
Information Services 
To serve the Study Groups and to maintain communication with 
other entities involved in metropolitan affairs, INTERMET provides 
two broad types of information services. The first type extends 
secondary information services to groups and other INTERMET 
associates and the second type involves INTERMET publications. 
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Both types of services are designed to inform the association and 
its clientele on what, where and how information on metropolitan 
development is made available around the world. 
Secondary Information System. Four basic areas of services 
are included in INTERMET's secondary information system. First, 
in INTERMET's specialized Library in the Toronto Secretariat, collec-
tions are being set up on the specific projects and research pro-
grammes that INTERMET is engaged in. Such holdings are avail-
able to INTERMET Study Groups and other interested parties. 
Second, INTERMET maintains a working file on institutions that 
provide information on metropolitan affairs. A questionnaire is 
regularly sent by INTERMET to such institutions to keep an up to 
date listing which is periodically evaluated and revised to enter 
the latest information on such information centres. INTERMET 
also keeps a working file on individuals who are engaged in 
research, consultation and other types of activities related to metro-
politan affairs. The interest, competence and availability of such 
individuals for various tasks is evaluated and such information 
is made avaikible to Study Groups. Finally, INTERMET keeps 
abreast of special events such as conferences, training pro-
grammes, lecture series, and other activities related to metro-
politan affairs to make sure that the association's members are 
well informed on the type, quality, timing and other aspects of 
such special events. 
Publications. As a regular channel for getting in touch with 
INTERMET members and associates, the organization publishes the 
Communique, a quarterly newsletter. This organ provides informa-
tion on what is happening in the different metropolitan areas 
linked with INTERMET, Secretariat doings, and special events of 
importance to people interested in metropolitan affairs. 
INTERMET also publishes the INTERMET Metropolitan Studies 
Series, a series on serious works on metropolitan affairs. 
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